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Abstract 
Since the establishment of China stock markets in early 1990s, two thirds of 
China domestic shares were held by the central government or their 
representatives and only about one third were issued to the public investors. 
Government shares were not allowed to be traded publicly while the 
otherwise identical shares were freely-traded. This unique split share 
structure can lead to conflicts of interest between tradable and non-tradable 
shareholders and has been recognized as the source of many corporate 
governance problems in China. In early 2001, the Government 
unsuccessfully decided to sell its ownership of the listed enterprises as the 
market collapsed under severe price pressure. In 2005, China Government 
launched Full-Circulation Reform to convert the non-tradable government 
shares into traded shares. The event consisted of a series of sub-events, 
including announcement of macro policies and subsequent firm-specific 
decisions. China Full-Circulation Reform was set to protect the interests of 
minority shareholders by (1) allowing companies to devise their own 
proposals which took in opinions from both the holders of non-tradable and 
tradable domestic shares; (2) requiring the owners of non-tradable 
government shares paying Consideration to the owners of tradable domestic 
shares to compensate them for any anticipated loss; and (3) imposing some 
restrictions on the sale of government shares. In this thesis the event-study 
method is employed to investigate the effect of China Full-Circulation 
Reform on China stock markets. In particular, whether the scheme was fair 
to both tradable and non-tradable shareholders and what factors were 
important in the outcome. The results suggest that the procedure taken by 
the Government to protect the minority interests in the reform was 
successful with the tradable shareholders not losing in the reform. And the 
main objective of maintaining the market stability while floating the 
non-tradable government shares had been successfully achieved.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
This thesis investigates empirically the impact of the Chinese stock market 
reform --- liberalizing non-tradable shares to be tradable --- on the market. 
The investigation is made on the basis of an institutional research and the 
event-based statistical method. The former research helps to characterize 
qualitatively the policy plan and institutional path to carry out the 
liberalization or “the Full Circulation Reform” --- over the period from 2002 
to 2007. The event study in the latter part explores quantitatively how the 
market responded to the reform policy in terms of market behavior in 
pricing assets. The study claims that the Full Circulation Reform is 
successful for its planned achievement of the policy objective to protect 
small shareholders. This explains largely why the reform is well perceived 
by the market that values its policy and the measures taken to implement the 
reform policy. The contribution of the finding is original and significant to 
the existing literature from the perspective of both applied financial studies 
on the market impact of events and the understanding of the Chinese stock 
market and its development.  
This study is divided into eight chapters.  
Chapter One is the introduction to the whole research. 
Chapter Two introduces the institutional development of China stock 
markets in the context of the overall Chinese reform since 1978 when the 
3rd Plenum of the 11th Party Congress announced the official prelude to the 
China economic reform.  
Since the founding of P.R. China in 1949, the first thirty years featured a 
full-planned economy system in which the Government controlled all major 
sectors of the economy and formulated all decisions about the use of 
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resources and the distribution of output. Planners decided what should be 
produced and direct lower-level enterprises to produce those goods in 
accordance with national and social objectives. SOE executives were 
appointed and dismissed by the Government and usually treated as 
Government officials.  
After the 3rd Plenum in 1978, China began to move from a centrally 
planned economic system to a market-oriented system. China SOE reform is 
a centerpiece of the overall reform. Enterprises have been gradually given 
more and more autonomy to take control of themselves, dealing with 
relevant rights and responsibilities. From 1979 to 1993 the Government 
gave SOEs responsibility for dealing with their own gains in the market but 
SOEs were not fully responsible for the losses. The managers didn’t worry 
about bankruptcy as they believed the Government was a convenient resort. 
The rights and responsibilities of SOE stakeholders and management were 
ill-defined.  
The 14th Party Congress in 1992 decided to construct a socialist market 
economy and establish a modern corporate system. China SOEs were 
privatised through restructuring and selling. China stock markets were used 
to privatise selected strong medium and large-sized SOEs through share 
issuance. The emergence of China stock markets is actually the fourth stage 
of China SOE reform process.  
China stock markets, consisted of Shenzhen Stock Exchange and Shanghai 
Stock Exchange (SHSE and SZSE), have been growing rapidly since the 
inception. The listed firms issued three types of shares: tradable A shares 
(TAS) available uniquely to domestic investors, tradable B shares (TBS) 
available uniquely to foreign investors and non-tradable A shares (NTAS) 
retained by the Government in terms of state shares and legal-person shares. 
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NTAS were allowed to transfer off-market. This classification of share types 
in effect has created three segmented markets where TAS, TBS and NTAS 
could be traded separately without mutual interference and thus valued at 
differential prices.  
The People’s Bank of China (PBoC) worked as the regulatory agency in 
1980s to supervise the share-issuance but resulted in a chaotic security 
market. The lack of an efficient regulatory framework stimulated the 
Government to set up the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
as a regulatory authority, hoping to put the security markets under an 
efficient centralized supervision and setting up an efficient regulatory 
framework.  
The listed SOEs sold averagely one third of the total shares outstanding, 
which is called partial privatisation.  
The valuation and size differences between the TAS and NTAS indicate the 
private investors were very much sensitive to the increase in P/B ratio and 
worried about their interests as the minority shareholders. Therefore there 
was call from them to full privatise the listed firms. Furthermore, the 
dramatic expansion of private household savings also highlighted the 
demand of diversified investment opportunities which can be realised 
through full privatisation. 
Chapter Three introduces the first attempt by the government in 2001 to sell 
NTA and the aftermath. Also studies and thoughts on this particular topic 
have been explored to draw useful lessons from this failure.  
The first attempt by China Government to reduce state-shares was marked 
by Measures (2001)
1
 which tended to use the revues to replenish NSSF. 
                                               
1 Provisional Measures for Raising Funds for NSSF from Divestiture of SOE Assets, issued by the 
CSRC in 2001.  
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Though carried out in a favorable macro-economic environment, this initial 
attempt was responded with a market plummet, which lasted for a quite long 
period, indicating the confidence of investors in the A-share market was 
damaged severely in the short-run and failed to recover even in the long-run. 
This plan therefore scraped in 2002.  
The minority private investors, who only possessed relatively one third of 
the total shares outstanding in the listed firms, dominated the tradable 
A-share market. The 2001 announcement of floating state shares in majority 
to the tradable A-share market agitated the investors. Neither were they 
happy with the scheme of equal pricing as they believed the state shares 
were overvalued. Moreover, the uncertainties over when this would happen 
and how many would be sold also fretted the investors.  
This unsuccessful attempt indicates that a premise to carry on the reform of 
reducing state ownership is to take into account the interests of the private 
investors namely the holders of TAS, to communicate with them effectively 
and to make compromise if necessary.  
Chapter Four introduces the preparation work done and the scheme 
designed during the Full Circulation Reform in full details. 
This time, the State Council drew a blueprint for reforming the country’s 
capital markets, emphasizing the reforming firms should respect market 
rules and protect the interests of minority public shareholders. The reform 
was conducted gradually step by step.  
The China Government launched the reform on April 29 2005 to sell 
non-tradable A shares, mainly owned by the Government, on the A-share 
markets. Under the trial guidelines issued on 8th May by the CSRC, two 
pilot groups consisting of 4 and 42 firms respectively were announced on 
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9th May and 20th June. Firms were invited to develop plans to allow 
non-tradable A-share holders to sell their shares, subject to negotiation with 
tradable A-share holders on an appropriate reform plan (mainly about a 
compensation level and trading restrictions). By 19th August, all of these 
companies had reached a consensus on proposal, and on 24th August, the 
Government issued formal guidelines to extend this reform scheme to the 
rest of the market. By the end of 2006, a total of 64 groups in addition to the 
pilot groups were announced, involving 1245 companies.  
From a firm-specific view, a plan was firstly proposed by the holders of 
non-tradable A-share and then submitted to the Board of Directors. If 
accepted, the plan was announced and simultaneously a suspension from the 
stock market was applied to the firm. Following a negotiation between the 
holders of tradable A-shares and non-tradable shares, a plan agreement was 
filed and announced and trading was resumed. The plan was voted in the 
Shareholders’ meeting. In general, another suspension was applied to the 
firm the same day when the meeting registered its shareholders. Once voted 
through, trading was resumed again when the approved plan was announced. 
Otherwise, trading was kept suspending.  
The overall event is confounding and consisted of a series of sub-events, 
including macro policies and subsequent firm-specific decisions under the 
influence of the policies. 
The 2005 reform program didn’t impose a one-fit-all solution and instead 
allowed companies to come up with their own proposals which took in 
opinions from both the holders of non-tradable shares and tradable shares. 
There was a lock-up of non-tradable shares in the first 12 months after the 
reform plan was authorised, and after the lock-up period, a maximum sale as 
a percentage of total shares outstanding within a certain period was imposed. 
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Most importantly, the owners of non-tradable shares were required to pay 
Consideration to the owners of tradable-shares to compensate them for any 
estimated loss in the aftermath. The successful pilot program was then 
extended to the rest firms which subsequently reformed in orderly groups.  
Chapter Five introduces the literature on event-study method, reviewing the 
development in the structure of an event study and important improvements 
in parameter estimation and statistics.  
Assuming market efficiency, event-study method is used to measure the 
event effect on stock prices. Next the market efficiency literature is 
reviewed, with a focus on China stock market efficiency. There is evidence 
China stock markets are at least weak-form efficient.  
China attempted to reduce state shares in June 2001 but failed due to the 
subsequent market crash. A few articles discussed this issue. Calomiris et al. 
(2010) suggested that the political benefits associated with the state 
ownership outweighed the benefits from private ownership. However the 
low R square cast doubt on their conclusions. Their conclusions implied that 
the holder of B shares on the China stock market should receive 
compensation as the holder of A shares during China’s FCR, which was 
actually abandoned by China Government.  
Finally there are few qualified studies on China’s FCR, indicating this event 
hasn’t been investigated properly and further research in depth is needed. 
Chapter Six introduces the research design for an event study on China 
Full-Circulation Reform, including selecting critical event dates and sample, 
identifying hypotheses for each event selected, justifying the use of market 
model to estimate normal returns and the application of uniform estimation 
period to estimate model parameters, illustrating suitable statistic tests for 
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hypotheses testing, and defining regression hypotheses and relevant 
variables. In order to investigate the impact of China Full-Circulation 
Reform on China stock markets, event-study method is used to measure the 
event’s economic impact constructed using security prices observed over a 
relatively short time period, assuming market efficiency in China. The 
research design follows a classic design of event-study analysis in Campell 
et al. (1997): (1) to define the event of interest and the event window, (2) to 
determine the selection criteria for the inclusion of a given firm in the study, 
(3) to model the normal returns so as to measure the abnormal returns, (4) to 
define an estimation period to estimate the parameters of the normal 
performance model, and (5) to design the testing framework for the 
abnormal returns. Binder (1998) pointed out the estimated abnormal returns 
for the sample firms were frequently used as the dependent variable in a 
regression with firm specific variables on the right hand side, indicating a 
sixth step: (6) to regress estimated abnormal returns against potential 
factors.  
Chapter Seven presents the results from the event-study and regression 
analysis, which show that the Full Circulation Reform is very successful by 
triggering an overall move-up of 9% on the markets and this success is 
mainly due to the reform policy to protect minority TAS owners, the lessons 
learnt from the failed attempt in 2001.  
Chapter Eight summarises and concludes the whole thesis. A complete 
picture is depicted. The contributions are highlighted. The contribution of 
the finding is original and significant to the existing literature from the 
perspective of both applied financial studies on the market impact of events 
and the understanding of the Chinese stock market and its development.  
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Chapter 2. China Stock Markets 
The emergence of China’s capital markets began with issuance of state 
treasury bonds in 1981 and state-enterprises corporate bonds to employees 
in 1984. Some state enterprises were also allowed to issue stocks to their 
employees. In the late 1980s, as part of state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform 
that took place during China’s gradual transition to a market economy, local 
Governments in China started experimenting with selling shares of 
collectively owned enterprises directly to domestic individuals in order to 
raise equity capital. Curbed trading of enterprise shares soon began and was 
quickly followed by over-the-counter (OTC) trading in more organized but 
still informal exchanges. The capital markets were not well shaped until the 
formal establishment of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) on December 
19, 1990, and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) on July 3, 1991. Since 
then, these two Chinese stock markets have developed rapidly and become 
one of the most important emerging markets in the world.  
2.1 China State-Owned Enterprises Reform and the Development of 
China Stock Markets 
The development of China Stock Markets is inevitably interrelated with 
China’s SOE reform, a center piece of the overall China economic reform. 
The China stock markets are managed by the state for the state-owned firms 
to raise pubilc funds to support the growth of state companies (Green and 
Liu 2005). In effect, the China stock markets have been helping the 
privatisation of China SOEs and represented the current stage of China SOE 
reform process.  
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2.1.1 Economic reform in China 
The overall China economic restructuring process started with the third 
Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 
December 1978, with an aim to move the country from the fully-planned 
economy to the market economy. There are two approaches adopted in 
transition economies to change from centrally planned economy to a free 
market. Countries in Eastern Europe adopted the Shock Therapy (or Big 
Bang) approach which modeled a transition advocating the immediate 
implementation of the necessary reforms to establish a free market economy. 
The shock therapy derived its named from Poland's stabilization and 
liberalization program initiated on January 1, 1990 and was also applied in 
Czechoslovakia (starting January 1991), Bulgaria (February 1991), Russia 
(February 1992), Albania (July 1992), Estonia (September 1992), and 
Latvia (June 1993). In contrast, since the very start of the China economic 
reform in1978, China has taken a gradual cautious approach, which was 
praised by many researchers as one of the key reasons for China’s success in 
setting up a market economy (Sinchen 1997). Kazakevitch et al. (2005) 
argued that China reform was gradual in macroeconomic sphere but sharp in 
the microeconomic sphere in terms of “the boldness of the reforms and the 
rapidity of the changes China has made in moving to a market economy, 
which has exceeded that attempted in most countries”.  
2.1.2 China SOE reform 
For more than 30 years after 1949, China was a centrally planned economy 
in which virtually all enterprises were state owned or collectively owned. 
China SOE reform is one major component of the overall China economic 
restructuring process which is gradually moving from the planned system 
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towards the free-market system. As suggested in Liu and Gao (1999), the 
process consists of four stages: 
Profit retention 
The first stage ran from 1979 to 1983 with the major goal of administrative 
decentralisation and profit retention (fangquan rangli). Instead of 
centralizing all production and capital allocation decisions as under the old 
system, a pilot reform program on the expansion of enterprise autonomy 
was started in late 1978 and SOEs were allowed to retain 3% of their profits 
so that there were incentives to improve productivity and efficiency. 
Fangquan rangli brought the undesirable consequence of motivating SOEs 
to bargain with or to hide profits from the Government, causing 
Government revenue to decline. The central Government’s revenues 
decreased steadily relative to gross domestic product (GDP), falling from 
31.2 percent in 1978 to 15.8 percent in 1989. Showing a deficit of 17.06 
billion yuan in 1979, the Government did not achieve a small surplus until 
1985.  
Tax application and bank financing 
The second stage of reform ran from 1983 to 1987. In order to solve the 
revenue reduction out of Fangquan rangli, the Government took two 
measures. First, SOEs were required to pay taxes instead of turning in 
profits (ligaishui) so no more bargaining on profit sharing is necessary. 
Second, the funding for SOE capital investments, instead of centrally 
planned and funded by Government fiscal grants, had to come through bank 
loans. In other words, bank loans (bank financing) replaced Government 
allocation (budgetary financing) to fund SOEs (bogaidai). This policy 
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relieved the Government’s financial burden and made SOEs more cautious 
in their use of capital. 
Unfortunately, this eventually led to the huge ‘‘triangular debt2’’ problem 
(chain debt) that has plagued SOE reform all along. This refers to the fact 
that a great number of SOEs are in debt to one another. The causes are 
complicated. The lack of discipline on management is one of the concerns. 
The average total debt ratio of SOEs was as high as 67.9% in 1994 (Wu, 
1997). In the mid-1990s, state-owned banks, as a main funding of SOEs, 
had a rate of nonperforming loans as high as 40% (Wong and Wong 2001).  
Yet, the policies of ligaishui and bogaidai did not help much. Effectively, 
SOEs used their money to pay the bank interest instead of Government 
taxes. In Chinese accounting, interests (or financial charges) are paid out of 
operating income. Furthermore, they now had an incentive to declare no 
profit or low profits. The Government ended up collecting much less 
revenue.  
Contractual responsibility system 
These factors led to the implementation of the Contractual Responsibility 
System (chengbaozhi). The Government gave SOEs a free hand to run their 
operations. Hiring and Firing authority were devolved down to enterprise 
managers and in return, SOEs had to promise a certain amount of tax to the 
Government. This marked the third stage of the reform process (1987–1992) 
that focused on the separation of Government ownership from control of 
SOE’s operations. Because firms could retain funds earned above this tax 
quota, an incentive to engage in profit-making activities was created.  
                                               
2 Triangle debt is a big headache in transition economies.  
12 
 
However, the SOEs’ obligation was on the profit side, not on the loss side. 
SOEs were not fully responsible for their losses and the managers didn’t 
worry about the threat of bankruptcy.  
Meanwhile Lin et al. (1998) pointed out China SOEs were mainly 
capital-intensive heavy industries whose products with strategic importance 
were purposely suppressed in price to facilitate national development plan, - 
in other words, the production were not sold at the market price, rather there 
were administrated prices -, and were meanwhile burdened with all social 
benefits of their employees. In addition, China SOEs were confronted with 
fierce competition from the non-Government firms, which were free of the 
problems that SOEs had and were beneficial from the preferential policies 
of the economic reform. According to Cao et al. (1999), in 1994, close to 
half of the SOEs were loss makers.  
Privatisation 
The party decided to go one step further in the 14th Party Congress in 
October 1992 which announced the target of constructing a socialist market 
economy and establishing a modern enterprise system. This announcement 
spearheaded the fourth stage of the SOE reform and led to the policy of 
Zhuada fangxiao (grasping the large and letting go the small). Zhuada 
fangxiao has successfully privatised the failing and smaller SOEs through 
restructuring, selling and mergers while selected some relatively strong 
medium and large-sized SOEs to be transformed into publicly listed firms 
on the stock market, namely share issue privatisation (SIP). During the 
period, private household savings surged in spite of the budget deficits 
relative to GDP while there was a lack of diversified investments other than 
the bank savings. China stock markets were supposed to facilitate the 
mobilisation of private savings to finance SOEs as an alternative investment 
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to savings and to improve the performance of SOEs through SIP (Wong 
2006). China SOEs sold an average of one-third of the total shares 
outstanding on the stock markets.  
Unlike open market economies where equity financing involves the 
exchange of control and cash flow rights over assets for a certain amount of 
capital that is determined by market valuation, China’s stock market has at 
least three institutional peculiarities that provided additional rents to be 
captured through equity financing and thus create special incentive to issue 
shares and raise funds from the market. First, China’s stock market operated 
in a financially repressed regime in which enterprises faced artificially low 
capital costs. As argued by Gordon and Li (2003), raising funds from 
China’s stock market has been equivalent to the central government 
implicitly allocating taxes. As a result, local governments and enterprises 
have a strong incentive for equity financing in order to capture the economic 
rents created by such financial repression. Second, state ownership itself is 
associated with a greater tendency toward equity financing. Unlike private 
owners, state owners are not real owners but are rather bureaucrats who are 
unable to capture directly and entirely the cash flows that can be derived 
from state assets (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). The absence of or at least the 
incomplete cash flow rights for state owners implies that their valuation of a 
given asset tends to be lower than that of private owners who enjoy both 
control and cash flow rights (Li and Wong 2004). The lower valuation 
assigned by state owners in turn implies that they are more willing, when 
compared with private owners, to sell a given asset for a given price. 
Therefore, the incomplete property rights of state ownership create a special 
incentive for equity financing. Thirdly in China, many controlling 
shareholders treated listed enterprises as cash cows from which they can 
benefit at the expense of minority shareholders. Documented abuses by 
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controlling shareholders include obtaining soft loans from listed firms; using 
listed firms as guarantors to borrow money from banks; and buying and 
selling goods, services, and assets at unfair prices (Tenev and Zhang 2002; 
World Bank 1997). Green and Liu (2005) further argues that legal 
protection for shareholders in China improved little in the 1990s because the 
regulators were under political interference for the local governments that 
wanted to maintain a low level of legal protection for the average 
shareholders to allow listed SOEs to reap the benefits of expropriations 
created by a weak legal framework. China’s stock market then became a 
venue where local governments and enterprises sought to issue shares to 
raise equity funds.  
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Year  Privatisation size % Year  Privatisation size % 
1993 24.4 1999 31.0 
1994 26.3 2000 33.5 
1995 27.0 2001 33.2 
1996 29.1 2002 34.7 
1997 29.7 2003 35.3 
1998 29.5 2004 36.1 
Data source: National Bureau of Statistics of China 
Table 2.1 The average partial privatisation size across China SOEs on the stock 
markets each year from 1993 to 2004 
 
In the above table, the proportion of shares sold by China SOEs to the 
public was increasing from 24.4% in 1993 to 36.1% in 2004. It took China 
SOEs 11 years to sell a further 11.7% of the state shares. 
In effect, the Government retained the control over these firms by holding 
the other two-thirds of shares. Not a single China SOE was completely 
privatised. According to China Securities Journal and National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, there were 1381 firms listed on two China exchanges by 
the end of Apr. 2005, out of which 92% (1345) were former SOEs directly 
controlled or partially owned by the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC).  
2.1.3 The development of China Stock Markets 
This section mainly reviews the history and the present of China stock 
markets, introduces the unique share and ownership structure of China stock 
markets and the resulting impacts on pricing of different shares, and finally 
looks at the administrative intervention in China stock markets. 
The shareholding reforms in 1980s 
China’s shareholding reforms began in the early 1980s. During 1980 – 1986, 
twenty shareholding companies were established. All these companies were 
created on ad hoc basis without any kind of authorization or policy 
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framework being provided by central Government. The processes were 
spontaneous. Since 1986, the Government began more systematic 
shareholding experiments across China, which was strongly backed by 
Premier Zhao Ziyang, one of the chief exponents of these reforms. As a 
result, during 1986-1988, the issuance of securities across the country grew 
out of the quota set by the Government. Unofficial securities issuance, often 
informally authorised by local Government but not by the central 
Government, expanded massively, despite the central Government attempts 
in 1987-1988 to restrain the scale of restructuring, such as banning SOEs 
from public issuance unless authorised by the central Government. During 
1989, share issuance shrank as the central Government became more severe 
on curbing investment and the local Government thus reoriented to the new 
situation.  
The central Government authorised Shanghai OTC in December 1986, 
which listed eight companies by the end of 1989. OTC then quickly spread 
to other major cities. By the end of 1987, there were reports of securities 
trading taking place unofficially in over 44 cities across China. However the 
OTCs could not cope with rapidly growing demand, prices were unstable 
between counters and fees were high. Moreover the OTCs facilitated insider 
trading
3
. In March 1987, the state officially authorised the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Governments to experiment with stock markets and banned them 
elsewhere. The need of a larger, better governed and more economically 
significant trading sites was evident by early 1990.  
                                               
3 For details, please refer to chapter 4 in “To Get Rich is Glorious! China’s stock markets in the ‘80s 
and ‘90s” by Carl E. Walter and Fraser J.T.Howie. 2001 
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China stock markets  
The Shanghai Securities Exchange was formally established in 1990, and 
initially eight stocks were listed. The Shenzhen Stock Exchange was also 
established in 1991. At the beginning, five companies were listed on the 
Exchange. Few companies actually issued shares in 1991. Share prices 
moved little and the public remained largely suspicious of the new 
commodity known as share. After Deng Xiaoping called for rapid economic 
growth, increased investment and experiments with shares in January 1992, 
people swarmed to buy shares. A share fever broke out. Deng’s call also 
triggered another round of mass issuance of shares. In response, the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) was established in1992. THE 
CSRC is in charge of conducting daily supervision and regulation of the 
securities markets and future markets in accordance with the law
4
. Since 
then China stock markets have rapidly developed and experienced 
tremendous growth with total market capitalization increasing from RMB 5 
billion at the end of 1993 to RMB 2452.3 billion at the end of 2008 (China 
Statistic Yearbook 2009). At the end of 2008, China’s stock market had 
1,625 listed enterprises.  
  
                                               
4 For details, please refer to chapter 5 in “To Get Rich is Glorious! China’s stock markets in the ‘80s 
and ‘90s” by Carl E. Walter and Fraser J.T.Howie. 2001 
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Year Issued Share (100 million 
shares) 
Raised Capital (100 million 
yuan) 
Number of firms 
listed  
1991 5 5 10 
1992 20.75 94.09 14 
1993 95.79 375.47 53 
1994 91.26 326.78 183 
1995 31.6 150.32 291 
1996 86.11 425.08 323 
1997 267.63 1293.82 530 
1998 105.56 841.52 745 
1999 122.93 944.56 851 
2000 512.04 2103.24 949 
2001 141.48 1252.34 1088 
2002 291.74 961.75 1160 
2003 281.43 1357.75 1224 
2004 227.92 1510.94 1287 
2005 567.05 1882.51 1377 
2006 1287.77 5594.29 1381 
2007 637.2409 8680.17 1434 
2008 180.29 3852.21 1550 
Total   4953.59 31651.84 1625 
Table 2.2 Summary statistics of issued shares and capital raised from China stock 
markets 1991-2008 
 
The above table summarises the growth of the Chinese stock market since 
its inception. China has expanded enormously in the past two decades. 
Shares issued increased from 0.5 billion in 1991 to over 10 billion in late 
1990s, arrived in 2000 at 51.2 billion and made a record in 2006 at 128.8 
billion. Correspondingly, the capital raised from selling shares enhanced to 
dozens of billions yuan in late 1990s and jumped to hundreds of billions 
yuan in 2000s from RMB 0.5 billion in 1991. The proceeds exceeded RMB 
500 hundred billion in 2006, made a record in 2007 at RMB 868 billion and 
slightly dropped to RMB 385 billion in 2008. The year of 2006 marked the 
rapidest expansion of the markets over the past two decades according to the 
statistics. Many papers documented that the size of Shanghai stock market is 
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bigger than that of Shenzhen stock market in term of total number of listed 
companies and total market capitalization.  
Instead of selling out all shares of a SOE in one go, China Government 
cautiously retained substantial ownership in listed SOEs, which is named as 
partial privatisation. As a result, listed SOEs only sold one-third of the 
enterprises’ equity capital to private shareholders during initial public 
offerings (IPOs). The other two thirds of the equity capital raised were held 
either by state asset management agencies or by SOEs themselves. Partial 
privatisation of China SOEs distinguishes China stock markets from other 
mature western markets. Sun et al. (2003) claimed the partial privatisation 
of SOEs in China was in light of an ideology of socialist market economy 
which still conformed to the communist public ownership principle. In other 
words, the China Government wanted to maintain its control or influence 
over the SOEs via ownership maintained in listed SOEs. However 
Governments across the world usually didn’t sell an entire SOE, or even a 
controlling stake at the first time (JMNN 1999). Even UK issues, an 
example of extreme market-oriented privatisation in JMNN (1999), saw 
partial privatisation of six SOEs.  
Perotti (1995) had a model showing that Governments tend to privatize a 
smaller proportion of such firms at the beginning. Being the largest 
stakeholder of the partially privatised SOE, the Government sent a credible 
signal to the market that it is not expropriating shareholders’ wealth. Mok 
and Hui (1998) argued that high equity retention by the state lowers the 
ex-ante uncertainty of domestic investors because investors interpreted that 
as a sign of the Government’s confidence in the company, and a business 
guarantee. Indeed, there is a policy role for state ownership in China’s SIP 
firms in the form of Government backing or subsidization. 
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Jefferson (1998) argued from the perspective of viewing SOEs as public 
goods and that a quick and complete privatisation was not desirable. In the 
absence of a well-functioning property-rights market, privatisation can 
result in the transfer of public assets to private agents who do not use them 
more efficiently than under state ownership. On the other hand, partial state 
ownership helps to monitor managers in China’s SIP firms. Indeed, in China 
the managerial labor market is not well established, the product market does 
not function well, and the takeover market for firms does not exist at all. 
There is no significant independent shareholder in China who can provide 
effective monitoring of management. As a result, managers tend to be 
opportunistic and seek personal benefit rather than company success.  
Partial privatisation of China SOEs distinguishes China stock markets from 
other mature western markets where private-held companies dominate.  
Share and ownership structure 
In May 1992, the State Council issued a Regulation (Opinions on Standards 
for the Companies Limited by Shares) that privatisation categorized the 
shares of a shareholding enterprise into four types: 
(1) A-shares, which are yuan-denominated and are available for trading by 
domestic private shareholders on the stock exchanges. When going public, 
companies are required to issue no less than 25% of their total outstanding 
shares as tradable A shares. 
(2) B-shares are available for trading by foreign investors in foreign 
currencies on the domestic stock exchanges. B shares listed on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange are denominated in US dollars and B shares listed on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange are denominated in HK dollars. H shares are 
allowed to trade on Hong Kong Stock Exchanges only and denominated in 
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HK dollars.   
Owners of B and H shares are entitled to the same rights and dividends, and 
responsible for the same obligations as holders of A shares. The dividends 
of B shares are paid in US dollars if traded in SHSE and in HK dollars if 
traded in SZSE. The dividends of H shares traded in HKSE are paid in HK 
dollars.  
Companies issuing B-shares are required to prepare two sets of financial 
statements: one set based on Chinese accounting regulations for 
A-shareholders and the other set following International Accounting 
Standards (IASs) for B-shareholders. Individual investors are allowed to 
hold up to 25% of a firm’s B-shares, but total foreign ownership cannot 
exceed 49% of a firm’s total shares.  
A, B and H-shares are freely tradable. All are tradable shares (TS) and can 
be respectively described as tradable A, B and H-shares (TAS, TBS and 
THS respectively).  
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Year National Shanghai 
Stock 
Exchange 
Shenzhen 
Stock 
Exchange 
A Share 
Only 
A & H 
Share 
A & B 
Share 
B Share 
Only 
1990 10 8 2 10                                 
1991 14 8 6 14                                 
1992 53 29 24 35  18  
1993 183 106 77 140 3 34 6 
1994 291 171 120 227 6 54 4 
1995 323 188 135 242 11 58 12 
1996 530 293 237 431 14 69 16 
1997 745 383 362 627 17 76 25 
1998 851 438 413 727 18 80 26 
1999 949 484 465 822 19 82 26 
2000 1088 572 516 955 19 86 28 
2001 1160 646 514 1025 23 88 24 
2002 1224 715 509 1085 28 87 24 
2003 1287 780 507 1146 30 87 24 
2004 1377 837 540 1236 31 86 24 
2005 1381 834 547 1240 32 86 23 
2006 1434 842 592 1287 38 86 23 
2007 1550 860 690 1396 45 86 23 
2008 1625 864 761 1459 57 86 23 
Source: China Statistic Yearbook 2009 
Table 2.3 Summary of shares listed in China stock markets 
 
This table above summaries the number of listed companies from 1990 to 
2008. By the end of 2008, out of a total of 1625 listed firms, 1459 firms 
have issued A-shares only, 57 have issued both A and H shares, 86 have 
issued both A and B shares and 23 issue B shares only.   
(3) Non-tradable A shares (NTAS), which are state and legal person
5
 shares 
owned either directly or indirectly by the state and which cannot be traded 
                                               
5 Under the General Principles of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China, legal person refers to 
“organs which possess the capacity for civil rights and the capacity for civil activity, and in 
accordance with the law, independently enjoy civil rights and undertake civil obligations”. According 
to the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China, a company is an enterprise legal person, 
which has independent legal person property and enjoys the property right of the legal person. 
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freely on the stock exchanges but can be transferred only with 
administrative approval. State shares are held by central or local 
Government or solely state-owned enterprises while legal person 
(institutional) shares are held by joint stock companies and non-bank 
financial institutions most of which are partially owned by the Governments. 
NTAS entitles the holders to exactly the same rights assigned to the holders 
of TS but cannot be publicly traded. As indicated, two thirds of the A-shares 
outstanding were NTAS owned mainly by the Chinese Government and its 
affiliates and legal persons. The NTAS were transacted on contract base and 
subject to the approval of regulatory authorities. The regulation didn’t 
specify the exact lock-up years for NTAS except a blur statement that these 
NTAS would be released at right time in the future.  
This regulation effectively institutionalized a unique feature of China’s 
stock market—the creation of three distinct and segmented markets for the 
stocks of a listed enterprise, namely, the one-way transfer market for 
state-owned shares, the A-shares market for domestic private shareholders, 
and the B-shares market for foreign investors. Therefore the investors 
cannot arbitrage between these markets. 
Valuation differential between tradable A shares and tradable B shares 
Unlike their A-share counterparts, B-share markets constitute a small 
proportion of the overall market capitalization and have been much less 
actively traded during the past decade. In addition, instead of being traded at 
a price premium, B-share stocks are sold at a prevailing and persistent 
discount. This phenomenon has been called the “Chinese B-share discount 
puzzle”. Specifically, B shares trade at an average discount of about 60% to 
the prices at which domestic A shares trade (Chakravarty et al. 1998). Since 
then, there is enormous literature trying to explain the puzzling B-share 
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discount. Many researchers presume that foreign investors have less 
information than domestic investors due to language barriers, different 
accounting standards and weak access to local information (Brennan and 
Cao 1997; Chakravarty et al. 1999). Accessible to much more 
diversification opportunities, foreign investors are assumed to have higher 
demand elasticity for local stocks. Local firms are able to charge different 
prices to domestic and foreign investors in order to maximize their firm 
values (Stulz and Wasserfallen (1995. Ma (1996) proposed that the price 
differences can be influenced by the investors’ attitude toward risk 
(Pratt-Arrow measure of risk aversion). He argued that the highly 
speculative behavior of Chinese investors may push up A-share prices and 
investors might be highly risk tolerant and may want to make money in the 
short run. That is to say, A-share investors are more risk-loving compared to 
B-share investors due to their high speculative behavior. The most 
commonly used indicator for the degree of speculation in a stock market is 
the average turnover rate, defined as the total annual trading value divided 
by the average market capitalization. In 1996, the average turnover rate at 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange reached 1,350%. In other words, each share 
changed hands about 13 times in that year. During 1992–2003, the average 
turnover rate was 543% for the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 498% for the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. These rates were about 10 times higher than the 
turnover rates of other major stock markets in the world. 
Chen-Lee-Rui(2001) computed the relative turnover (trading volume to 
shares outstanding ratio) of B shares to A shares and found it strongly 
negatively related to the discount, even after controlling for other factors. 
They concluded that “the price difference is primarily due to illiquid 
B-share markets”, indicating B-share investors were more risk-averse than 
A-share investors. Sun-Tong (2000) found a positive relationship between 
25 
 
the B-share discount and risk levels, which they proxied with the ratio of A 
to B- share return variances.  
Valuation differential between non-tradable A shares and tradable A shares 
In the mid-1990s, state-owned banks, which had been primarily responsible 
for providing loans to SOEs for more than 10 years, had a rate of 
nonperforming loans that was as high as 40% (Wong and Wong 2001). 
Subsequently, in 1997, the Government decided to make greater use of the 
stock market as an alternative fundraising vehicle for SOEs in order to allow 
state-owned banks some room for restructuring. Since the mid-1990s, a 
small but increasingly vibrant market has grown up in NTAS. Transactions 
were negotiated on a one-to-one basis, though sometimes traders made use 
of auctions. The transactions took place off the exchanges – and were 
generally subject to fewer rules (including rules on disclosure and 
protections of minority shareholder rights) as well as oversight than 
exchange-based transactions. They were generally priced at a significant 
discount to listed shares but at prices above net asset value (NAV). In Chen 
and Xiong (2001), NTAS were actually traded transferred at a discount of 
around 70% to 80% lower than the corresponding market prices of listed 
shares. One crucial feature of this off-exchange market is that, unlike the 
market in listed shares, large blocks of shares in listed firms are often 
transferred, often resulting in the transfer of control rights over the listed 
enterprise. In other words, this market is facilitating the privatisation of 
listed firms.  
Meanwhile in US, securities issued by a company but not registered with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) can be sold via private 
placements to sophisticated investors but cannot be resold in the open 
market except under provisions of the SEC's Rule 144, which permits 
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holders to of such restricted stock to sell limited amounts of these securities 
after a two-year holding period. Thus holders of restricted stock are subject 
to a minimum two-year period of illiquidity. The restricted stocks were 
found sold at discounts from 34% to 40% off the market prices of the 
corresponding liquid shares in Pratt (1989) and Siber (1992). Longstaff 
(1995a, b) explained the discount as compensations for the lack of liquidity 
in restricted shares and developed valuation models for illiquid securities. In 
his model, the key determinants are the volatility of the liquid but otherwise 
identical stock and the lock-up period. The upper bound estimated with 
Longstaff’s model closely approximated the empirical discount estimates of 
SEC Rule 144 letter stocks at around 35.5% to 45.5%. The higher volatility 
and the longer lock-up period indicate more discount of illiquid shares, 
consistent with Chen and Xiong (2001). In addition, Siber (1991) found that 
the price penalty is sensitive to block size, which indicates that marketing a 
large block of illiquid securities requires significant price concessions. 
Table 2.4 compares these three factors (the price volatility of liquid but 
otherwise identical stock and the lock-up period of illiquid shares as well as 
the proportion of illiquid shares over the total shares) in China stock 
markets with those in US stock markets. 
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 Length of 
Restricted years 
Volatility of 
TAS (standard 
deviation) 
Number of restricted 
shares divided by the 
otherwise identical 
shares  
Price discount  
within restricted 
period (%) 
China Uncertain a 76.71% 
(auction); 
87.73% (Private 
Transfer) c 
NTAS/TAS: 64.62 
(historically Max 
72.18 and Min 64.28 
since 1992)a  
77.93 for 
auction; 
85.59 for private 
transfer c 
US T = 2 b 25%-35%  d 13.6 b 33.75 c 
Source a. China’s Securities and Futures Markets, China Securities Regulatory 
Commission April 2004, available on: http://www.the 
CSRC.org.cn/cms/uploadFiles/introduction2004edition.1087888443500.doc  
Source b. Siber (1991);  
Source c. Chen & Xiong (2002); 
Source d. Longstaff (1995) 
Table 2.4 Comparison of main features concerning illiquid discount 
 
The lock-up period of China NTAS is undefined. The standard deviation of 
TS is around three times larger than that of the liquid but otherwise identical 
stocks in US. The proportion of NTAS/TAS is about 5 times larger than that 
in US. From the point view of illiquid discount, there is no wonder that the 
discount of NTAS in China is much higher than that of illiquid shares in US, 
almost twice as much.  
Or alternatively the price of illiquid state-shares of China listed SOEs was 
deliberately suppressed in private transfers and auctions due to the 
Government intervention. In December 2003, the State Council publicised 
the Notice on Further Regulating the Work Relating to the Restructuring of 
State-owned Enterprises (thereafter Notice 2003), which clearly stated that 
the price of the transferred State-owned property rights of enterprises should 
be determined on the basis of the appraisal of properties and funds and 
account audit, or in other words, the net asset. This pricing method was 
reinforced in a joint issue of Interim Measures for the Management of the 
Transfer of the State-owned Property Right of Enterprises by MoF and 
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SASAC one month later. Song (2003) found that the net asset had a 
significant impact on determining the transfer price of state-owned shares, 
which may explain the price discount of illiquid state shares to the otherwise 
identical liquid A-shares.  
Comparatively speaking, the NAV-core pricing is more broadly known as 
the main pricing mechanism of China NTAS than the illiquid-asset pricing 
hypothesis proposed by Longstaff (1995).  
Supply and demand in China stock markets  
China’s Government adopted measures to control the supply of and the 
demand for shares in the market. So the market price is not determined in 
the market place. Rather it is an administrate price. The most important 
control devices on the supply side were administrative controls aimed at 
controlling the amount of shares available to domestic shareholders. From 
1993 to 1998, the Government imposed an explicit annual quota on the total 
amount of capital that could be raised through IPOs issuance. According to 
Wong (2006), the restrictions on the supply of shares served two purposes. 
First, these restrictions limited the size of the stock market and thus limited 
potential competition between enterprise shares and other financial assets. 
Second, the restrictions tended to inflate share prices and thus reduce the 
investors’ returns relative to the investment. In this way, the restrictions 
effectively increased the implicit tax rates levied on stock ownership held by 
the investors (Gordon and Li 2003).  
Measures to control demand for stocks included regulations imposed to 
restrict the sources of funds that could be invested in the stock market. First, 
the investment restrictions on A and B shares enabled the Government to 
access funds from foreign investments while maintaining control over both 
domestic and foreign capital. Second, domestic individuals and institutions 
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were prohibited from using bank loans to invest in the stock market in order 
to control the amount of funds that could be diverted from the banking 
sector to the stock market. Third, financial institutions and major 
institutional investors such as insurance funds and pension funds were not 
permitted to buy shares and could only invest in Government bonds and 
bank deposits. From May 1997 to September 1999, all SOEs and listed 
enterprises were prohibited from buying any shares, even with funds from 
their own operations.  
The supply and demand controls that the Government imposed on the stock 
market until the late 1990s were aimed at restricting its size and growth. The 
restrictive strategy was perhaps due in part to the central leaders’ lack of 
experience with operating a stock market within the construct of a socialist 
economy and also to opposition from the banking sector, which had 
exercised nearly complete monopolization over the uses of funds before the 
emergence of the stock market. 
With the growth and expansion of China stock markets, nearly all the 
restrictive regulations that had been imposed on both the supply of and the 
demand for stocks were relaxed since late 1990s, step by step. On the supply 
side, the quota system on IPO issuance was the first to be relaxed in 1999 
and eventually abolished in 2001. On the demand side, domestic individuals 
were permitted to buy B-shares from February 2001, and the A-share 
market was opened to foreign investors under the scheme of Qualified 
Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) in 2002. Since February 2000, some 
selected securities enterprises were also permitted to borrow funds from 
banks with their shares as collateral. This marked the first step toward 
allowing bank credits to enter the stock market. Starting in September 1999, 
institutional investors, including SOEs, listed enterprises, investment funds, 
insurance funds, and pension funds were gradually allowed to invest in the 
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stock market either directly or indirectly through investment vehicles such 
as investment funds.  
2.2 Regulatory Framework for Securities Market and Exchanges  
2.2.1 People’s bank of China as the regulatory agency  
The initial stage of shareholding reform experiment was characterized by 
bold local initiatives, lack of standardization and regulation, and chaotic 
markets. It was carried out and supervised by local Governments and 
People’s bank of China (PBoC) local branches since such reform involved 
finance. It fell into the PBoC jurisdiction.  
Between 1982 and 1987, some city Governments selected local collective 
ownership enterprises to be transformed into shareholding companies on an 
experimental basis. There were no central regulations regarding issues of 
shares. Local Governments were inactive in regulating share issues until 
1984 when the Shanghai Government enacted the first Provisional Measures 
on the Issuance of Shares in China (Fan, 2001).  
In 1987, the State Council designated the PBoC to be the regulatory agency 
of bond and stock markets and the state established macro-control over the 
capital market, making it clear that all issues of corporate bonds would have 
to be approved by the PBOC and the total capitalization would be set by 
state annual planning
6
. The state retained control over issues of corporate 
securities through an annual quota set jointly by the PBOC, SDPC, and 
MoF.  
                                               
6
 Details can be found in the No. 21 and 22 documents by the State Council of People’s Republic of 
China, “Temporary Provisions on The Administration of Corporate Bonds”, March 27, 1987 
(available on http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=9707) and “The Circular of The State 
Council On Strengthening the Administration of Stocks and Bonds” (available on 
http://www.chinabaike.com/law/zy/xz/gwy/1332433.html). 
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The PBOC differentiated the bond and the stock as well as regulated the 
formation of shareholding companies according to the type of ownership. 
Basically, three types of enterprises were allowed to become shareholding 
companies.  
The first type was SOEs which would have to be approved for shareholding 
experiment by the State Commission for Restructuring the Economy (SCRE) 
or by the PBOC. The second type of enterprises was collective enterprises 
which, with the approval of local Governments and PBOC branches, could 
form shareholding companies and, with central Government approval, issue 
stocks to the public. The third type of enterprises was joint ventures. Almost 
all joint ventures were shareholding companies, but only limited joint 
ventures had been allowed to sell shares to the public.  
Since issues of stocks would have to be approved by the PBOC local branch, 
the PBOC used its macro-planning to limit the amount of capital to be raised 
nationally. Meanwhile capital-starved enterprises allied themselves with 
local authorities to form joint-stock companies outside central planning. 
Furthermore the PBoC, though namely a “central bank”, was in fact a much 
decentralised entity with principal staffing and functions at the provincial 
level and a small staff of a few hundred in Beijing. Local branches, although 
reporting on a direct line to Beijing, had strong links to local Governments 
such that the local Government had the right to nominate senior branch staff. 
From this background, the PBOC was hardly an appropriate candidate to act 
as the national regulator of a rapidly evolving market-based experiment
7
. 
Therefore the system of approving stock issuance was regional rather 
standardised and complicated involving many bureaucratic players who had 
                                               
7 For details, please refer to chapter 5 in “To Get Rich is Glorious! China’s stock markets in the ‘80s 
and ‘90s” by Carl E. Walter and Fraser J.T.Howie. 2001 
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different orientation toward shareholding reform. Enterprises ignored the 
macro-planning and went after what was the fashion of the time to form 
joint-stock companies. Provincial or city Governments tended to be more 
enthusiastic in approving applications of shareholding companies while the 
local branches of the PBoC acting as the main regulatory agency, guarded 
their shared power with local Governments in approving joint-stock 
companies’ stock issuance (Tan 2004).  
In the absence of regulatory institutions and due to local Government 
failures to observe central planning, enterprises rushed to issue shares 
without bothering to report to supervising agencies. The total value of share 
issues was impossible to calculate and state statistics was rather incomplete. 
Lack of an effective regulatory framework was clearly responsible for the 
failure of the state to rein in the market. 
2.2.2 China Securities Regulatory Commission as regulatory authority 
The Shanghai and Shenzhen Securities Exchanges were regulated initially 
by both the local Governments and local provincial branches of the PBoC. 
The regional laws were very different. Hence, securities practitioners at that 
time were confronted with diverse laws varying between regions. The 
development of China stock markets led to the establishment of a 
centralized market regulatory body.  
In 1992, the State Council Securities Commission (SCSC) and the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (THE CSRC) were established. The 
SCSC is the State authority responsible for exercising centralised policy 
making. The CSRC is the SCSC’s executive branch responsible for 
conducting daily supervision and regulation of the securities markets in 
accordance with the law.  
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The scope of the authority of the SCSC and the CSRC gradually expanded 
with the growth of the securities markets. In November 1993, the State 
Council decided to charge the SCSC with the responsibility of the test 
operation of the futures market to be carried out by the CSRC. In March 
1995, the State Council formally approved the Organisation Plan of the 
CSRC, confirming the CSRC to be a deputy-ministry level unit. The CSRC 
was authorised to conduct supervision and regulation of the securities and 
future markets in accordance with the law. In August 1997, the State 
Council decided to put the security markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen 
under the supervision of the CSRC. Meanwhile offices of the CSRC 
commissioners were set up in the two municipalities. In 1998, the 
Government held the National Finance Conference and decided to reform 
and reorganise the national securities regulatory mechanism. The local 
securities regulatory departments will be supervised directly by the CSRC. 
Organisations engaged in securities formerly supervised by the PBoC were 
put under the centralised supervision of the CSRC. 
In April 1998, the SCSC and the CSRC were merged to form one ministry 
level unit directly under the State Council. Both the power and the functions 
of the CSRC have been strengthened. A centralised securities supervisory 
system was thus established.  
In September 1998, the State Council approved the Provisions regarding 
CSRC’s Functions, Internal Structure and Personnel (hereafter Provisions 
CSRC), further confirming CSRC to be one of the enterprise unit directly 
under the State Council and the authorised department governing the 
securities and futures markets of China. This strengthened and clarified the 
CSRC’s functions.  
• Basic Functions 
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1. To establish a centralised supervisory system for securities and 
futures markets and to assume direct leadership over securities and 
futures market supervisory bodies. 
2. To strengthen the supervision over securities and futures business, 
stock and futures exchange markets, the listed companies, fund 
management companies investing in the securities, securities and 
futures investment consulting firms, and other intermediaries 
involved in the securities and futures business. To raise the 
standard of information disclosure. 
3. To increase the abilities to prevent and handle financial crisis. 
4. To organise the drafting of laws and regulations for securities 
markets. To study and formulate the principles, policies and rules 
related to securities markets. To formulate development plans and 
annual plans for securities markets. To direct, co-ordinate, 
supervise and examine matters related to securities in various 
regions and relevant departments. To direct, plan and co-ordinate 
test operations of futures market. 
5. To exercise centralised supervision of securities business. 
• Major Responsibilities 
1. Studying and formulating policies and development plans regarding 
securities and futures markets; drafting relevant laws and regulations 
on securities and futures markets; and working out relevant rules on 
securities and futures markets; 
2. Supervising securities and futures markets and exercising vertical 
power of authority over regional and provincial supervisory 
institutions of the market; 
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3. Overseeing the issuance, trading, custody and settlement of equity 
shares, convertible bonds, and securities investment funds; approving 
the listing of corporate bonds; and supervising the trading activities 
of listed Government and corporate bonds; 
4. Supervising the listing, trading and settlement of domestic futures 
contracts; and monitoring domestic institutions engaged in overseas 
futures businesses in accordance with relevant regulations; 
5. Supervising the behavior of listed companies and their shareholders 
who are liable for relevant information disclosure in securities 
markets; 
6. Supervising securities and futures exchanges and their senior 
management in accordance with relevant regulations, and securities 
associations in the capacity of the competent authorities; 
7. Supervising securities and futures companies, securities investment 
fund managers, securities registration and settlement companies, 
futures settlement institutions, and securities and futures investment 
consulting institutions; approving in conjunction with the People's 
Bank of China, the qualification of fund custody institutions and 
supervising their fund custody business; formulating and 
implementing rules on the qualification of senior management for the 
above-mentioned institutions; and granting qualification of the 
people engaged in securities and futures-related business; 
8. Supervising direct or indirect issuance and listing of shares overseas 
by domestic enterprises; supervising the establishment of securities 
institutions overseas by domestic institutions; and supervising the 
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establishment of domestic securities institutions by overseas 
organizations; 
9. Supervising information disclosure and proliferation related to 
securities and futures and being responsible for the statistics and 
information resources management for securities and futures 
markets; 
10. Granting, in conjunction with relevant authorities, the qualification of 
law firms, accounting firms, asset appraisal firms, and professionals 
in these firms, engaged in securities and futures intermediary 
businesses, and supervising their relevant business activities; 
11. Investigating and penalizing activities violating securities and futures 
laws and regulations; 
12. Managing the foreign relationships and international cooperation 
affairs in the capacity of the competent authorities; and 
13. Any other duties as commissioned by the State Council. 
• Organizational Structure of the CSRC 
The CSRC has one chairman, four vice-chairmen, one secretary general, and 
two deputy secretaries generals. It has 13 functional departments or offices, 
3 subordinate centers, and one special committee. It also has 10 regional 
offices set up in key cities around the country and a missionary office in 
every province, autonomous region, cities directly under the jurisdiction of 
the State Council, and cities enjoying the provincial-level status in the state 
economic plan. 
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The organisation structure of the CSRC is showing in the chart below: 
 
 
Figure 2.1 The organization structure of the CSRC 
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2.3 Partial Share Issue Privatisation of State-Owned Enterprises via 
China Stock markets: Goals and Achievements 
As discussed in 2.1.3 above, China stock markets have been facilitating the 
partial SIP of SOEs, as part of the China SOE reform process and partial 
privatisation was better than complete privatisation. 
2.3.1 To incentivise China SOEs 
In line with the SOE reforms, the first goal is to incentivise China SOEs to 
improve performance, productivity and efficiency.  
Sun and Tong (2003)  
They evaluated the performance changes of 634 partially privatised SOEs 
listed on China’s two exchanges during 1994-98. They firstly followed 
literature to examine profitability changes, output changes, leverage changes, 
and employee and productivity changes pre and post partial privatisation.  
• Profitability change 
They measured profitability in earnings (real net profit and real EBIT) as 
well as in returns (ROA and ROE). They observed a general increase in 
earnings after privatisation but a general decrease in profitability returns 
now. This hinted at the possibility that sales increased at a faster rate than 
earnings do.  
• Output change 
They measured output in real sales and found it increase from a median 
(mean) of 0.88 (0.91) before privatization to 1.24 (1.45) after privatisation. 
This conformed to their conjecture that the return decreases were due to the 
increase in output faster than the increase in earnings after privatisation. 
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• Leverage change 
The measurement of leverage adopted were the operating cash flow to total 
debt (OCF/TD) and the times interest earned (TIE). The typical measures of 
leverage - the long-term-debt-to-equity ratio (LLE) and the total 
debt-to-asset ratio – were abandoned primary SIP led to higher total equities 
and total assets of the SOEs after privatisation. OCF/TD indicates a firm’s 
ability to cover total debt with the yearly cash flow. TIE, the ratio of EBIT 
to interest expense, indicates a long-term debt-paying ability from the 
income statement view. OCF/TD dropped from a median (mean) of 0.23 
(0.35) before privatisation to 0.18 (0.23) after privatisation. The median TIE 
also dropped from 6.24 to 4.73 after privatisation. 
However the increased leverage after privatisation may not tell the full story. 
As mentioned before, bank loans replaced the Government loans to fund 
SOEs (bogaidai). The fall in the OCF/TD may reflect the change in the 
financing mechanisms of SOEs, as part of China SOE reform. Second, 
interest rates on bank loans and deposits are centrally determined and 
uniform across China. The savings rate and the borrowing rate set by the 
Government were not much different before 23 Aug 1996
8
, which indicates 
an effective approximation of zero interest paid on loan. Furthermore, the 
tax shield would lead to debt increases as well. In one word, the drop in 
OCF/TD and TIE doesn’t necessarily imply low profitability or a bad sign if 
it doesn’t incur bankruptcy.  
• Employment and productivity change 
                                               
8 The table below gives the interest rates on loan and deposits from 1990 to 1996. 
 Aug 21 1990 Apr 21 1991 May 15 1993 July 11 1993 May 1 1996 
Savings rate 9.36 7.92 9.9 11.7 9.9 
Borrowing 
rate 
9.36 8.64 9.36 10.98 10.98 
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They used three variables to capture the productivity effect, the real sales to 
employee ratio, the real net profit to employee ratio, and the real EBIT to 
employee ratio. The median employment figure increases from 1,478 
workers before privatisation to 1,849 workers after privatisation but changes 
were not statistically significant. The real sales per employee increased from 
RMB 105,860 to RMB 126,670 with a Wilcoxon value of 1.82 with 
statistical significance. The real net profit per employee and the real EBIT 
per employee also increased after privatisation although without statistical 
significance. SIP in China seemed to lead to increased employment and 
higher productivity instead of massive layoff. Only 112 out of 634 samples 
have employment figures. There is possibility that only firms with good 
employment and productivity performance were willing to present the 
figures, which may lead to overestimation of the productivity efficiency.  
Secondly Sun and Tong (2003) were also concerned about how the 
Government retention of significant portions of state shares in the privatised 
SOEs would relate to the performance changes of SIP firms. They found 
that the proportion of shares held by the Government was too big and hurt 
the company performance and suggested reducing the state shares. The TAS 
owners desired to maximise the share price of the firm while the NTAS 
holders were indifferent to share prices since they couldn’t sell the shares on 
the open market. Hence, the owners of NTAS may try to seek maximise 
their benefit in other ways often at the cost of the minority shareholders. 
Thus the split share structure may lead to a decline in performance of 
China’s public listing companies.  
Hu et al. (2004)  
They investigated the relative importance of competition, ownership and 
governance both independently and jointly on the efficiency of state-owned 
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versus private firms, using a unique World Bank survey data of 736 Chinese 
firms across seven sectors and five cities from 1996 to 2001.  
They defined production and performance variables (sales, employment and 
capital), competition variables (number of competitors to firms’ major 
business line perceived by managers, potential entry cost for a new player to 
compete with firms’ major products perceived by managers), ownership 
variables (tradable and non-tradable ownership types and the percentage of 
private-owned shares) and corporate governance variables (shareholder 
meeting index, a board of director index,
9
 the existence of external auditors 
and a firm’s autonomy when making decisions). 
They applied cross-sectional multi-regression analysis and found that when 
examined independently, each determinant mattered in explaining the 
efficiency of sample firms.  
They found that private ownership share and its legal status affected a firm’s 
performance positively and significantly. They suggested that the lack of 
incentives in SOEs was a fundamental issue and changing the nature of 
ownership, or reducing state ownership, was beneficial to the firm.  
Both competition and governance enhanced the SOE’s productivity, 
valuation and performance. However when they were jointly examined, 
corporate governance were relatively more important while the competition 
effect was less significant generally. The non-SOEs seemed to have certain 
                                               
9 They constructed a shareholder meeting index and a board of director index. More specifically, two 
questions are addressed in the shareholder meeting index: 1) Has a shareholder meeting been 
established? 2) Is the decision made with one-share-one-vote by the shareholder meeting? Four 
questions are used in the construction of the board of director index: 1) Does a firm have a board of 
directors? 2) Is the board of directors appointed by the shareholder meeting, or by the Government, or 
by the firm but with the Governmental approval? 3) Are the CEO and the chairman of the board two 
different individuals? 4) Are there more non-Government members than Government members in the 
board? We assign the value of 1 to each question if the answer is yes, and 0 otherwise.  
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advantage in some governance mechanisms than SOEs and that market 
competition mattered greatly for SOEs but not so much for non-SOEs. This 
may be due to the fact that an SOE, because of its internal governance and 
management problems, needs more pressure from the market in order to 
improve its productivity. While for non-SOEs, the distinguish features of 
property rights of the firms may be enough pressure for them to pay 
attention to their productivity. 
Aivazian, Ge and Qiu (2005)  
They examined the impact of corporation on the performance of the SOEs 
without full privatisation in China by employing the annual data on 442 
SOEs from 1990 to 1999. Corporation is an alternative expression of partial 
privatisation. They found that corporatisation (a dummy equal to 1 if after 
corporatization and 0 otherwise) had a significantly positive impact on SOE 
performance, event without full privatisation. 
They further reported that the sources of productivity engendered by 
corporation could be traced to the reform of the internal governance 
structure of these firms. They compared differences between corporatised 
and noncorporatised SOEs in terms of four major features: institutional 
structure, managerial appointments, managerial incentives, and credit 
sources.  
• The institutional structures bewteen corporatised and noncorporatised 
SOEs:  
Each corporatised SOE set up a board of directors, and a CEO as part of its 
requirements under Corporate Law. A higher proportion of corporatised, as 
compared to noncorporatised, firms established institutions such as a 
supervisory board, legal, financial, marketing, and research and 
43 
 
development departments, and a labour disputes mediation committee. 
There were statistically significant differences between corporatised and 
noncorporatised firms in the formation of supervisory boards and of finance 
departments with independent budgets, suggesting that corporatisation did 
indeed change the governance methods of SOEs.  
• The manager selection between corporatised and noncorporatised SOEs: 
It appeared that the Communist Party personnel departments had a 
significant role in the placement of senior managers for both corporatised 
and noncorporatised firms. However, the influence of the Party was 
significantly weaker in corporatised than in noncorporatised firms.  
More than 60% of firms, corporatised or noncorporatised, reported that 
Government authorities issued the formal appointment letters to the 
managers. But part of this decision power was transferred to the board of 
directors in corporatised firms. The board of directors in 10% of 
corporatised firms issued the formal appointment letters to the managers.  
They found that the demotion of managers was significantly related to firm 
performance of corporatised firms, while this linkage was insignificant for 
noncorporatised firms. 
• Manager incentives between corporatised and noncorporatised SOEs: 
The incentive contracts were widely used in order to link manager payment 
to enterprise performance and there was no significant difference in the 
incentives of managers in corporatised firm and noncorporatised SOEs. 
• Credit sources between corporatised and noncorporatised SOEs: 
More than 70% of corporatised SOEs reported that their superiors’ 
(Government authorities) decision was the most important factor in 
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borrowing decisions, and almost none reported that the interest on loans was 
extremely important. There was no significant difference between 
corporatized and noncorporatised firms concerning factors that were 
extremely important in their borrowing decisions. However, Corporatised 
firms had a greater preference for credit from the four major state banks 
than from other sources of credit, indicating that corporatised SOEs 
depended highly on these banks instead of on other market-oriented 
financial institutions.  
The main results suggested that the SOE corporatisation program had been 
fairly successful in improving the effectiveness of the governance system of 
SOEs and their performance although some problems still persist after 
corporatisation.  
Wong (2006) 
She provided a table detailing the profitability of China listed companies 
from 1992 to 2003.  
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Year Ratio of 
Operating 
Profits to 
Total 
Assets (%) 
Ratio of 
Pretax 
Total 
Profits to 
Total 
Assets (%) 
Percentage of 
Enterprises 
with Negative 
Operating 
Profits 
Percentage of 
Enterprises 
with Negative 
Pretax Total 
Profits 
Chang
es in 
Operati
ng 
Profits 
(%) 
Changes 
in Pretax 
Total 
Profits 
(%) 
1992 4.98 6.62 5.77 3.85 147.15 237.26 
1993 7.34 8.56 1.70 0.57 64.11 87.42 
1994 5.63 7.56 4.24 0.71 −2.95 21.20 
1995 3.76 5.43 14.66 5.21 −18.28 −18.88 
1996 4.59 6.84 15.29 6.67 −15.42 0.65 
1997 5.61 7.34 12.31 5.87 11.36 11.78 
1998 5.26 6.80 17.78 10.35 −1.22 3.08 
1999 4.63 6.11 17.32 9.04 −8.42 −3.31 
2000 4.13 5.25 16.13 9.49 −0.39 3.98 
2001 3.10 3.95 19.79 13.87 −16.02 −16.34 
2002 2.92 3.47 20.03 14.14 −2.76 −4.07 
2003 2.70 3.39 20.43 12.59 −0.30 3.39 
Source: China Stock Market & Accounting Research Database, provided by GTA 
Information Technology Company, Ltd 
Table 2.5 Profitability of China listed companies from 1992 to 2003 
 
Wong concluded the Chins listed SOEs performed poorly because the ratio 
of pretax operating profit to total asset declined from 7.34 % in 1993 to 2.7 % 
in 2003, while the ratio of pretax total profit to total asset declined from 
8.56 % in 1993 to 3.39% in 2003. Similarly, the percentage of listed 
enterprises incurring negative operating (pretax total) profits increased 
substantially from 1.7 (0.57) %in 1993 to 20.43 (12.59) % in 2003. The total 
amount of operating profits achieved by the listed SOEs has continued to 
decline since 1998. However her conclusion is based on the comparison of 
annual after-privatisation performances from 1992 to 2003 rather than 
performances before privatisation and after privatisation.  
2.3.2 To diversify investments 
The emergence of enterprise shares also creates potential competition for 
bank deposits because enterprises now have the option of seeking direct 
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financing, and domestic households can invest their savings in the stock 
market rather than deposit them in state-owned banks. Private household 
savings surged with deposits in state-owned banks increasing from RMB 
21.06 billion in 1978 to RMB 1529.3 billion in 1990 and has been 
continuously growing over the past twenty years.  
Code of Industry Classification (1st 
level) 
Name of Industry Classification 
I Farming, Forestry, Animal Husbandry And 
Fishery 
II Mining And Quarrying 
III Manufacturing 
IV Production & Supply Of Power, Gas & Water 
V Construction 
VI Transportation, Storage 
VII Information Technology Industry 
VIII Wholesale And Retail Trades 
IX Finance, Insurance 
X Real Estate 
XI Social Services 
XII Transmitting, Culture Industry 
XIII Integrated 
Source: China statistic yearbook 2009 
Table 2.6 Summary of the 1st level industry categories as evidence on diversification 
 
The listed SOEs cover various industries including manufacturing, real 
estate, IT, construction, finance, and energy industries etc., which also help 
create diversification opportunities.  
2.4 Concluding Remarks 
In1978, the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Party Congress announced the official 
prelude to the China economic reform.  
Since the founding of P.R. China in 1949, the first thirty years featured a 
full-planned economy system in which the Government controlled all major 
sectors of the economy and formulated all decisions about the use of 
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resources and the distribution of output. Planners decided what should be 
produced and direct lower-level enterprises to produce those goods in 
accordance with national and social objectives. SOE executives were 
appointed and dismissed by the Government and usually treated as 
Government officials.  
After the 3rd Plenum in 1978, China began to move from a centrally 
planned economic system to a market-oriented system. China SOE reform is 
a centerpiece of the overall reform. Enterprises have been gradually given 
more and more autonomy to take control of themselves, dealing with 
relevant rights and responsibilities. From 1979 to 1993 the Government 
gave SOEs responsibility for dealing with their own gains in the market but 
SOEs were not fully responsible for the losses. The managers didn’t worry 
about bankruptcy as they believed the Government was a convenient resort. 
The rights and responsibilities of SOE stakeholders and management were 
ill-defined.  
The 14th Party Congress in 1992 decided to construct a socialist market 
economy and establish a modern corporate system. China SOEs were 
privatised through restructuring and selling. China stock markets were used 
to privatise selected strong medium and large-sized SOEs through share 
issuance. The emergence of China stock markets is actually the fourth stage 
of China SOE reform process.  
China stock markets, consisted of SHSE and SZSE, have been growing 
rapidly since the inception. The listed firms issued three types of shares: 
tradable A shares available uniquely to domestic investors, tradable B shares 
available uniquely to foreign investors and non-tradable shares retained by 
the Government in terms of state shares and legal-person shares. NTAS 
were allowed to transfer off-market. This classification of share types in 
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effect has created three segmented markets where TAS, TBS and NTAS 
could be traded separately without mutual interference and thus valued at 
differential prices.  
The PBoC worked as the regulatory agency in 1980s to supervise the 
share-issuance but resulted in a chaotic security market. The lack of an 
efficient regulatory framework stimulated the Government to set up the 
CSRC as a regulatory authority, hoping to put the security markets under an 
efficient centralized supervision and setting up an efficient regulatory 
framework.  
The listed SOEs sold averagely one third of the total shares outstanding, 
which is called partial privatisation.  
Sun and Tong (2003) compared SOE performances before and after partial 
privatisation and found that the revenues and earnings were improved but 
not the profitability returns, indicating the sales were growing faster than the 
earnings. The productivity was improved as well. The result was probably 
overestimated due to the sample selection bias. Aivazian et al. (2005) 
compared SOE performances between corporatised and noncorporatised 
firms and found corporatised SOEs performed better than non-corporatised 
SOEs. These results may not be convincing since only firms relatively 
stronger were selected for corporatisation. Combined with the findings in 
Wong (2006), it seemed that listed SOEs didn’t improve in performance.  
Hu et al. (2004) also showed that the listed SOEs with a more independent 
board and confronted with a fiercer competition performed better. Aivazian 
et al. (2005) found that the internal governance structure did improve SOE 
performances in a small proportion of firms with more developed and 
independent governance systems.  
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Sun and Tong (2003) studying China partial privatisations found the 
retained Government ownership had negative impacts on firm performance, 
indicating a reduction of NTAS may be beneficial to improve SOE 
performance. Hu et al. (2004) found that private ownership affected SOE 
performance positively, suggesting that a further privatisation to increase 
private ownership could enhance SOE performance.  
Partial privatisation in China led to changes in internal governance structure 
and competition, which were proved to have positive impacts on SOE 
performances. But in general, SOE performance wasn’t improved after 
partial privatisation. Moreover, there are indications that a further 
privatisation to reduce Government ownership while increase private 
ownership may be useful to improve SOE performance.  
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Chapter 3. 1st Attempt to Reduce Non-tradable Shares by 
China Government 
The State Council issued The Provisional Measures on Raising Social 
Security Funds through Sales of State-owned Shares (Hereafter Measures 
2001) on June 12, 2001 to expand the funding sources for the National 
Social Security Fund (NSSF). Measures (2001) aimed to reduce the state 
shares in listed companies by transferring them to the public.  
3.1 National social security fund (NSSF) 
The NSSF is a strategic reserve fund set up by the Chinese Government to 
mitigate the looming aging crisis in the country and help provide financial 
protection for the country’s pensioners. It is in fact intended to serve as a 
pension fund of last resort to support those provinces with pension financing 
difficulties. The National Council for Social Security Fund (NCSSF), a 
ministerial level entity reporting directly to the State Council, is charged 
with the responsibility of operating the Fund. 
Since its inception in 2000, NSSF has grown significantly in size, stature 
and influence. By the end of 2008, the total assets of NSSF had reached 
RMB 563 billion, making it by far the biggest institutional investor in 
China’s pension sector. 
3.1.1 The pension crisis in China 
China faces a looming crisis to provide old-age pensions for its 1.3 billion 
citizens. The one-child policy implemented since the late 1970s, combined 
with improved longevity, means that the population is ageing at a rapid 
speed. According to data from the UN Population Division, the old age 
dependency ratio (defined as the number of people aged between 15 and 59 
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to the number of people aged 60 and above) of China was 6 in 2005, but 
will rapidly decline to 2 by 2040
10
. 
The Chinese Government, hoping to build a sustainable pension system, 
started to implement reforms in the 1990s. After a series of new regulations, 
pilot programs and revisions, the current Chinese pension model is a five 
pillar pension system broadly in line with the World Bank’s multipillar 
model
11
.  
The new Chinese pension system, which applies to the urban sector but not 
the rural community, now includes: 
• Pillar zero – a minimum economic support payment provided to people 
in extraordinary straitened circumstances to ensure their minimum 
livelihood, with the target group including people: with no labour 
capability and no income source; with insufficient income source, and 
their living standard lower than the legal minimum standard; with labour 
capability, but having temporary interruption of income due to accidents 
or disasters. No contribution is required for eligibility for this social 
benefit. 
• Pillar Ia – a basic state pension provided through mandatory 
contributions by employers. Any excess of contributions over benefit 
payments under Pillar Ia are pooled together at the provincial level and 
administered by the provincial social security bureaus. Urban retirees 
will receive pension payments based on average local wage, indexed 
individual wage and years of employment after a working lifetime.  
                                               
10 UN Population Division, World Population Prospects, the 2004 Revision. http://esa.un.org/unpp/ 
11 A more detailed account of the Chinese pension reforms can be found in Pension Funds in China: a 
New Look, by Stuart Leckie and Yasue Pai, ISI Publications, Hong Kong, 2005. 
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• Pillar Ib – a mandatory individual system funded by employees 
contributing 8% of their monthly salary. The amount is accumulated in 
individual accounts earning interest and cannot be accessed until 
retirement. These assets are also administered by the provincial social 
security bureaus. 
• Pillar II – also known as “Enterprise Annuities” (EA), which are 
voluntary defined contribution retirement plans set up by eligible 
employers. These plans are provided through trustees, administrators, 
investment managers and custodians approved by the Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security (MoHRSS)3. 
• Pillar III – Various other types of voluntary schemes set up by 
employers which do not conform to the EA format. 
• Pillar IV – Voluntary informal family care inherent with the Chinese 
culture; subsidised healthcare and housing. 
However, given the historical pension liabilities accumulated over the 
decades since the founding of the PRC in 1949, as well as the rapidly 
deteriorating demographics, these reforms, even when fully implemented, 
may prove inadequate. A World Bank study estimates that under a baseline 
scenario with the current pension system, China’s implicit pension debt 
amounts to 141% of GDP, and the financing gap is as much as 95% of 
GDP
12
. 
The vulnerability of the system was keenly felt in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, leading to some loss of confidence among many Chinese. Even 
though the regulations at the time clearly stated that Pillar Ia and Pillar Ib 
assets were to be segregated from each other, many provinces, facing huge 
                                               
12 Yvonne Sin, the World Bank. “Working paper Series on China: Pension Liabilities and Reform 
Options for Old Age Insurance, Paper No. 2005-1”; May 2005. 
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benefit payouts and insufficient Pillar Ia contributions, decided to 
conveniently channel Pillar Ib money to pay Pillar Ia benefits, resulting in a 
high number of “empty” individual accounts. The problem was most severe 
in the Northeast provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang, where the 
heavy concentration of unprofitable state-owned enterprises meant the 
provinces had significant difficulties to collect Pillar Ia contributions yet 
had to pay out significant pension benefits. In fact, workers made redundant 
were sometimes given full pensions many years before their normal 
retirement date. 
Worry about potential social unrest, the Chinese central Government had to 
step in to support the provinces. New rules were issued with revised 
contribution rates for Pillars Ia and Ib. The rules also reinforced the 
segregation of the two pilot programmes in Liaoning and later in Jilin and 
Heilongjiang; and the troubled provinces were rumoured to be given relief 
through reduced taxes from the central Government to tide over the 
difficulties. Last but not least, a reserve fund at the national level that could 
bail out potential provincial pension defaults – the National Social Security 
Fund – was created. 
3.1.2 The Establishment and the Administration of NSSF 
In late 2000, aware of the looming pension difficulties at the provincial level 
and concerned about the demographics, the Chinese Government 
established the National Social Security Fund as “a strategic reserve fund” 
and a “solution to the problem of ageing”. The National Council for Social 
Security Fund (NCSSF), a ministerial level entity directly reporting to the 
State Council, was simultaneously created to operate the Fund. The NCSSF 
is charged with a range of responsibilities which include: 
• Administer the assets of the NSSF 
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• Formulate and implement the NSSF’s investment strategies 
• Select fund managers and custodians for the NSSF assets, and monitor 
their performance. To the extent allowed by regulations, directly invest 
NSSF’s assets 
• Provide financial management and accounting for the NSSF, including 
the preparation of periodic financial statements and accounting reports 
• Regularly disclose to the public the financial condition of the NSSF, 
including assets, returns, cash flows, etc. 
• Distribute funds according to directives jointly formed by the Ministry 
of Finance (MoF) and the MoHRSS 
• Undertake other duties assigned by the State Council. 
The NCSSF now comprises 21 executive board members. It is led by a 
Chairman and three Vice Chairmen, all appointed directly by the State 
Council. The executive board oversees 9 permanent departments which run 
the day-to-day operations of the NSSF. In addition to the permanent 
departments, the NCSSF also oversees three nonpermanent committees in 
charge of investment manager/custodian selection, investment decisions and 
risk management.  
It is interesting to note that many of the NCSSF officials have strong ties 
with or a background in key Government departments including Ministry of 
Finance (MoF), Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security 
(MoHRSS), the People’s Bank of China (PBoC), the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (THE CSRC) and the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC). The recruitment of senior officials from other 
agencies is a reflection of the political reality that the NSSF has multiple 
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stakeholders, and that the smooth functioning of the NSSF will require 
understanding, coordination and compromise among these various agencies. 
3.1.3 NSSF Sources of Assets 
By regulation, the assets of the NSSF come from four sources
13
: 
• Funds allocated from the central Government’s budget 
This has historically been the largest source of asset accretion for the NSSF. 
However, during the past few years, the NSSF sources of funds have 
become increasingly diversified, and the proportion of monies from state 
allocation has been in decline from 100% of the NSSF’s net addition to 
assets in 2000 to about 19% in 2006 and back to 32% in 2007. 
• Capital and equity assets derived from state-owned enterprise share sales 
This refers to a proportion of the IPO proceeds arising from the public 
offering of SOEs. According to Measures (2001), when joint stock limited 
companies with state-owned shares conducted IPOs and secondary offerings, 
it is mandated that additional shares, equivalent in value to 10% of the IPO 
proceeds, should be sold on the market as well, and the proceeds should be 
submitted to the NSSF. The policy was originally applied to both domestic 
and international offerings, but it was suspended for domestic offerings in 
June 2002. After June 2002, assets from this source came only from 
overseas listings of Chinese companies. Since July 2005, companies going 
for overseas listings are required to make a direct transfer of their IPO 
shares to the NSSF for the sake of NSSF’s participation in the long-term 
growth of Chinese companies. As of 31 May 2008, the total amount derived 
from international offerings stood at RMB89.5bn. In June 2009, the transfer 
                                               
13“The Preliminary Rules on the Administration of the Investments of the National Social Security 
Fund” Jointly issued by MoF and MoLSS, Dec. 2001 
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of shares from domestic offerings was resumed, and a total of 131 SOEs 
that conducted domestic IPO since July 2005 are required to transfer the 
equivalent of 10% of their floated shares to the NSSF, expected to reach a 
total value of RMB64bn.  
• Other means approved by the State Council (in practice this refers to 
state lottery license fees, as well as funds obtained through a securities 
repo programme) 
• Investment returns. 
In December 2006, NCSSF was assigned the task of managing and 
investing monies the central Government granted to 9 pilot provincial 
Governments
14
 as a supplement to their individual account funds for 5 
years. The NCSSF promised a minimum of 3.5% p.a. investment return 
while no management fee or performance fee will be charged. It was also 
decided that if the investment return exceeds 3.5%, 50% of the extra money 
will be saved as a provision to cover any future investment losses. At the 
end of 2008, the balance of “individual accounts” under the NSSF’s 
management stood at RMB19.8bn.  
3.1.4 Summary 
The NSSF has made impressive progress in terms of its asset base, 
sophistication in operations and management, as well as its pioneering 
efforts in international diversification. 
One of the sources of NSSF assets comes from the operation of reduction of 
state shares, which triggered the first attempt to reduce state shares by China 
Government in June 2001.  
                                               
14 The 9 provinces are Jilin, Heilongjiang, Tianjin, Shanxi, Henan, Xinjiang, Shandong, Hunan and 
Hubei. 
57 
 
3.2 Measures (2001) 
In early 2001, the central Government decided to sell its ownership of the 
listed enterprises to raise funds to replenish the newly established NSSF. On 
12
th 
June 2001, State Council issued a regulation entitled Provisional 
Measures on Management over the Reduction of State Shares to Raise the 
Social-security Fund (Measures 2001)
15
, which detailed the program to 
reduce state stock. 
3.2.1 Overall background 
Economic background 
The overall economy in China was booming around 2001, which made the 
Government thought it was a good time to make an announcement of 
reducing the state-shares.  
In the 1990s, the Chinese economy continued to grow at a rapid pace, at 
about 9.5%. The Asian financial crisis affected China at the margin, mainly 
through decreased foreign direct investment and a sharp drop in the growth 
of its exports. However, China had huge reserves, a currency that was not 
freely convertible, and capital inflows that consisted overwhelmingly of 
long-term investment. China GDP reached RMB 9.92 trillion ($1.2 trillion) 
in 2000 and RMB 10.97 trillion ($1.32 trillion) in 2001, around 13% of the 
US GDP at that time. The growth rate of China GDP recorded at 10.6% and 
10.5% in 2000 and 2001 respectively, compared to a growth rate of 3.5% in 
the US and negative growth in Japan. 
China stock exchanges entered a bull market since May 1999. Just days 
before the release of Measures (2001), the A-share market indices went up 
quickly by over 80% and reached a record high as of the 1998 Asian crisis.  
                                               
15 Refer to appendix 1 for full text of Measures (2001) 
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Under this circumstance, the Government was intended to carry forward the 
privatisation process.  
Relaxing the restrictions on the demand for shares 
China Government imposed the supply and demand controls on the stock 
market until the late 1990s. But the restrictions on both supply and demand 
sides were relaxed since late 1990s. On the demand side, the controls have 
been loosened:  
• The A and B share markets were completed segmented prior to Feb 19, 
2001 but B share markets were opened to domestic investors since then: 
domestic individuals were permitted to buy B-shares using foreign 
currency (US dollar for Shanghai B shares, Hong Kong dollars for 
Shenzhen B shares) with certain conditions. On Feb 19 2001, the CSRC 
announced that Chinese nationals with existing foreign currency deposit 
accounts with a domestic commercial bank are allowed to trade B shares 
starting from Feb 28 2001. Chinese nationals who opened such foreign 
currency deposit accounts after Feb 19 are allowed to trade B shares 
from June 1 2001 onwards. The B share markets were closed for a week 
after the announcement and resumed trading on Feb 28, 2001.  
• The A-share market was opened to foreign investors under the scheme 
of QFII (Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor) in 2002. Chinese 
mainland stock exchanges were previously closed off to foreign 
investors due to China's exercise of tight capital controls which restrict 
the movement of assets in-and-out of the country. The QFII
16
 is a 
Chinese program that was launched in 2002 to allow licensed foreign 
investors to buy and sell yuan-denominated “A” shares in China's 
mainland stock exchanges (in Shanghai and Shenzhen). The qualified 
                                               
16 More can be found on: http://www.llinkslaw.com/shangchuan/20092594011.pdf 
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foreign institutional investors may, upon approval by the competent 
regulatory bodies, remit a certain amount of foreign exchange into China 
under specific regulations and restrictions and convert the foreign 
exchange into local currency for direct investment in the local securities 
market through the designated accounts under close supervision, and 
allowing them to remit abroad capital gains and dividends from the 
investments after being converted back into foreign exchange upon 
approval. This QFII regime actually refers to a regulatory system for 
securities investments introduced before the capital market is fully 
opened up.  
• Some selected securities enterprises were also allowed to borrow funds 
from banks with their shares as collateral since February 2000. The 
central bank and the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) jointly 
promulgated the “Administrative Measures governing Stock Collateral 
Loans for Securities Firms”, allowing qualified securities firms with a 
comprehensive self-stocks and securities investment fund certificates as 
collateral to borrow from commercial banks, which is considered a new 
channel of short-term financing for listed companies. The shares a 
comprehensive security company trades on the primary and secondary 
market on its own using its own funds are self-stocks. 
• Beginning in September 1999, institutional investors were gradually 
permitted to invest in the stock market either directly or indirectly 
through investment vehicles such as investment funds.  
Relaxing the restrictions on the demand for shares was intended not only to 
accommodate the increase in the supply of IPO and post-IPO issuance but 
also to support the Government’s plan of reducing the state ownership stake 
in listed enterprises (Naughton 2002a, 2002b). The lift of restrictions on the 
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demand of shares was aimed to promote the investment in the stock 
markets.  
3.2.2 Objective 
Measures (2001) aims to reduce the state shares in listed companies 
(including companies to be listed) by means of transferring the state shares 
to the public and public investors like securities-investment funds.  
3.2.3 Ownership of state shares 
In principle, state assets are owned by the state, managed at different levels 
and operated with authorization. The State Council exercises in a unified 
manner the ownership over state shares on behalf of the state. Specifically, 
the units that are authorized to represent the state to hold state shares in 
listed companies exercise the ownership at different levels.  
3.2.4 Approach 
The reduction of state shares is mainly carried out through issuing the 
stocked state shares. When joint-stock limited companies with state shares 
(including companies listed overseas) launch initial public offerings (IPOs) 
and issue additional stocks, they shall sell state shares, up to 10 percent of 
the total funds to be raised. If a joint-stock limited company has been 
established for less than three years, the state shares to be sold shall be 
transferred to the Council of the National of Social-security Fund. The 
council will then authorize the company to sell the shares at one time or 
over several times when it publicly raises capital by floating stocks. 
Revenue from the selling of stocked state shares shall all be turned over to 
NSSF.  
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3.2.5 Pricing of state shares 
The reduction of state shares shall on principle adopt the method of market 
pricing. The operations shall be examined, approved and implemented by 
the Inter-ministry Joint Conference (IMJC). The MoF shall be responsible 
for the convention of the Inter-ministry Joint Conference. The Inter-ministry 
Joint Conference is comprised of the State Development Planning 
Commission (SDPC), the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC), 
the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MoLSS), The CSRC and the 
Council of NSSF. The conference is mainly responsible for working out the 
fundraising plan and pricing principle in relation to the reduction of state 
shares. It also studies and solves other major problems related to the 
reduction of state shares for fund raising. The office of the Inter-ministry 
Joint Conference, which is set in the MOF, undertakes specific matters 
related to the Joint Conference. All the members in the conference are 
expected to work with each other to work out the plans. But Measures (2001) 
doesn’t set forth the definite division of responsibilities affixed to each 
member.  
3.2.6 Required documents 
For those the Inter-ministry Joint Conference has decided to reduce state 
shares, the representative units authorized by state shareholders need to 
provide the following documents: 
• Prospectus (draft) for the reduction of state shares and underwriting 
agreement (Measures 2001 doesn’t specify who is doing the 
underwriting. In previous cases like China IPOs, underwriters are 
appointed by issuers. The role of underwriters in equity offerings has 
gone through three stages in China. Prior to 2001, the task of selecting 
eligible firms primarily rested with local Governments, which usually 
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considered firm performance and regional development objectives. 
Underwriters had limited influence on the choice of issuers. From 2001 
to January 2005, the selection of issuers was decentralized to 
underwriters, who began to pay particular attention to project selection 
and to play a critical role in equity offerings. However prestigious and 
less prestigious underwriters were treated equally. Since early 2005, 
only underwriters with qualified sponsors can underwrite offerings, and 
competition among underwriters has become increasingly fierce.
17
) 
• Written commitment of the representative unit and the lead underwriter 
on turning over the revenue from the reduction of state shares 
• Other documents required by the Inter-ministry Joint Conference. 
3.2.7 Regulatory body 
The CSRC is responsible for making rules for the information disclosure 
and market regulations concerning the reduction of state shares in listed 
companies. 
3.2.8 Use of proceeds 
The lead underwriter shall be responsible for turning over the revenue 
payable from the issuance of stocked state shares to the designated item set 
by the budget of the MOF within two days after obtaining the revenue. The 
MOF shall allocate the funds to the Council of NSSF within five days and 
undergo formalities for verifying the reduction of state-owned capital in 
related units.  
                                               
17 For details on underwriting information in China, please refer to Luo et al. (2010), “Information 
Risk and Underwriter Switching in SEOs: Evidence from China”, Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting, 37(7) & (8), 905–928 
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3.2.9 Verification 
After these measures are implemented, the transfer by agreement of the state 
shares in listed companies shall be verified by the MOF. The securities 
registrar handles formalities related to the transfer of stock ownership 
according to the official and written reply of the MOF. Specific proportion 
of the revenue from the transfer to NSSF and operation methods are made 
by the Inter-ministry Joint Conference and submitted to the State Council 
for approval before being implemented.  
3.3 Market response 
On 12th June 2001 which saw the announcement of Measures (2001), the 
reduction of state-shares was launched and the Government started offering 
non-tradable state-shares as if they were freely-traded A shares to the 
A-share market in IPOs and seasoned offerings (additional stock issued to 
the secondary market). The trading constraints on the offered restricted 
shares were also terminated without consulting with the holders of 
freely-traded A shares.  
3.3.1 Short-term effect 
Quite a few papers observed a dramatic downturn in both Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange following the announcement. Wu 
(2002) found that in the four months from mid-June to mid-October, the 
Shanghai A Share Index and the Shenzhen A Share Index dropped by about 
31% and 33% respectively. Hou (2010) showed that the Cumulative Market 
Return (CMR) of the freely-traded shares in two exchanges in China 
collapsed and greatly underperformed the US and UK Stock Markets, even 
though the US stock market was affected by the “September-11” attack. De 
Jonge (2008) also spotted that major indices on both exchanges fell 
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substantially following the announcement. Although China Government 
emphasized it was a mere proposal, De Jonge (2008) alleged that its 
existence contributed to the perception that implementation of a plan to sell 
state-shares was imminent and thus contributed to a significant downward 
trend to the relevant indices. Kim et al. (2003) declared that the sell-off of 
state shares was widely unpopular and was blamed in part for the 
subsequent equity market decline. 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the main market indices on Chins stock markets from 12
 
June 2001 till the end of 2005. As highlighted with solid dots, the blue line 
of Shanghai A-share Index (SHAI) (000002) fell by 29.26% and the red line 
of Shenzhen A-share Index (SZAI) (399107) slumped by 34.31% within 
three months after 12 June 2001. The losses were worth some RMB 600 
billion. These finding are consistent with the papers listed above. 
 
Figure 3.1 source: http://www.google.com/finance 
 
In addition, Figure 2.2 compares the Shanghai A-share Index and Shenzhen 
A-share Index to S&P 500 (.INX) and UK FTSE All share (FTAS) from 12 
June 2001 till end of 2005. As highlighted with the solid dots, the S&P 500 
(orange line) and the FTAS (green line) declined by 15.47% and 16.48% 
respectively within three months as of 12 June 2001, around half the 
decreases witnessed on the China stock markets over the same period. This 
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is consistent with Hou (2010) that the US and UK markets greatly 
outperformed China markets.  
 
Figure 3.2 Source: http://www.google.com/finance 
 
China Government suspended the procedure on 22 October 2001 while a 
new proposal for reducing state-shares was conceived.  
In November 2001, the CSRC asked the public for suggestions on how to go 
about organizing future state share sales. Thousands of letter and emails 
flew in and the CSRC in December 2001 published an edited list of the 
proposals and asked the research department of nine security companies to 
examine seven of them in details. In January 2002, the CSRC convened a 
consultation meeting to discuss the two most popular methods. The first 
involved a form of administrative pricing. State shares would be valued on 
the basis of a formula linking their net asset value with annual earnings. The 
second option involved market-based pricing above a set floor. An auction 
would be held for the state shares of selected companies. If the winning 
bid’s price was above the NAV then the sale would be authorised. Many in 
the CSRC supported the second scheme while MoF backed the first. The 
meeting finally broke up without consensus. The State Council decided to 
cancel the program in June 2002 since the market continued to slide down. 
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As Figure 2.1 suggests, from Jan 2002 to the end of June 2002, SHAI and 
SZAI dropped by 39% and 44% respectively. Meanwhile Figure 2.2 
demonstrates that S&P 500 the FTAS were actually climbing up steadily 
during the same period, indicating China stock markets tended to be 
overwhelmingly affected by country-specific factors. 
As the market slid down, many private investors, including small investors 
and a significant interest group of fund management firms, became 
dangerously exposed. The state Council then had to announce a halt to the 
sale of state-owned shares on domestic market returns in June 2002. The 
first attempt to reduce state-shares which were non tradable was regarded as 
unsuccessful.  
3.3.2 Long-term effect 
Even after the Government terminated the plan in June 2002, the effect 
seemed persisted in the long-run. In Figure 2.4, the continuous decline in the 
main indices of SHAI and SZAI seemed to persistently spread the 
pessimistic sentiments across the investors. The SZAI was improving 
relative to the SHAI since the SZAI line is below the SHAI line at the 
beginning but moves above the red line from the point of middle 2003.  
In Figure 2.5, S&P 500 and FTAS in the long-run were moving up steadily 
and gradually while the SHAI and SZAI kept sliding down. The wider and 
wider gap along the timeline between the China market indices and the US 
and UK market indices indicate that the China stock markets were moving 
further away from the western markets in the long-run. The persistent 
long-run effect indicates the gloomy clouds were always looming above the 
investors.      
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3.3.3 Dilution effect and uncertainty 
Many researchers, Wong (2006), Kim et al. (2003) and De Jonge (2008), 
attributed the market slump to dilution effect in the tradable A-share market, 
which feared it would be flooded with these state shares, in general twice as 
much as the tradable A shares. Measures (2001) stated that value of 
state-shares to be sold should be no more than 10% of the proceeds of IPOs 
(of companies to be listed) and Post-IPO issuances (of listed companies). 
This is kind of restriction on state shares immediately available for sale but 
very ambiguous about the scale of sale, exactly how many state shares 
would be floated. Green (2003) pointed out the June 2001 scheme failed to 
lay down reliable guidelines for when, and in what quantities, state shares 
would be sold. With plans for future sales unclear, investors were left to fear 
a sudden tidal wave of equity that would destroy the value of their portfolios. 
This uncertainty over when this would be or what shape the sales would 
then take aggravated dilution effect. He then suggested a credible timetable 
was required.  
3.3.4 Equal pricing envision 
Moreover, Beltratti and Bortolotti (2006) stated that the 1
st
 attempt failed 
badly in 2001 because the Measures (2001) envisaged an equal pricing for 
tradable and non-tradable shares. In private transfers and auctions in China, 
non-tradable state shares were priced at net asset value (NAV), different 
from the model by Longstaff (1995), which discounted non-tradable shares 
(lock-up shares) off-exchange by the liquidity premium. According to Chen 
and Xiong (2001), the NTAS were priced at a discount of 70%-80% of the 
price of TAS in the informal markets. Equal pricing, therefore, was 
suspicious of transferring wealth from the private investors to the 
Government (the holders of NTAS).  
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3.4 Concluding Remarks 
The first attempt to convert NTAS to TAS was operationally designed in 
order to raise more funds to support the newly established pension system in 
China. As a by-product, the liberalization of state-held NTAS can help pave 
the way to facilitate full privatisation of state controlled quoted companies. 
However, there are not any official documents that clearly announced this as 
a goal of the liberalization, although there are some studies that might 
expect this to happen in the future. For instance, China’s state controlled 
backs are listed on the market but they are clearly not fully privatized at the 
present and also in the foreseeable future, even if they have all of their 
shares that are tradable on the market.    
Though carried out in a favorable macro-economic environment, this initial 
attempt was responded with a market plummet, which lasted for a quite long 
period, indicating the confidence of investors in the A-share market was 
damaged severely in the short-run and failed to recover even in the long-run. 
This plan therefore scraped in 2002.  
The minority private investors, who only possessed relatively one third of 
the total shares outstanding in the listed firms, dominated the tradable 
A-share market. The 2001 announcement of floating state shares in majority 
to the tradable A-share market agitated the investors. Neither were they 
happy with the scheme of equal pricing as they believed the state shares 
were overvalued. Moreover, the uncertainties over when this would happen 
and how many would be sold also fretted the investors.  
This unsuccessful attempt indicates that a premise to carry on the reform of 
reducing state ownership is to take into account the interests of the private 
investors namely the holders of TAS, to communicate with them effectively 
and to make compromise if necessary.  
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Chapter 4. China Full Circulation Reform 
The early initiative in 2001 was to invite companies to reduce the proportion 
of state ownership by selling non-tradable state-owned A shares, up to no 
more than 10% of IPOs and post-IPO issuances, into the A-share markets 
without a clear-set scheme, which resulted in a significant decline in stock 
prices in the A-share markets as shown in figure 2.4 and 2.5. The A-share 
markets feared that the overwhelming size of state shares going to be sold at 
the market price of TAS would depress the share prices. The uncertainties, 
such as when the state shares would be sold and in what quantities, as well 
as the future plans regarding the remained state shares, kept making the 
market nervous and unconfident of this selling plan, which drove the market 
down dramatically. The Government withdrew the plan in October 2002 and 
this marked the initial, albeit unsuccessful, attempt at share ownership 
reform. 
A-shares are only available to domestic investors. This kind of effort to 
reduce state-owned A-shares in a large scale only involved domestic 
investors and the A-share markets. The foreign players on the B-share or 
H-share markets, which were segmented from the A-share markets, didn’t 
need to worry about the pressure from the flotation of large-size 
non-tradable A-shares. 
4.1 Improvements in protection of minority shareholders 
The failure reflected that the public shareholders - the holders of TAS - were 
not confident that their interests would be protected or even would not be 
damaged in the operation of reducing state shares. Therefore many efforts 
were made to comfort the private investors that their interest would be taken 
into account.  
71 
 
4.1.1 Improvement in voting rights  
The CSRC promulgated a Code of Corporate Governance for Listed 
Companies in early 2002 [Code (2002) thereafter]. The Code was developed 
according to the OECD 
18
Principles of Corporate Governance, taking into 
consideration the peculiarity of the Chinese market. 
The Code is mandatory for all listed companies to follow, and puts the 
protection of shareholders’ rights as the basic goal of corporate governance. 
In doing so, the Code asks for equitable treatment of all shareholders. Listed 
companies may adopt proxy voting and cumulative voting methods
19
 to 
protect the rights of minority shareholders. The Code also calls for 
shareholder activism and the increased participation of institutional 
investors. 
To better protect the rights and interests of public investors, On 7th 
December 2004, the CSRC issued Strengthening the Protection of the 
Rights and Interests of Public Shareholders Several Provisions 
20
[Provisions (2004) thereafter], which aims to establish a constraining 
mechanism to combat the abuse of control of listed companies and to 
protect the lawful rights and interests of shareholder. According to the 
Provisions (2004), listed companies’ major business decisions, such as asset 
                                               
18 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development is an international economic 
organisation of 33 countries. It defines itself as a forum of countries committed to democracy and the 
market economy, providing a setting to compare policy experiences, seeking answers to common 
problems, identifying good practices, and co-ordinating domestic and international policies of its 
members. 
19   Cumulative voting is a type of voting process that helps strengthen the ability of minority 
shareholders to elect a director. This method allows shareholders to cast all of their votes for a single 
nominee for the board of directors when the company has multiple openings on its board. In contrast, 
in "regular" or "statutory" voting, shareholders may not give more than one vote per share to any 
single nominee.  
20 Refer to appendix 3 for main aspects 
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restructuring
21
 and equity-for-debt plan, should win majority votes (more 
than one half) from voting holders of public shareholders in the general 
shareholders meeting.  
Given China’s vast territory and dispersed geographic location of investors, 
it is often difficult for many investors to attend shareholders meetings in 
person. Therefore, the Provisions require listed companies to provide online 
voting platforms for shareholders’ meeting.22 Listed companies must also 
actively pursue a system of cumulative voting when electing directors and 
supervisors which fully takes into account the opinions of minority 
shareholders.  
Even if the holder of TAS present were inferior to those of NTAS in terms 
of the proportion size (one third vs two thirds), their opinions and interest 
are appreciated, respected and protected. This Provisions landmark the 
developments to protect public holders in minority.  
4.1.2 Call for improvements from the State Council  
On 1st Feb 2004, the State Council issued Some Opinions of the State 
Council on Promoting the Reform, Opening and Steady Growth of Capital 
Markets
23
 [Opinions (2004) thereafter], the third article of which read 
“actively and reliably resolving the problem of separation of equity 
ownership and trading rights
24” and “When resolving this issue, the solution 
must respect market laws, contribute to the stability and development of the 
                                               
21 Corporate governance reform has been on the CSRC’s top agenda since 2001. Vigorous measures 
have been taken since then to improve the corporate governance of Chinese listed companies. This 
regulation is one of them.  
22 However, more work needs to be done to promote the understanding of on-line voting among 
investors and increase the turnout rate (statistics show that those who have voted on-line represent no 
more than 10% of the tradable shares of the company). 
23 Please refer to appendix 2 for full text of Opinions (2004) 
24 The separation of equity ownership refers to the separation between the tradable and non-tradable 
shares. Tradable shares have trading right while non-tradable shares don’t. 
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market and genuinely protect the lawful rights and interests of investors, in 
particular public investors”. Apparently Opinions (2004) indicated two 
things. First, the Government was still hoping to reduce the state shares in 
the listed companies since the NTAS constituted a major hurdle for 
domestic financial development. Second the market slump following the 
initial attempt was so impressive that the Government was determined to 
prevent the reoccurrence of market depression in a next attempt. The 
Government decided to concentrate on protecting the interests of holders of 
TAS so that they wouldn’t feel unsure and keep selling shares if the 
Government was about to announce to reduce state shares.  
Opinions (2004) burdened the CSRC with a compulsory task to solve the 
separation of TAS and NTAS. Under the pressure of Opinions, Dr. Shang 
Fulin, Chairman of CSRC, frequently gave public speeches as well as held 
meetings and discussions with relevant important parties.  
The lobbying activities by CSRC as well as the improved voting system in 
accordance with Code and Opinions (2004) finally prepared for the 
full-circulation Reform.  
4.2 China Full Circulation Reform 
In line with Opinions (2004), the CSRC started to float non-tradable shares 
in 2005.  
Below is the timeline of the release of FCR-relevant policies, as well as the 
announcements of group reforms in light of these policies.  
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Notice (2005) 
April 29
th
 2005 
For all firms with 
non-tradable shares 
Guidelines (2005)  
May 8
th
 2005 
For pilot firms 
May 9
th
 2005 
4 firms in Pilot 
Group 1 made reform 
announcements 
June 17
th
 2005 
42 firms in Pilot Group 
2 made reform 
announcements 
 
Measures (2005) 
September 5
th
 2005 
For the rest firms  
September 12
th
 2005 
Group 1 
40 firms made reform 
announcements 
December 31
st
 2006 
Group 64 
32 firms made reform 
announcements 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 The timeline of macro events including the announcement of policies and 
the relevant groups under guidance 
4.2.1 Notice (2005) 
On April 29, 2005, the CSRC promulgated the Notice on the Trial 
Implementation of Measures on Full Circulation Reform for Listed 
Companies and Related Questions [Notice (2005) thereafter
25
]. This 
announcement formally launched Full Circulation Reform (FCR thereafter) 
in China stock markets and was supposed to affect all the listed companies 
in China.  
Equity separation reform 
According to Notice (2005), with a view to implement Opinions (2004), a 
pilot program was to be launched to reform the separation of equity 
ownership – the separation of tradable A shares and non-tradable A shares – 
by floating the non-tradable shares of listed firms to the China A-share 
markets – the Shanghai Stock Exchanges (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges (SZSE) set up in early 1990s. 
China FCR is also known as the split-share structure reform or non-tradable 
shares reform. Since the inception of the Chinese domestic A-share market 
in the early 1990s, tradable and non-tradable shares of otherwise identical 
                                               
25 The full Chinese text is available on http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/FI-c/852093.htm. 
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rights coexisted for a company. Under such dual share structure, two thirds 
of the A-shares outstanding were non-tradable shares owned mainly by the 
Chinese Government and its affiliates and legal persons. The non-tradable 
shares were transacted on contract base and subject to the approval of 
regulatory authorities. The tradable shares were largely held by institutional 
and individual investors. The purpose of establishing such dual share 
structure was to enable the SOEs to raise capital and the Government to 
retain control at the same time. In Chapter 2, it’s been illustrated that the 
partial privatisation, though did improve the internal governance and 
competition for a small proportion of listed companies, failed to meet the 
expectation to improve the performance of listed firms. Private shares in 
listed firms were found to have positive impact while the retained 
Government ownership seemed to work oppositely. Chapter 3 suggests that 
the first attempt seeking to reduce the state shares failed because the 
interests of the TAS holders were neglected which destroyed their 
confidence in the markets. Therefore the split-share structure is necessary to 
revitalise Chinese SOEs but has this time taken pains not to repeat the 
mistake and to safeguard the interests of the owners of TAS.  
Statement to protect the interests of investors       
Notice (2005) stated that a pilot program should comply with the overall 
requirement set forth by Opinions (2004) to contribute to the stability and 
healthy growth of market and to protect the lawful rights and interests of 
public investors. In line with this statement, Notice (2005) set forth the 
relevant issues as follows:  
• The selection of pilot companies 
The final decision is made by the CSRC after considering the proposals 
submitted from firms with intention to reform.  
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• Disclosure of relevant information 
Pilot firms should disclose relevant information voluntarily, fairly, 
accurately and completely.  
• Time scale  
1
st
 suspension: once announced as a pilot firm, the firm should suspend 
immediately. The board should then work with the sponsor employed on 
the reform proposal.  
1
st
 resumption: once the proposal is publicised, the firm should apply to 
resume.  
2
nd
 suspension: the firm should suspend one day before the scheduled 
registration date of the shareholders’ meeting. 
2
nd
 resumption: once the proposal is voted through, the firm should 
publicise the proposal and the “pass” result within two days, and at the 
same time apply to resume trading. If not, the firm should publicise the 
“fail” result within two days and apply to resume trading.  
• Voting rights of shareholders 
Online voting and proxy voting are adopted. The reform proposal should 
win no less than two thirds of the votes from both TAS holders and 
NTAS holders.  
• Lock-up period 
No trading of NTAS is allowed within 12 months after the 2
nd
 
resumption.  
• Trading restriction 
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NTAS holders who have more than 5% of the firm’s total shares 
outstanding are not allowed to trade more than 5% / 10% of the total 
shares within 12 / 24 months after the 12 months lock-up. Once there is 
a large sale of NTAS exceeding 1% of the total shares, the investors 
should be notified.  
• Supervisory duties 
The CSRC should supervise the overall reform process in an effort to 
prevent any illegal operations.  
• Operational guidelines  
The stock exchanges should draft operational guidelines in accordance 
with Notice (2005). 
Generally speaking, Notice (2005) drew up the basic structure of the reform 
but missed lots of operational details. Further adjustments, improvements 
and supplements were required to enrich this basic form as coming down to 
the concrete and complicated issues. Point 8 reflects that the CSRC have 
noticed this already. The key elements described from point 1 to 7 were 
expected to be inherited in general or partially inherited into future 
documents.  
4.2.2 Guidelines (2005) 
Based on Notice (2005), the Shanghai Stock Exchange, the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange and the China Securities Depository & Clearing Corporation 
Limited (D&C hereinafter) issued Operational Guidelines for the Pilot 
Reform of the Listed Companies [Pilot Guidelines (2005)] 
26
 on 8
th
 May 
                                               
26 The full Chinese text is available on 
http://www.chinasecurities.xinhua.org/gqfz/zcfg/t20050509_674933.htm. 
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2005 which set out the operational procedures from the 1
st
 suspension to the 
2
nd
 resumption for the pilot reform program.  
1. 1st suspension  
Once selected by the CSRC, the firm board should immediately report to 
the stock exchange and apply for suspending its shares as well as 
disclose relevant information like the ownership of NTAS holders, the 
potential impact of the reform and the risks, the sponsor to be employed 
etc.. 
2. 1st resumption 
The firm should communicate effectively with the stock exchange and 
the D&C on the reform proposal. Independent directors should give 
views on crucial issues, such as how the reform proposal would 
influence the management and protect public investors. Within two days 
the proposal is ready, the firms should apply to resume to the market.  
3. The reform brochure of the firm should include:  
• The history of the ownership structure from listing; 
• The interaction between the NTAS holders and their respective 
ownerships; 
• The trading of TAS by NTAS holders within six months before the 
1
st
 suspension; 
• The trading of TAS by the sponsor employed within six months 
before the 1
st
 suspension; 
• The reform proposal; 
• Other relevant issues. 
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4. The sponsor letter should include : 
• Whether there is any significant breach of market rules by the firm 
within three years time; 
• Whether there is any ownership dispute on NTAS of the firm, or 
pledge of NTAS, or freeze of NTAS; 
• Assessment on how reform proposal would protect the interests of 
TAS holders of the firm; 
• Assessment on how reform proposal would influence the 
management of the firm; 
• Independence of the sponsor; 
• Relevant documents check; 
• Other specific issues; 
• Conclusion by the sponsor; 
• Contact details of the sponsor. 
5. 2nd suspension 
The firm should suspend one day before the scheduled registration date 
of the shareholders’ meeting. Farcicalities required for online voting 
proxy voting should be ready by then.  
6. 2nd resumption 
Once the reform proposal receives no less than two thirds of the votes 
from both the holders of TAS and NTAS, the firm should publicise the 
proposal and the “pass” result within two days, and at the same time 
apply to resume trading. If not, the firm should publicise the “fail” 
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result within two days and apply to resume trading. The stock exchange 
should review the relevant documents publicised and decide whether to 
approve the decision from the shareholders’ meeting.  
Based on Notice (2005), Pilot Guidelines (2005) further specified the 
information to be disclosed during the reform.  
4.2.3 First pilot group  
On May 9, 2005, one day after the release of Pilot Guidelines (2005), the 
CSRC announced a pilot program, inviting a first group of four companies 
to transform NTAS into TAS by compensating existing shareholders.  
These companies are Shanghai-listed Tsinghua Tongfang (600100), Zi Jiang 
Enterprise (600210) and Sanyi Heavy Industry (600031), and 
Shenzhen-listed Jinniu Engergy Resources (000937). As Table 4.1 shows, 
Tsinghua Tongfang is an IT company, Zi Jiang Enterprise is operating in the 
coal industry, Sanyi Heavy Industry and Jinniu Engergy Resources are 
manufacturing companies, producing plastic products and construction 
machinery respectively. The proportion of non-tradable A shares (NTAS) 
by then was 52.48% and 58.47% for Tsinghua Tongfang and Zi Jiang 
respectively but was 72.11% and 75% for Jinniu and Sanyi respectively.  
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 Tsinghua 
Tongfang 
Jinniu Energy 
Resources 
Sanyi Heavy 
Industry 
Zi Jiang 
Enterprise  
Listing SHSE SZSE SHSE SHSE 
Code 600100 000937 600031 600210 
Main 
Activities: 
Production and 
Sale of IT 
products, and 
software 
Manufacture of 
construction 
machinery 
Manufacture 
of PET bottles 
and plastic 
products 
Extraction and 
sale of Coal 
NTAS % 52.48% 75% 58.47% 72.11% 
Date of 1st 
suspension 
9th May 2005 9th May 2005 9th May 2005 9th May 2005 
Date of 1st 
resumption 
12th May 2005  16th May 2005 11th May 2005 12th May 2005 
Date of 2nd 
Suspension 
6th June 2005 6th June 2005 2nd June 2005 3rd June 2005 
Date of 2nd 
resumption 
11th June 2005 
Fail 
21st June 2005 
Success  
14th June 2005 
Success 
26th July 2005 
Success 
Consideration 
paying date27  
NA 28the June 2005 17th June 2005 29 July 2005 
Consideration 
size 
The NTAS 
holders would 
give shares 
received from the 
1.475-for-1 stock 
split to the TAS 
owners, equal to 
0.525 bonus share 
for every TAS 
owned.  
The owners of 
NTAS would 
give the owners 
of TAS 0.25 
share for every 
1 share they 
own 
The owners of 
NTAS would 
give the 
owners of 
TAS 0.35 
share RMB0.8 
for every share 
they own 
The NTAS 
owners would 
give the TAS 
owners 0.3 
share for every 
TAS share they 
own 
Computation 
basis 
No details 
provided 
Estimated P/E 
ratio to calculate 
the aftermarket 
share price 
No details 
provided 
Valued the 
NTAS and TAS 
respectively 
with NAV and 
the pre-market 
price and 
calculated the 
weighted mean 
to    estimate 
                                               
27 A few days after the 2nd resumption date, firms were suspended for one day in order to 
record the shareholders who were entitled to get Consideration payment. The next trading 
day is Consideration payment day. 
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the aftermarket 
share price.  
Commitments 
of the NTAS 
holders 
Lock-up of NTAS 
for the first 12 
months. During 
the following 12 
/24 months, up to 
5% /10% NTAS 
are allowed to be 
sold. 
Lock-up of 
NTAS for the 
first 12 months. 
During the 
following 12 
months, up to 
10% NTAS are 
allowed to be 
sold. The floor 
selling price is 
112.1% of the 
closing price on 
April 29 2005 
for five 
consecutive 
trading days.  
Lock-up of 
NTAS for the 
first 12 
months. 
During the 
following 12 / 
36 months, up 
to 4% / 10% 
NTAS are 
allowed to be 
sold. The floor 
selling price is 
110% of the 
average price 
30 days to 
April 29 2005.  
Lock-up of 
NTAS for the 
first 24 months. 
During the 
following 18 
months, up to 
5% NTAS are 
allowed to be 
sold. The 
minimum 
selling price is 
RMB8.71 (floor 
price). 
 Note: the floor price is adjusted or distributions and stock splits, rights 
issues, etc. 
Source: http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/chinaggzw/index.shtml 
Table 4.1 Comparison of reform proposals of four companies in the first pilot group 
 
It was expected that the pilot firms would help to test the responses from the 
public shareholders to the firm-specific reform announcements. As 
illustrated in sector 3.1, the CSRC, this time, seriously planned to protect 
the interests of public shareholders who would be affected in the reform, in 
light of Opinions (2004). Firstly, the holders of NTAS were required to pay 
the holders of TAS enough Consideration to compensate them for the loss 
they would suffer in front of the floatation of large-scale NTAS. Secondly 
the reform proposal including the size of Consideration had to get no less 
than two thirds of the votes from the holders of TAS and NTAS respectively, 
as indicated in the classified voting system.  
All the 4 firms were suspended from 9
th
 May 2005. Each reform process 
involved an announcement of a reform plan and a subsequent shareholder’s 
meeting to vote for the proposal.  
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Tsinghua Tongfang as an example, it publicised on 11
th
 May 2005 an initial 
reform plan proposed by the holders of NTAS, including the Consideration 
size and the schedule of shareholders’ meeting. Simultaneously, Jingwei 
Law Firm issued legal opinions on the proposal, declaring that the reform 
proposal was legal and was authorised by the CSRC. Southwest Securities 
Company issued recommendation opinions on the proposal, indicating that 
the reform proposal seriously and fairly considered the interests of the 
holders of TAS. According to the proposal, Tsinghua Tongfang would carry 
out a 1.475-for-1 stock split and transfer the new shares that the holders of 
NTAS would receive to the owners of TAS. Therefore, the owners of TAS 
would receive approximately 1 share [ %)48.521/()1475.1(  ] for every 1 
TAS held before the share split, of which 0.525 share 
[ %)48.521/(%48.52)1475.1(  ] would be the compensation from the 
holders of NTAS. The NTAS holders would not be allowed to sell any 
shares for the first 12 months from the final announcement day if the 
proposal would pass. They may sell up to 5% of their holdings during the 
following 12 months and up to 10% during the following 24 months. After 
the release of reform proposal, Tsinghua Tongfang resumed trading the next 
day on 12
th
 May 2005. The registration day of shareholders’ meeting was 3rd 
June 2005. Tsinghua Tongfang suspended trading again on 6
th
 June 2005 
when the directors began proxy solicitation and the online voting started. 
The shareholders’ meeting took place on 10th June 2005 and the reform 
proposal only got 61.9% of the votes from TAS owners, less than the 
minimum requirement of two thirds (66.7%) of the votes from TAS owners. 
The next day, the failure of Tsinghua Tongfang was publicised and the 
trading was resumed. Tsinghua Tongfang was brought back to the stage and 
was suspended again on 23
rd
 Dec 2005. This time, the NTAS holders 
promised to pay the TAS holders 0.366 for every TAS they own and 
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committed to lock-up NTAS for the first 36 months. On 5 Jan 2006, the 
Consideration size was adjusted to 0.38 for every TAS the holders own. The 
firm was resumed on 6
th
 Jan 2006. The directors started to solicit votes on 
12
th
 Jan 2006 on which day Tsinghua Tongfang suspended too. The 
shareholders’ meeting took place on 23rd Jan 2006. The proposal of 
Tsinghua Tongfang successfully got no less than 66.7% of the votes from 
the holders of both NTAS and NTAS this time and was resumed on 10
th
 Feb 
2006. 
The case of Jinniu Energy Resources announced the start of its reform and 
stopped trading on May 9
th
 2005. Then it publicised original reform plan on 
May 13
th
 2005, underwritten by Hualian Law Firm and China Coal Trust 
and Investment Company and resumed trading on May 16
th
 2005. 
According to the reform proposal, the owners of NTAS would give the 
owners of TAS 0.25 share for every 1 share they own. Jinniu estimated the 
P/E ratio of its shares once they were all tradable from that of its 
international competitors and calculated how many shares should be 
transferred to the TAS owners so that the market capitalisation of the TAS 
based on the estimated P/E ratio would be no less than the current market 
capitalization of TAS. Mathematically, the estimated market capitalisation 
of the TAS once all shares are tradable is where
 T
N  is the number of TAS. 
The current market capitalisation is Tcurrent NP  . 
The Consideration is 
bonus shares offered to the TAS owners in order to compensate them for the 
market loss, therefore: )( ononsideratiTtaftermarkeTcurrent CNPNP  . The unit 
Consideration per TAS held is consequently equal to: 
taftermarke
taftermarkecurrent
P
PP 
. On 
May 30 2005, the NTAS owners made adjustments on the commitment that 
they would not sell shares for the first 24 months from the day they 
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successfully announce the reform after the shareholders’ meeting. During 
the next 18 months, they would sell up to 5% of the holdings. The 
longer-than-required lock-up period made the current investors feel more 
secure. They also committed that the selling price would be no less than 
RMB8.71, similar to a put option on the NTAS with an exercise price of 
RMB8.71, indicating they had confidence in the future development of 
Jinniu and wouldn’t dump shares for proceeds. Jinniu suspended again on 
June 6
th
 2005 when the directors began to solicit votes from the holders of 
TAS. On June 21
st
 2005, Jinniu successfully completed the announcement 
of reform and resumed trading. On June 27
th
 2005, Jinniu suspended for one 
day and registered TAS shareholders and resumed the next day to pay the 
Consideration, suggesting only those who had Jinniu TAS by June 27
th
 2005 
were qualified to receive Consideration. 
Zi Jiang firstly suspended on 9
th
 May 2005, publicised its reforms proposal 
underwritten by Haotian Law Firm and Guosen Securities Co.,Ltd. on 11
th
 
May 2005 and resumed trading on 12
th
 May 2005. According to its original 
proposal, the NTAS owners would give the TAS owners 0.3 share for every 
TAS share they own. Instead using international evidence as a benchmark to 
estimate P/E ratio, the theoretic share price of Zi Jiang after the reform was 
computed by dividing the total share value before the reform, the market 
value of TAS plus the net asset value (NAV) of NTAS by the number of 
total shares. Mathematically, the theoretic aftermarket share price is: 
NTT
NTTcurrent
taftermarke
NN
NNAVNP
P


 , where NTN  is the number of NTAS 
and currentP  here is the average share price during the 30 days before the 
reform. And accordingly the pre-market value of TAS is equal to: 
NTtaftermarkeTtaftermarkeTcurrent NNAVPNPNP  )( . The part of 
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NTtaftermarke NNAVP  )(  would be paid in full by allotting share to the 
owners of TAS as Consideration. Therefore the unit Consideration should 
be equal to: 
taftermarke
taftermarkecurrent
taftermarke
taftermarke
T
NT
P
PP
P
NAVP
N
N 



)(
. The owners of 
NTAS would not be allowed to sell any shares in the first 12 months but 
would be allowed to sell up to 4% of their holdings during the next 12 
months and up to 10% during the following 3 years. The selling price 
should be no less than 110% of its average for the 30 days to April 29 2005 
and adjusted for any distributions, stock splits, right issues etc.. Zi Jiang 
suspended again on June 3
rd
 2005 when the directors began to solicit votes 
from the holders of TAS. On July 26
th
 2005, Zi Jiang successfully 
completed the announcement of reform and eventually resumed trading. On 
28
th
 July 2005, Zi Jiang suspended to register the qualified TAS 
shareholders and resumed the next day to pay Consideration accordingly. 
O n 9
th
 May 2005, Sanyi Heavy Industry firstly suspended and publicised 
initial proposal underwritten by Hunan Qiyuan Law Firm and China Euro 
Securities Ltd. and resumed on 11
th
 May 2005. In the original proposal, the 
owners of NTAS would give the owners of TAS 0.35 share RMB0.8 for 
every share they own. The Consideration was calculated by estimating the 
P/E ratio after the reform. Sany Heavy Industry failed to provide a proper 
explanation. The owners of NTAS would not b allowed to sell any shares in 
the first 12 months but would be allowed to sell up to 10% of their holdings 
during the next 12 months. The floor selling price is 112.1% of the closing 
price on April 29 2005 for five consecutive trading days. Sanyi suspended 
for the second time on 2
nd
 June 2005 when the proxy solicitation by 
direction began and resumed again on 14
th
 June 2005 after its reform 
proposal successfully won the majority votes (no less than two thirds) from 
the TAS owners. The TAS registration day was 16
th
 June 2005 and the firm 
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was suspended on this day. The Consideration paying day was 17
th
 June 
2005. 
Here is the summary of how the minority TAS owners were protected.  
• Basically the reform process of each firm consisted of two suspension 
stages. A firm was suspended when selected by the CSRC to go through 
the reform process. Initial proposal was released during the 1
st
 
suspension period and the firms would resume trading the next working 
day. The 2
nd
 suspension period started when the directors began to 
solicit votes. Then a few days later a shareholders’ meeting was held to 
vote for the reform proposal and the voting results were disclosed at the 
end. The firms usually resumed trading the next working day if the 
proposal won no less than two thirds of the votes from both the holders 
of NTAS and TAS. Otherwise, it failed. In the first pilot group, all the 
proposals were accepted except that of Tsinghua Tongfang, which 
failed the first time but came back with an improved proposal on 23
rd
 
Dec 2005 and successfully passed the second time. The TAS holders 
had a final say on the reform proposal which directly affected their 
interests during the reform.  
• There was a 12-month lock-up period from the successful 
announcement of reform after the proposal was voted through in the 
shareholders’ meeting. In the following two to three years, usually no 
more than 10% of NTAS were allowed to sell. The minority investors 
were protected as the selling of NTAS was not an immediate or one-off 
act that would drive the market down. In three out of four cases, a floor 
selling price was set, usually higher than an average price around the 
announcement of Measures (2005)  
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• The Consideration valuation was based on the assumption of a 
substantial price drop after the reform was successfully announced with 
a reform proposal voted through. The first step was to calculate the loss 
the TAS owners would suffer once all shares were tradable. Therefore 
the estimate of aftermarket share price was essential. Unfortunately the 
details how each firm estimates the share price are not available. The 
second step was to compute how many shares should be paid to them to 
compensate for the loss. Jinniu Energy Resources and Sany Heavy 
Industry both estimated P/E ratios after the reform to calculate the 
aftermarket share price. Whereas Tsinghua Tongfang proposed a stock 
split where all the new shares would be offered to the owners of TAS, 
presumably based on an estimated of aftermarket share price. Zi Jiang 
Enterprise estimated the aftermarket share price to be the weighted 
mean where NAV was used to value NTAS and TAS were market 
valued.  
• Jinniu Energy Resources amended their proposals after taking the 
advice of the owners of TAS during the trading period between the 1
st
 
and 2
nd
 suspension stages. It prolonged the lock-up period and put a 
floor under the price at which its major shareholders could sell their 
shares. This suggested that the owners of TAS played an active role to 
influence the proposals decisions and were protected.  
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Figure 4.2 shows the share price of the four companies during the reform 
period.  
 
Source: http://uk.finance.yahoo.com 
Figure 4.2: Return movements of the four companies 
 
The returns of Zi Jiang (600210.SS), Sanyi (600031.SS) and Tsinghua 
Tongfang (600100.SS) moved up by more than 10% on the 1
st
 resumption 
day while that of Jinniu (000937.SZ) dropped by nearly 40%, indicating 
except Jinniu, the investors in the A-share markets were happy about the 
reform plans proposed by the other three companies. But Tsinghua 
Tongfang actually failed in the voting stage which indicated that the TAS 
investors were not that supportive of its proposal released, opposite to the 
findings of positive market response here. Comparatively, Jinniu proposal 
set the least Consideration paid to the TAS owners, probably the reason that 
its proposal was adjusted later on that the NTAS owners of would not sell 
shares for the first 24 month and would sell up to 5% of the holdings during 
the next 18 months, in order to comfort the TAS owners.  
The return of Sanyi, Jinniu and Zi Jiang increased on the 2
nd
 resumption day, 
probably the investors wanted to be registered as the Consideration paying 
day was approaching. Furthermore, the return of Tsinghua Tongfang 
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increased as well as the news of failure, in other words the cancellation of 
reform proposal, was publicised.  
Except Tsinghua Tongfang, the returns of Sanyi, Jinniu and Zi Jiang sharply 
slid down on the Consideration paying day by nearly 50%, 15% and 25% 
respectively.  
4.2.4 Second pilot group  
On 20
th
 June 2005, the CSRC initiated the second pilot program involving 
42 companies worth 10% of overall stock market value. On August 19
th
 
2005, the second program was successfully accomplished since all the 
companies successfully announced reform with their reform proposals voted 
through in the shareholders’ meetings.  
The reform process of a firm in the second pilot program was similar to that 
in the first pilot program but changed in a few aspects.  
In the 1
st
 pilot group, the voting results in the shareholders’ meeting were 
released the next day and trading was from then resumed, named the 2
nd
 
resumption day. In the 2
nd
 pilot group, the voting results were released the 
next day of the shareholders’ meeting but the trading was not resumed till 
the Consideration paying day. Therefore the 2
nd
 resumption day in the pilot 
2 program refers to the Consideration paying day. For instance, 
Shenzhen-listed Luxi Chemicals (000830) suspended to announce the start 
of reform on 20th June 2005, publicised the original proposal on 14th July 
2005 and resumed trading the next day on 15 July 2005. According to the 
proposal, the NTAS owners would pay 0.3 share to the TAS owners for 
every one share they own. Since the 1st resumption day, the holders of 
NTAS were listening to the public shareholders on the A-share market and 
adjusted Consideration upward to 0.4 share per TAS held by the owners and 
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this revised proposal was announced on 1st Aug 2005. The NTAS owners 
promised they would not sell any share in the first 12 months. Luxi Group, 
the parent company who held more than 5% of the NTAS, wouldn’t sell any 
of its shares in Luxi Chemicals in the first three years and in the next two 
years, the selling price shouldn’t be less than RMB5.2, 32% higher than the 
average price in the 30 days before the reform. Luxi suspended again on 5 
Aug 2005 when the proxy solicitation started. The shareholders’ meeting 
took place on 16
th
 Aug and the trading was resumed on 23
rd
 Aug 2005, the 
next day of registration of TAS owners. 
In the 2
nd
 pilot group, various types of Consideration were proposed. For 
example, Jilin Aodong Pharmaceutics (000623) initially proposed that the 
NTAS owners to carry out a 1-to-0.6074 reverse stock split and give the 
TAS owners RMB0.093 for every TAS they own. The cash payment was 
increased to 0.186 after the TAS owners reacted negatively to the initial 
proposal. The percentage of NTAS of Jilin Aodong was 46.38% of total 
A-shares outstanding before the reform and decreased to 34.4% after the 
reverse stock split. Bao Steel (600019) proposed its NTAS owners would 
transfer to its TAS owners 2.2 shares as well as 1 European put warranty 
with an exercise price of RMB4.5 and a maturity of 378 days for every 10 
shares they own. If the share price at the maturity was smaller than RMB4.5, 
the TAS owners probably would sell the TAS at RMB4.5 to gain. Otherwise, 
they would keep the TAS. The TAS holders were protected from the 
downside risks in the market. Instead of giving warranty, the NTAS holders 
of Shanghai Automobile (000717) promised to buy back shares at RMB3.98 
subject to a maximum cost of RMB 1 billion if the share price fell below 
RMB3.98 in two month times after a successful announcement, other than 
its NTAS holders gave its TAS owners 0.34 share for every TAS they own.  
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In order to provide further incentives to the companies, the CSRC 
encouraged all mainland-listed companies to turn NTAS into TAS and 
stated that reform-compliant companies would be given priority to raise new 
capital. This is one of the value consequences of accepting the offer. 
Furthermore, according to the debt tax code, the debt interests in China are 
tax deductable. The debt covenants were restricted to TAS only before 
October 2001. A loan was allowed to be pledged against the state shares 
since the issuance of Notice on State-shares Pledged Loans on 25 Oct 2001 
and the state shares were valued as net asset rather market price. Then the 
transfer from NTAS to TAS increased debt capacity and hence the tax 
benefits. This also adds to the value of the FCR reform. 
4.2.5 The features of the pilot programs  
The pilot reform program has four main features: 
• It attempted to be flexible rather than impose a one-size-fits-all 
solution; 
• It allowed holders of NTAS and TAS to negotiate with each other over 
the reform proposal until a mutual agreement is achieved; 
• It addressed the concern of price volatility; 
• It addressed the effect of price pressure owing to the massive future 
supply of shares.  
Flexibility 
Both Notice (2005) and Guidelines Pilot Reform (2005) made no mention of 
any specific measures to deal with the problem of NTAS. When the CSRC 
previously carried out a public consultation on the issue in 2002, it received 
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over 4,000 suggestions, all of which had disadvantages as well as 
advantages and none stood out as the best solution (Inoue 2005). 
The CSRC didn’t impose a one-size-fits-all solution and instead allowed 
companies to come up with proposals of their own. In other words, the 
companies decided for themselves what was the best solution given their 
particular shareholder structure financial situation. By eliciting a wide range 
of responses, such an approach should also reduce the risk of the market 
moving in one direction in response to a one-size-fits-all solution, as 
happened on the previous occasion.  
The four companies involved in the first pilot group sounded out the views 
of the shareholders at extraordinary shareholders’ meetings, and in all four 
cases, the owners of NTAS proposed that the owners of tradable shares 
receive compensation
28
 in the form of transferred bonus share or cash. 
Leaving aside the issue of whether owners of TAS should be compensated, 
the type of compensation proposed and the thinking behind it varied 
considerably from company to company, and the discussions that were held 
with shareholders and market professionals elicited a wide range of 
reactions. In the case of the 42 companies involved in the second pilot group 
announced on 20
th
 June 2005, the compensation was more varied. One 
proposed the use of a reverse stock split (Jilin Aodong), four proposed the 
use of stock options (eg. Bao Steel), while eleven proposed that the owners 
of NTAS should buy shares if the share price fell below a certain level (eg. 
Shanghai Automobile).  
                                               
28 The compensation is termed as Consideration in the official documents issued in September 2005. 
Details are provided later in this chapter.  
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Classified voting system 
After drafting their reform proposals, companies had to submit them to a 
meeting of their board of directors and then to an extraordinary meeting of 
their shareholders. The details of the decision by the board of directions 
were normally published and shareholders voted on the proposals at an 
extraordinary meeting. In other words, the shareholders had the final say on 
whether a company’s proposals were accepted or rejected.  
Proposals were accepted or rejected on a two-thirds majority of those taking 
part in an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting, and the procedure was the 
same as that for a special resolution on important matters such as mergers, 
demergers and amendments to a company’s articles of incorporation.  
Votes were no longer put to all the shareholders together. No less than 
two-thirds of votes from the TAS owners must be sought separately so that 
the TAS owners won’t be outvoted. As previously mentioned in Provisions 
(2004) issued, the CSRC adopted this classified voting system in December 
2004 for resolutions on important issues such as rights issues and important 
asset transactions in order to safeguard the rights of the owners of TAS.  
In addition, companies were required to announce extraordinary 
shareholders’ meeting at least three times in order to encourage owners of 
TAS to attend and to ballot shareholders via the Internet for at least five 
days, while independent directors collected proxies from owners of TAS.  
Two suspension periods 
The reform announcements were expanded into two suspension periods, 
defined by a series of four critical event dates. Trading in a company’s 
shares was suspended from the day on which the company announced its 
intention to reform (the 1
st
 suspension date) till the day on which it 
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announced its proposals (the 1
st
 resumption date) as well as from the day 
when the directors began to solicit votes (the 2
nd
 suspension date: the 
following day of the record date for the right to attend an shareholders’ 
meeting) till the day on which the results of a vote were publicly announced 
(the 2
nd
 resumption date: also the Consideration paying day (the following 
day of the record date for the right to get Consideration) since the second 
pilot program). No price data was available during the two suspension 
periods. But trading was resumed on the two resumption dates from when 
the share prices were available. Information could be leaked before the two 
suspension dates and the share prices on the previous days were available 
too. 
The event information was released step by step on the four event dates and 
thus distributed the price effect and volatilities between the event dates. 
Furthermore, the market response around the previous event date might help 
to adjust the details to be released next. Consequently this arrangement 
protected the interests of minority TAS by diluting the risk and negative 
market impact as well as leaving room for the NTAS owners to adjust to 
improve the market reaction. 
Lock-up period and restrictions 
This program also sought to avoid a situation where a sudden and massive 
release of share onto the market upsets the demand-supply balance. In 
particular, a 12 month lockup period was established for the holders of 
NTAS. Furthermore, in the two years after the expiration of the lock-up, a 
holder of NTAS with more than 5% of the total issued share capital of the 
listed company is further prohibited from trading on the stock exchange 
more than 5% (10%) of the company’s total share capital within 12 (24) 
months. Such shareholders were also required to issue an announcement 
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every time before they sold 1% of a company’s shares in order to give the 
widest possible publicity to information about disposals by major 
shareholders. The minority TAS holders were thus protected from the shock 
of large-scale sale in the A-share markets.  
4.2.6 Formalisation and expansion of FCR 
In August 2005, the Government issued guidelines to extend the reform 
share project to the rest of the stock market, setting the end of 2006 as the 
deadline of the process. The new listed companies are required to fully 
circulate their shares on both exchanges. Non-tradable state-owned shares 
are not allowed to issue in the IPOs since May 2006.  
On September 5, 2005, CSRC issued the Measures on administration of 
split share structure reform of listed companies (Measures 2005), the first 
official document providing details about the implementation of NTAS 
reform. And the full-scale reform then started since then.  
The program followed the principles established in the pilot reform. It 
decentralised decision making at the firm level, by allowing shareholders to 
bargain over the method and terms of the compensation. Furthermore, it 
safeguarded the interests of TAS holders by seeking no less than two thirds 
of the votes from the TAS owners, diluted the risks by introducing a series 
of announcements dates, and prevented market slump by banning any sale 
of NTAS in the 12 months and restricting the issue size in the following 24 
months.  
Theme of China FCR 
Measures (2005) defined China FCR as a process to eliminate the 
discrepancies between NTAS and TAS via a negotiation mechanism to 
balance the interests of holders of NTAS and TAS. In other words, the 
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central theme of the reform was to convert NTAS to TAS and protect the 
interests of TAS holders in the A-share market from the invasion of NTAS. 
Supervisor and regulator 
According to Measures (2005), the main players and their relevant activities 
are under the surveillance of the CSRC. With authorization of the CSRC, 
the stock exchanges should act as the front-line regulator to coordinate and 
direct the reform and handle procedures related to listing of non-tradable 
shares. Specifically, the stock exchanges and depository & clearing 
companies should formulate operation guidelines in accordance with the 
Measures (2005), provide facilities for listed companies to handle issues 
involving their reform, and exercise continuous supervision over relevant 
parties involving information disclosure obligations, materialization of the 
undertakings made for the reform, and the sale of shares by the former 
non-tradable shareholders after the reform plan is implemented. 
A typical reform process 
Measures (2005) established the following stages for the implementation of 
the reform: 
1. Holders of NTAS should submit to the board of directors a reform 
proposal proposed by a shareholder/shareholders holding 
individually/collectively two-thirds of the NTAS of the listed company 
to and request the board to start the reform process. 
The proposal should include:  
• information on the formation and each alteration of capital stock 
structure as of the establishment of the company; 
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• shareholding proportion of the holders of NTAS and the association 
with each other; 
• the holders of NTAS, actual controllers of the holders of NTAS who 
hold 5% or more of the total shares of the company 
• the share-trading reform scheme 
• commitments made by the holders of NTAS; 
• information on the holding of the company’s TAS by the 
recommending institution on the day prior to the day when the board 
of directors announces its reform, and the information on the 
purchasing and selling of the company’s tradable shares within the 
previous six months; and  
• other matters that shall be explained. 
2. The board must seek the cooperation of an external sponsoring 
institution and of a law firm to formulate the proposal. The board has to 
select from 51 sponsor institutions approved by the CSRC. There is no 
such requirement to choose a law firm. The board and the external 
sponsor institution and law firm will reach an agreement on how much 
the cost is and how the payment is made. The Securities Association of 
China, Circular on Issues Relevant to Sponsors Engaging in Cases of 
Full-Circulation Reform issued on 15 July 2005 (Circular 2005) 
regulates that a sponsor institution should charge no less than RMB2.5 
million after the reform proposal was voted through. There is no such 
payment regulation for a law firm.
29
 The sponsor must consult the stock 
exchange about the feasibility of the proposal and arrange a meeting 
with the relevant market shareholders. The stock exchange neither 
                                               
29 The data and information on sponsor institutions and law firms are usually not publicly provided. 
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“approves” the proposal nor provides any judgment on the amount of the 
proposed compensation, but just advises the company on the technical 
aspects of the proposal. 
The sponsor shall perform the following duties: 
• to assist in formulating the reform plan; 
 to conduct due diligence on the reform plan; 
 to verify the documents involving the reform plan; 
 to comment on the competence of the NTAS to implement the 
consideration plan and fulfill their undertakings; 
 to issue the sponsor opinion 
• to assist in implementing the reform plan; 
 to assist in drafting and enforcing the measures to stabilize the 
stock price; 
 to continuously inspect the parties in respect with their 
fulfillment of undertakings. 
The sponsor opinions should include: 
• Whether or not the non-tradable shares of the listed company 
involve ownership disputes, pledge or being frozen and the 
influence of the foregoing circumstances on the implementation of 
the reform plan; 
• The assessment of the influence on tradable shareholders’ interests 
as the reform plan is implemented; 
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• Conclusion on the verification of the documents relating to the split 
share structure reform; 
• A feasibility study on the relevant undertakings in the reform plan; 
• Explanation for whether or not there exists any circumstance in 
which the sponsor cannot duly perform its duties;  
• Other particulars the sponsor deems necessary to be specified; 
• The sponsor conclusion and the grounds. 
3. The board of directors then publicises the reform proposal, including 
date of the shareholders’ meeting, a description of the reform proposal 
as well as the opinions of the recommending institution and the law firm. 
And trading in the shares of the stock is immediately suspended ( sust 1 : 
the 1st suspension date).  
4. Within 10 days after the announcement, the board of directors should 
assist the owners of NTAS in adequately communicating and 
negotiating with the holder of TAS of A-share market by such 
approaches as hosting an investor symposium, a press conference or an 
online road show, paying a visit to institutional investors and issuing a 
consultation paper and so on. In addition, the board of directors of the 
listed company should publicly disclose its hotline, facsimile and e-mail 
address in order to widely solicit opinions from tradable shareholders so 
as to lay a broad shareholder foundation for the reform plan. 
5. If the proposal is acceptable to both parties, an announcement of 
consensus will be made and trading resumes ( rest 1 : the 1st resumption 
date), which put an end to the first suspension period. Otherwise some 
more days may pass before resumption of trading until all shareholders 
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firmly agree on a given proposal. However, once trading resumes the 
proposal cannot be further modified. 
6. Registration starts for the shareholders’ meeting and trading is 
suspended the next day of registration for the second time ( sust 2 : the 
2nd suspension date). 
7. The shareholders’ meeting is held. The proposal needs a majority of two 
thirds of votes from the participants. Such reform plan shall also be 
approved by the holders of tradable shares owning at least two-thirds of 
tradable voting shares. The board must publicise the voting results 
within 2 working days. If the proposal is accepted, the board should 
publicly release the timetable for actual implementation of the reform. 
Trading is restarted after the shareholder meeting ratifying the 
completion of the reform ( rest 2 : the 2nd resumption date). If the 
proposal is not approved the board should apply for trading resumption 
of the listed company’s shares from the next day of the announcement. 
The holders of NTAS of a listed company may redo the reform 
procedures from the very start but have to wait for at least three months. 
8. A 12 month lockup period is established for the holders of NTAS. The 
initial 12-month lockup expires on mt12 . Furthermore, in the two years  
after expiration of the lock-up, holders of NTAS with more than 5% of 
the total issued share capital of the listed company is further prohibited 
from trading on the stock exchange more than 5% (10%) of the 
company’s total share capital within 12 (24) months. 
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Figure 4.3 The timescale of a firm-specific event (as opposed to macro events)  
 
The above figure presents a typical timeline of reform process from 
preparation of a reform proposal to its implementation. The descriptions 
above the timeline indicate what happens in the time intervals below, 
defined by double-arrows. The explanations under the timeline indicate 
what news was released on the corresponding event dates above.  
• A company firstly suspends on sust 1 to announce the start of reform 
and publicise the initial reform proposal. 
• Since then the holders of NTAS are bargaining with the holders of 
TAS regarding the proposal and come out with a revised version of 
proposals. 
• The company resumes on resstt 1  when the revised proposal is 
publicised.  
• The company suspends again on sust 2 , the next day of the record 
date of the right to attend the shareholders’ meeting.  
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• Since then the proxy solicitation starts and a shareholders’ meeting 
is held to vote for the revised proposal.  
• If the revised proposal successfully wins no less than two thirds of 
the votes from both the TAS owners and NTAS holders, the 
company resumes on rest 2 when a successful reform is announced 
and Consideration payment is put into practice.  
• Where approved within one year from rest 2 to mt12 , no NTAS are 
allowed to be traded. If it is not approved, the company will be 
suspended until it finally comes up with an approved proposal. 
This bulleted procedure regulated by Measures (2005) is one step further 
than what has been demonstrated for the pilot program before. The 
formulation of initial reform proposal finishes before a company firstly 
suspends ( sust 1 ) rather than during the 1
st
 suspension period between sust 1  
and
 resst
t 1 . And subsequently, the initial proposal is publicised on sust 1
rather than on resstt 1 . The negotiation between the holders of NTAS and 
TAS takes place during the 1
st
 suspension period between sust 1  
and
 resst
t 1  
rather than after resstt 1 . The revised proposal based on the negotiation is 
publicised on resstt 1  rather than sometime before sust 2 .  
Commitment in the proposal 
Based on Measures (2005): 
1. The holder of NTAS should offer guarantee measures to perform their 
commitment and issue a statement in written form indicating that they 
will faithfully perform their commitment. 
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2. Under no circumstances can the holder of NTAS transfer their shares 
before their commitment is fully performed even if the lock-up period 
expires unless the parties to buy the shares are capable and agree to 
fulfill the commitment for the NTAS.  
3. Sponsors are required to comment on the competence of the 
non-tradable shareholders to implement the consideration plan and 
fulfill their commitment and to continuously inspect the parties in 
respect with their fulfillment of commitment. 
4. The shareholders, who fail to fulfill their commitment in the reform, are 
liable to a public censure of the stock exchanges. The CSRC will order 
such shareholders to make a correction and will take relevant 
disciplinary actions. If the legitimate interests of other shareholder are 
infringed in such case, the shareholders shall bear relevant legal 
liabilities. The penalty measure reduces the risks of default in 
commitment and thus adds credit to the commitment made by holder of 
NTAS. 
4.2.7 Reform in groups 
The reform process was gradual and took place in orderly groups. For firms 
in the same group, the announcement of start of the reform takes place on 
the same day ( sust 1 ). Firms of the same group necessarily do not complete 
the reform at the same time, although this is dependent upon how each firm 
progresses. By the end of 2006, the reform took place with 64 regular 
groups involving 1290 companies that had either completed or were in the 
reform process after the pilot programs. Among them, 840 companies 
successfully completed the reform process, comprising around 80% of the 
market capitalization of the combined SHSE and SZSE. By the end of 2007, 
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1,254 firms were successful, representing over 97% of the market 
capitalization at the time. Firms whose proposals were rejected the first time 
may come back with a revised plan for approval beyond the deadline of 
2006. 
The list of companies in each group was decided in two stages.  
Firm enthusiasm 
In the first stage, the stock exchanges set a deadline to accept reform 
proposals
30
 from companies wishing to participate. In this sense, the 
companies which submitted the proposals on time were more enthusiastic 
than the others to take the reform. Jiang et al (2008) argued that the higher 
the level of enthusiasm for implementing the reform, the earlier the reform 
process was completed. Therefore, they measured the firm-enthusiasm with 
an ascending Group order.  
Selection by the stock exchanges 
In the second stage, the stock exchanges examined all the applying firms 
and crossed out those they thought had problems. There is no explicit 
disclosure illustrating the selection criteria adopted by the stock exchanges. 
However the Government media, which were suspicious of having 
connection with the high levels in the stock exchanges, hinted in news that 
companies which might have exemplary effects and implications for the 
future were more likely to be selected. Under this guidance, companies 
showing larger market capitalisation, better cooperation with the sponsors 
and better practice in the market as well as producing more innovative 
proposal were probably more favorable than the others. However the stock 
exchanges sometimes did approve companies which eventually failed to 
                                               
30 Measures (2005) required the sponsor appointed by a company to consult the stock exchanges 
regarding the feasibility of the reform proposal. 
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meet the expectation to achieve votes from at least two thirds of the voting 
shareholders of NTAS and TAS respectively. The selection standards might 
vary with the outlook into the future, and were adjusted all the time. From 
the perspective of setting up an example to the future reforms, firms that 
implemented their reforms earlier were expected to affect firms in later 
groups. Li et al. (2011) controlled for market learning by including the 
Group order and found the later groups paid less Consideration, indicating 
the uncertainties were reduced due to the learning from the earlier groups. 
Li et al. (2010) only included those firms which paid Consideration in bonus 
shares.  
Group summary 
The table below summarises the Group information, reporting the Group 
date, the number of firms in a group and the interval in days since the 
previous Group date.  
The first group of 40 companies published the announcement of the start of 
the process on 12
th
 Sep 2005. All of them accomplished successfully. The 
last group started the reform process on 30
th
 Dec 2006 involving 32 
companies. The 22
nd
 Group is the largest including 49 companies and the 
50
th
 and 55 are the smallest Groups including 5 companies each. There is an 
average of 21 firms per batch. And the interval between two consecutive 
groups is generally 5 working days.  
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Group No. Group date Interval 
in days 
Group No. Group date Interval 
in days 
1 40 Sep 12 05 N/A 33 26 May 21 06 5 
2 32 Sep 18 05 6 34 30 May 28 06 5 
3 22 Sep 26 05 8 35 20 Jun 4 06 5 
4 23 Oct 9 05 13 36 21 Jun 11 06 5 
5 21 Oct 16 05 5 37 24 Jun 18 06 5 
6 18 Oct 23 05 5 38 36 Jun 25 06 5 
7 18 Oct 30 05 5 39 32 Jul 2 06 5 
8 20 Nov 6 05 5 40 8 Jul 9 06 5 
9 20 Nov 13 05 5 41 12 Jul 16 06 5 
10 17 Nov 20 05 5 42 8 Jul 23 06 5 
11 22 Nov 27 05 5 43 8 Jul 30 06 5 
12 19 Dec 4 05 5 44 9 Aug 6 06 5 
13 21 Dec 11 05 5 45 8 Aug 13 06 5 
14 27 Dec 18 05 5 46 6 Aug 20 06 5 
15 38 Dec 22 05 4 47 8 Aug 27 06 5 
16 19 Dec 30 05 5 48 8 Sep 3 06 5 
17 13 Jan 8 06 5 49 7 Sep 10 06 5 
18 24 Jan 15 06 5 50 5 Sep 17 06 5 
19 46 Jan 22 06 5 51 11 Sep 24 06 5 
20 38 Feb 12 06 5  52 6 Oct 8 06 14  
21 39 Feb 19 06 5 53 6 Oct 15 06 5 
22 49 Feb 26 06 5 54 7 Oct 22 06 5 
23 46 Mar 5 06 5 55 5 Oct 29 06 5 
24 25 Mar 12 06 5 56 7 Nov 5 06 5 
25 28 Mar 19 06 5 57 12 Nov 12 06 5 
26 41 Mar 26 06 5 58 14 Nov 19 06 5 
27 25 Apr 2 06 5 59 7 Nov 26 06 5 
28 16 Apr 9 06 5 60 10 Dec 3 06 5 
29 26 Apr 16 06 5 61 11 Dec 10 06 5 
30 35 Apr 23 06 5 62 12 Dec 17 06 5 
31 28 May 7 06 14  63 22 Dec 24 06 5 
32 23 May 14 06 5 64 32 Dec 31 06 5 
Source: http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/chinaggzw/index.shtml 
Table 4.2 Summary of reform groups  
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Firms whose reform proposals didn’t get two thirds of the votes from the 
holders of both NTAS and TAS would come back with a new plan in a new 
Group, such as Tsinghua Tongfang which failed in the first pilot group but 
rejoined Group 15 at the end of 2005 and this time its revised proposal was 
voted through. By the end of 2006, there were 67 firms whose reform 
proposals were rejected at least once at the shareholders’ meeting. The table 
below specifies these firms and all the groups they had ever participated 
since failure. 
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Stock Code Group Number Stock Code Group Number 
 1st 
Trial 
2nd 
Trial 
3rd 
Trial 
 1st 
Trial 
2nd 
Trial 
3rd 
Trial 
000026 18 52 59 600327 29 47  
000045 7 43  600333 44 58  
000090 9 36  600338 43 47  
000408 24 31  600354 32 41  
000423 49 60  600380 11 49  
000540 50 56  600499 4 27  
000549 8 46  600515 56 63  
000617 44 64  600559 18 39  
000626 39 57  600568 35 40  
000665 53 56  600578 19 20  
000672 33 40 60 600579 38 50  
000682 35 39  600606 6 31  
000703 47 51  600608 53 64  
000792 28 34  600627 28 51  
000838 33 58  600636 8 28  
000885 40 44  600645 34 59  
000905 27 48  600708 6 33  
000908 47 50  600712 34 50  
000929 32 46  600715 39 51  
600035 38 55  600721 36 61  
600083 58 60  600724 41 57  
600093 48 55  600727 34 36  
600100 pilot 1 15  600763 43 49  
600107 51 60  600766 37 41  
600116 53 56  600767 39 50  
600133 27 58 64 600768 37 57  
600149 54 64  600782 25 46  
600184 38 41  600786 37 44 63 
600186 30 64  600789 43 49  
600205 48 60  600790 41 56  
600248 42 45 64 600829 29 51  
600250 37 38  600857 34 39  
600318 33 33  600864 26 26  
600327 29 47  600865 47 62  
600333 44 58      
Source: http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/chinaggzw/index.shtml 
Table 4.3 Summary of firms whose proposals ever failed 
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47 of the firms were listed in SHSE, more than twice as many firms listed in 
SZSE. 62 firms were successfully through in the second trial. However there 
were still 5 firms which failed twice but got a pass in the third trial. Unlike 
firms in the pilot program which were allowed to resume trading after 
failure, Measures (2005) regulated that firms failed would be continually 
suspended until they could come up with a reform plan approved by the 
shareholders. Counting Tsinghua Tongfang out, the interval between the 1st 
failure till the eventual success was averagely 66 working days, indicating 
the price data immediately before the second or third trial was unavailable 
for non-pilot firms. 
4.2.8 Consideration 
One distinguishing feature of China FCR is the payment of consideration to 
shareholders of tradable shares. Consideration played an important role in 
the reform package. The specific terms of Consideration varied from 
company to company and took effect only when approved by a 2/3 of both 
shareholders of NTAS and TAS respectively. As introduced above, the 
holder of NTAS of a company were bargaining with the holders of TAS 
over the terms subject to the specific shareholding structure and financial 
situation of the firm. This term of Consideration appeared in Measures 
(2005) in Article 16 “implement the consideration plan specifically designed 
to balance the interests of each party in the split share structure reform” but 
was not specified in terms of the concept and connotation.  
Forms of Consideration: 
Consideration took various forms and could be used in different 
combinations.  
The most popular forms are: 
111 
 
• Shares Transfer (ST): the owners of NTAS give away certain NTAS to 
the holders of TAS. The existing investors of TAS receive free shares in 
proportion to their ownership in a firm from the corresponding owners 
of NTAS. But in ST, these shares are available to the existing 
shareholders for free and transferred from the NTAS instead of new 
shares. Effectively, an implementation of ST indicates a reduction of 
NTAS with zero revenues. Suppose an investor receives a consideration 
ratio of STC  per share held by the TAS owners and there are NT  
non-tradable A shares and T  tradable A shares in a company, an 
application of ST can reduce the NTAS of this company by STCT   .  
• Cash Payment (CP): the owners of NTAS pay Consideration in cash to 
the holders of TAS. Under this approach, there is no change in the 
shareholding structure but at the cash cost of the NTAS owners. NTAS 
owners opting for this payment method didn’t want to give away the 
shares and instead they paid RMB CPC  per share the TAS owners own. 
In other words, they valued the shares that they would otherwise have 
paid under SP at CPCT  .  
• Recapitalization of retained earnings (RI): a listed company capitalizes 
its retained earnings and issue new equity shares. The owners of NTAS 
pay the holders of tradable shares the new equity shares they receive 
from the company. Under this approach, the number of total shares 
increases by )/1( RICNTT  times. Retained earnings capitalized are 
unavailable for future dividends. Therefore this approach is more of a 
wealth transfer from the future investors to the existing investors than 
from the NTAS owners to TAS owners.  
• European Put Warrants Transfer (PWT): the TAS holders have the right 
to put (sell) an underlying share to the NTAS holders at a certain strike 
price on or before a specified date at zero premium. Only when the 
exercise price ( PWTK ) is greater than the market price around the mature 
date ( maturityatP  ), will the put warrant be exercised. Under this approach, 
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the NTAS owners are required to pay Consideration of 
)( maturityatPWT PKT  to the TAS owners on or before the expiry date. 
PWT protects the TAS owners when the market price falls below the 
exercise price. 
Usually a put warrant is sold at a certain price, which reduces the 
warrant holder’s payoff by the cost. However in the case of China FCR, 
the transfer of put warrant to the TAS holders is free of charge. The 
profit range for the TAS owners is (0,
 PWT
K ) as the market price of 
share drops. Different from the approaches of ST, CP and RI, PWT 
brings the post-market factor into consideration.  
• European Call Warrants Transfer (CWT): The TAS holders have the 
right to buy the underlying share for an agreed price, on or before a 
specified date at zero premium. Only when the exercise price ( CWTK ) 
set up front is lower than the market price around the mature date 
( maturityatP  ), will the call warrant be exercised. Under this approach, the 
NTAS owners are required to pay Consideration of 
)( CWTmaturityat KPT   to the TAS owners on or before the expiry date. 
CWT allows the TAS owners to share profits when the market price 
rises up above the exercise price.   
Like PWT, CWT is free of charge for the TAS holders and the profit 
range is (0, +∞) as the market price of share increases.  
• Share Split (SS): the owners of NTAS pay the holders of TAS the 
shares under their name from share split. A stock split increases the 
number of shares in a public company. Under this approach, the number 
of total shares increases by )/1( SSCNTT  times. Compared to RI, 
the firm value is the same while the par value of the stock decreases.  
The payments through ST, RI and SS implied a reduced state shareholding 
while the others didn’t. RI and SS increased the number of total shares 
outstanding. RI increased firm value as well but SS didn’t. Except for CWT 
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and PWT which indicated the use of a real post-event price in a certain 
period, the others estimated a post-reform price.  
Valuation of Consideration 
The calculation of Consideration was various from company to company on 
different assumptions. Many reform proposals didn’t provide a proper 
explanation of the calculation process or even presented a proposed 
Consideration ratio without any explanation on how it was set. Li and Yang 
(2006) reported that FCR process has characters of diversified 
Consideration ways, various Consideration bases, unbalanced Consideration 
levels, and frequent adjustments.  
But it was generally based on the assumption of a substantial price drop in 
the aftermath of the implementation of the reform. Each company thus 
estimated its price/earning ratio or NAV once all shares were tradable and 
calculated, 1
st
 the loss the TAS owners would incur as a result of the share 
price decline and 2
nd
 the number of bonus shares the NTAS holders would 
have to offer to in order to offset the loss. To illustrate, see the process 
below: 
1. 
posteventpost
NTpreeventpre
PNTTValue
PNTPTValue




)(
TPPLoss postpreTASfor   )(  
where T is the number of tradable shares and NT is the number of 
non-tradable shares, preP  is the market share price before the event and 
postP  
is the market share price after the event. 
 
2. Suppose C  refers to the bonus share received for by each TA held, 
therefore 
post
postpre
postpostpre
P
PP
CPTCTPP
)(
)(

 , indicating 
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TAS would receive 
post
postpre
P
PP 
shares for every premarket TA held. 
This is the basic model for the calculation of Consideration.  
The valuation of Consideration depends on the estimation of postP , which, 
generally speaking, is determined by how each firm estimated its post-event 
P/E ratio or NAV.  
Various Considerations forms may differ in presenting Considerations but in 
general follows the idea that the value before and after the event should be 
the same and Consideration should compensate for the aftermarket loss to 
the TAS owners. Following are the theoretic valuation of Considerations for 
various Consideration forms (on per share basis) although in most proposals 
the details were not available.  
• Consideration for Share Transfer: 1
)(



post
pre
post
postpre
ST
P
P
P
PP
C  
• Derivation of Consideration for Recapitalised Issuance: 
postRTRTeventpost
NTpreeventpre
PNTTNTTValue
PNTPTValue




)(
, where RTT  / RTNT  is the 
number of additional shares from the recapitalised earnings allocated 
proportionally to the holders of TAS / NTAS.
 
T
TT
P
P
PT
TPTPTP
C
PTCTTPTP
RT
post
pre
post
postRTpostpre
RI
postRIRTpostpre





 )(
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• Derivation of Consideration for Share Split: 
SSposteventpost
NTpreeventpre
RPNTTValue
PNTPTValue




)(
, where SSR  is share split ratio. 
SSpost
pre
post
SSpostpre
SS
postSSSSpostpre
RP
P
PT
RTPTP
C
PTCRPTTP
1





 
• Derivation of Consideration for Cash Payment: 
posteventpost
NTpreeventpre
PNTTValue
PNTPTValue




)(
 
postpreCP
CPpostpre
PPC
TCTPP

 )(  
In a proposal using PWT / CWT as Consideration, a strike price instead of a 
Consideration is provided. The potential aftermarket loss to the holders of 
TAS depends on the maturity price in the future ( maturityatP  ) rather than the 
market price immediately after the event ( postP ).  
• Derivation of Consideration for Put Warrant: 
maturityateventpost
NTpreeventpre
PNTTValue
PNTPTValue




)(
TCPKMaxTPP PWTmaturityatPWTmaturityatpre   ),0()( , subject to 
TCPWT   is no more than the maximum shares the warranties holders 
can sell.  
),0(
)(
),0(
)(
maturityatPWT
maturityatpre
maturityatPWT
maturityatpre
PWT
PKMax
PP
TPKMax
TPP
C










 
Put warrant won’t be exercised if maturityatPWT PK   
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Put warrant will be exercised if maturityatPWT PK  , and therefore
maturityatPWT
maturityatpre
PWT
PK
PP
C




  
• Derivation of Consideration for Call Warrant: 
maturityateventpost
NTpreeventpre
PNTTValue
PNTPTValue




)(
TCKPMaxTPP CWTCWTmaturityatmaturityatpre   ),0()( , subject to 
TCCWT   is no more than the maximum shares the warranties holders 
can buy.  
),0(
)(
),0(
)(
CWTmaturityat
maturityatpre
CWTmaturityat
maturityatpre
CWT
KPMax
PP
TKPMax
TPP
C










 
Call warrant won’t be exercised if CWTmaturityat KP   
Call warrant will be exercised if CWTmaturityat KP  , and therefore
CWTmaturityat
maturityatpre
CWT
KP
PP
C





 
4.3 Concluding remarks 
Although China Government purposely relaxed restrictions on the stock 
market to increase the market liquidity, the 2001 scheme of reducing state 
shares still failed due to the sharp market collapse following the 
announcement, which also put an end to the bull market from May 1999.  
The investors feared the dilution effect from floating the dominant state 
shares to the tradable A-share market would destroy the market. The 
uncertainties regarding when the sale began and how many of state shares 
117 
 
would be floated aggravated the dilution effect. They were also critical 
about the equal pricing plan which they thought overvalued the state shares.  
• Improvements in protecting minority holders of TAS  
Code (2002) adopted proxy voting and cumulative voting methods. 
According to Provisions (2004), the major business decisions of a listed 
firm should win majority votes from the minority shareholders as well.    
Opinions (2004) issued by the State Council drew a blueprint for reforming 
the country’s capital markets, calling for solution to the problem of split 
share structure (the separation of NTAS and TAS) which should respect 
market rules and protect the rights of interests. By the end of 2004, the 
aggregate shares of China listed companies were 714.9 billion, of which, 64% 
were still non-tradable. 
• Official documents and reform groups  
The Notice (2005) issued on April 29 2005 by the CSRC signaled the 
launch of China Full-Circulation Reform and set out the basic format for the 
reform. This is an announcement for all the listed firms with non-tradable A 
shares.    
The Guidelines (2005) issued on May 8
th
 2005 outlined the operational 
procedure for pilot programs. The next day, four medium-sized companies 
selected by the stock exchanges announced to carry out the FCR (Pilot 
Group 1). This was followed, on June 17
th
 2005, by an announcement 
approving 42 companies to carry out the FCR (Pilot Group 2).  
The pilot program didn’t impose a one-fit-all solution and instead allowed 
companies to come up with their own proposals which took in opinions 
from both the holders of NTAS and TAS. The cooperation of interested 
shareholders reduced the uncertainties over crucial issues and the 
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discrepancies between them. Furthermore, both shareholders had equal 
decision-making power over the reform proposal, which should get no less 
than two thirds of votes from both shareholders for a pass. This ensured that 
minority holders of TAS could have a review on the reform proposal and 
make a decision in their own favor. Each company was required to suspend 
during producing of reform proposal (1
st
 suspension – 1st resumption) and 
running of shareholders’ meeting to vote for the reform proposal (2nd 
suspension – 2nd resumption). This reform process was thus purposely 
extended at the firm-level as to carry forward FCR gradually and steadily 
and subsequently dilute the effect of FCR over the extension, consistent 
with a China tradition to develop and reform step by step rather than a shock 
therapy or big bang. The NTAS, which were announced tradable to the 
public on the 2
nd
 resumption day, were actually subject to trading 
constraints, like no trading (lock-up) in 12 months, and a maximum sale as a 
percentage of total shares outstanding within a certain period after the 
lock-up. The trading constraints further diminished the dilution effect and 
uncertainties.   
Based on the experiments in pilot program, Measures (2005) were 
publicised on September 5 2005, setting out details about implementing the 
FCR. In light of Measures (2005), the rest firms with non-tradable shares 
took turns to reform in 64 groups across two years. CSRC revealed the 
names of selected firms group by group with interval of 5 working days. 
The selected firms made announcements to reform and simultaneously 
suspended trading the next day of CSRC group announcement. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates how FCR would be carried out for the rest of the firms 
with non-tradable shares. The firm-level reform process has changed 
slightly. Having a reform proposal ready became a premise to join the 
reform process. Trading firstly suspended for soliciting the holders of TAS 
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to share their views regarding the proposal. Adjustments were made if 
necessary. Then the proposal was finalised and share trading resumed (1
st
 
suspension – 1st resumption). Trading suspended again for conducing voting 
procedure at the shareholders’ meeting. If the proposal was voted through, 
share trading resumed again. If not, share trading kept suspending for 
revising the proposal for the next round.  
• Consideration 
Holders of TAS received considerations as compensation from the holders 
of NTAS in the FCR as to balance the interests of each party in FCR. 
Consideration took various forms, such as share transfer (ST), cash payment 
(CP), call/put warrant transfer (CWT/PWT), transfer of shares from 
recapitalized earnings (RI) or stock split (SS), as well as a combination of 
any above. SP / CP are payments from the current holdings of NTAS 
owners to TAS owners in shares / in cash. RI uses the new holdings of 
NTAS owners from recapitalised dividends resources to pay TAS owners. 
SS depreciates the value of each share and offers the depreciation under the 
name of NTAS holders as compensation. CWT and PWT bring in the 
post-market performance as benchmark. CWT / PWT allows the holders to 
buy / sell shares at an agreed price if the market increases / decreases at 
maturity. SP, RI and SS effectively reduce the shareholding of NTAS in 
proportion. Both RI and SS complicate the payment process and increase 
the number of total outstanding shares. RI actually sacrifices the benefits of 
the future investors by taking away the dividends resources. PWT protect 
the holders of TAS when the market value of share decreases while CWT 
allows them to share profits when the market value of share increases.  
The valuation of Consideration was not specified in official released 
documents like Measures (2005) and various from firm to firm, but in 
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general assuming a substantial price drop in the aftermarket of FCR and 
hoping to compensate the TAS owners for the potential loss. 
To sum up, the government learnt lessons from the first attempt and revised 
the objective and reform goal. The government abandoned the short-term 
interests which used the reform to raise finance for the pension funds in 
2001 as this time the state companies were required to hold their shares for 
the next 12 months and sell no more than 10% in the following 24 months. 
In the Full Circulation Reform, the government officially announced that 
their goal was to maintain the markets. As illustrated in this chapter, the 
government showed many efforts to protect the minority TAS owners in 
order to keep them in the markets so that the stock markets wouldn’t be 
damaged severely like in the first attempt. This brilliant scheme designed 
for the Full Circulation Reform is not thoroughly explored in this chapter 
but will become the topic of my further research on this issue.  
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Chapter 5. Literature Review 
This chapter is divided into four parts, proving a review of literature on 
event-study methodology, market efficiency of China stock markets, the 
China program to reduce state-shares in 2001, and the China 
Full-Circulation Reform of 2005.  
Event-study is the primary methodology used to measure the impact of an 
event on the stock returns under the assumption that the stock market should 
be efficient to quickly reflect the information conveyed by the event.  
China stock markets are where the investigation is to be carried out and its 
market efficiency is under concern. Research on the efficiency of China 
stock markets will provide evidence on how efficient China stock markets 
are. 
The program proposed by China State Council in June 2001 to reduce 
state-shares of the listed companies resulted in a market crash and was 
scrapped one year later. Relevant studies on the 2001 program may help to 
find out the potential defects of the scheme. 
The China Government launched a reform on April 29 2005 to sell 
non-tradable A shares, mainly owned by the Government, on the A-share 
markets. Under the trial guidelines issued on 8
th
 May by the CSRC, two 
pilot groups consisting of 4 and 42 firms respectively were announced on 9
th
 
May and 20
th
 June. Firms were invited to develop plans to allow 
non-tradable A-share holders to sell their shares, subject to negotiation with 
tradable A-share holders on an appropriate reform plan (mainly about a 
compensation level and trading restrictions). By 19
th
 August, all of these 
companies had reached a consensus on proposal, and on 24
th
 August, the 
Government issued formal guidelines to extend this reform scheme to the 
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rest of the market. By the end of 2006, a total of 64 groups in addition to the 
pilot groups were announced, involving 1245 companies.  
From a firm-specific view, a plan was firstly proposed by the holders of 
non-tradable A-share and then submitted to the Board of Directors. If 
accepted, the plan was announced and simultaneously a suspension from the 
stock market was applied to the firm. Following a negotiation between the 
holders of tradable A-shares and non-tradable shares, a plan agreement was 
filed and announced and trading was resumed. The plan was voted in the 
Shareholders’ meeting. In general, another suspension was applied to the 
firm the same day when the meeting registered its shareholders. Once voted 
through, trading was resumed again when the approved plan was 
announced. Otherwise, trading was kept suspended.  
The overall event is confounding and consisted of a series of sub-events, 
including macro policies and subsequent firm-specific decisions under the 
influence of the policies. Its magnitude and impact hasn’t been 
systematically and fully studied yet. Any relevant studies will be collected, 
analyzed and discussed.  
5.1 Literature Review on Event-Study Method 
Using financial market data, an event study measures the impact of a 
specific event on the value of a firm. The usefulness of such a study is based 
on the assumption that in an efficient market, the effects of an event will be 
reflected immediately in security prices. Thus a measure of the event’s 
economic impact can be constructed using security prices observed over a 
relatively short time period.  
The event study has many applications (MacKinlay, 1997). In accounting 
and finance research, event studies have been applied to a variety of firm 
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specific and economy wide events. Some examples include mergers and 
acquisitions, earnings announcements, issues of new debt or equity, and 
announcements of macro-economic variables such as trade deficit. Besides, 
in other fields like law and economics, event-studies are used to measure the 
impact on the value of a firm of a change in the regulator environment (e.g. 
G. William Schwert 1981).  
Event studies have a long history involving an evolution of ideas. This 
history and evolution is shown in what follows:  
5.1.1 Preliminary studies 
James Dolley (1933) 
His work is perhaps the first published study that can be traced. He 
examined the price effects of stock splits, studying nominal price changes at 
the time of the split. Dolley used a very brief time interval and observed 
only a single day’s movement of each stock.  
Assume that a stock closed at 100 the day before the split shares were 
admitted to trading. The next day the new shares, after a four to one split, 
closed at 26. The aggregate value of the four new shares, therefore, was 
26*4 =104, representing a 4-point price effect. Here is his formula: 
 price date-split
priorday  one price- ratiosplit price date-split 
.
 
Using a sample of 95 splits from 1921-1931, he found that the price 
increased in 57 of the cases and the price declined in only 26 instances. No 
apparent effect is found in the remaining 12.  
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Myers and Bakay (1948)  
They refined the approach by statistically removing the general market 
action from the split-up stocks over a period from eight weeks before the 
announcement to eight weeks after the split. They removed market impact 
by dividing the market price with the individual security price. The formula 
employed is: 
index market  date-price/base date-base
indexmarket  date- /splitprice date-split
.
 
 
By analysing sample of 70 selected split-ups occurring in 1945 and 1946, 
they concluded that, at least in the short term, stock split-ups resulted in 
average price increases of approximately 20% over the Standard & Poor 
price index. A similar study by Burrell O. K. (1948) also adjusted for the 
removal of changes in the general market price before surveying the market 
effect of stock split-ups. 
Barker (1956, 1957, 1958) 
In his studies, he took into account the confounding influence of dividends, 
which presumably would or would not have been paid just the same if the 
stock had not been split.  
According to his results, the stocks split with dividend increases registered a 
gain in real prices 2 to 3 times higher and more persistent than the stocks 
split without dividend increases.     
He further showed that the split-ups unaccompanied by dividend increases 
were actually followed by a temporary rise in real prices which was quickly 
wiped off and replaced by a drop in real price.  
He then extended his researches to the real effect of stock dividends alone 
on market price.  
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Summary 
Over the decades following Dolley (1933) until the late 1950s the level of 
sophistication of event studies increased. The improvements included 
removing general stock markets price movements (Myers and Bakay 1948, 
Burrell 1948) and separating out confounding events (Barker 1956, 1957, 
1958).  
5.1.2 Milestone studies 
In the late 1960s seminal studies by Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama, 
Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969, hereafter FFJR) introduced the methodology 
that sets the basic model for event-studies and since then on, event studies 
have become a predominant methodology for determining the effects of an 
event on the distribution of security returns.  
Ball and Brown (1968) considered the information content of earnings 
unique to a particular firm, and FFJR (1969) studied the effects of stock 
splits after removing the effects of simultaneous dividend increases. 
Even the most cursory perusal of event studies done over the past 30 years 
reveals a striking fact: the basic statistical format of event studies has not 
changed over time. The key focus is still on measuring the sample 
securities’ mean and cumulative mean abnormal return around the time of 
an event (Khotari and Warner 2006).  
FFJR (1969) 
FFJR (1969) purposely abstracted from general market conditions in 
examining the returns on securities during months surrounding split dates in 
order to study the supposed extraordinary effects a split and its associated 
dividend history may have on returns.  
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• Data and sample 
They required that a split security must be listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange for at least twelve months before and twelve months after the 
split. From January, 1927, through December, 1959, 940 splits meeting 
these criteria occurred on the NYSE.   
• Abnormal return 
To capture the effect of the event on stock i , they controlled for the normal 
relation between the return on i  during month t , and the return on a broad 
stock market index, in their case the CRSP
31
 NYSE Market Portfolio, 
during month t . Using a sample of monthly return data from 1926 to 1960 
including the period containing the event, they estimated the parameters of 
the following “market” model for each stock i  in the sample:  
itteiiite LRLogPRLog     
where 
1,/)(  tiititit PDPPR  = price relative of i -th security for month t ; 
itP  = price of the i -th stock at end of month t ; 
itD  = cash dividends on the i -th security during month t ; 
itLR  = the link relative of Fisher’s “Combination Investment Performance 
Index”, which is the measure of “general market conditions” in FFJR’s 
study.  
                                               
31 Center for Research in Security Prices 
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This method removed the effects of economy wide factors from the return 
on i ’s stock, leaving the portion of the return attributable to firm specific 
information, which contains the effect of the split announcement. 
FFJR used continuously compounded returns (natural logarithms) to denote 
the rate of return for the individual securities and the market index because 
they found that according to their data, logarithm terms were fairly 
symmetric.
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The event period was from 29 months before the split announcement to 30 
months after. The month of the split was defined as 0t  in event time and 
the event period then runs from 29t  to 30t . That is, the event 
period covered sixty months surrounding the split month ( 3029  t ).  
The residual it  was from the market model for the calendar month 
corresponding to month t  as an estimator of the abnormal return
33
 for 
stock i  during event month t .  
• Cross-sectional average 
Secondly, FFJR relied on the simple process of averaging to abstract from 
the eccentricities of stock splits so as to examine whether the process of 
splitting was in general associated with specific types of return behaviour.  
They defined the average residual for month t  (where t  is always 
measured relative to the split month) as: 
t
N
i
it
t
N
m

 1

  
                                               
32 Subsequent researchers generally use simple returns. 
33 Early event studies, e. g., FFJR (1969), Ball and Brown (1968) and Scholes (1972), discussed the 
market model residuals or prediction errors but do not use the term abnormal return.  
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where 
tN  was the number of splits for which data are available in month t . t  
was the average deviation of the returns of split stocks from their normal 
relationships with the market.  
• Time-series aggregation: Cumulative abnormal return 
The estimates of the average abnormal returns were summed across months 
to measure the average cumulative effect on the sample securities of 
company specific information reaching the market from month 1t  to month 
2t . 

2
1
21
t
t
tttc   
where 
21 tt
c   was the cumulative deviation (from month 1t  to month 2t ), 
or the cumulative effects of the wandering of the returns of split stocks from 
their normal relationships of market movements.  
• Confounding effect 
FFJR examined splits with increased and decreased dividends separately 
and compared them with average dividends paid by all securities on the 
NYSE. The hypothesis was the effect of returns of stock splits centered on 
the dividend behavior of the split shares.   
• Results 
The cumulative average residuals for both dividend classes rose sharply in 
the few months before the split, indicating the market was in anticipation of 
future dividend increase.  
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The average residuals in the dividend-increased class were in general 
slightly positive after the split and the cumulative average residuals drifted 
upward, indicating the large price adjustments could have already been 
carried out before the split.  
Both the average and cumulative average residuals in the decreased class 
rose before the split but then plummeted in the months following the split, 
strongly supporting that the dividend behavior dominated the return effect 
subsequent to the split.   
Ball and Brown (1968) 
Ball and Brown (1968) extended FFJR (1967)
34
 methodology to study 
incomes and earnings announcement effects in the area of accounting and 
further employed abnormal performance index (API) to estimate the net 
abnormal return over a holding-period.  
• Abnormal return 
They estimated abnormal return using market mode with security price 
changes: itmtititit RR    
where 
1,1, /)(  titiititit PPDPR = the percentage return of firm i  for month t ; 
mtR  = an estimate of market’s return for month t . 
                                               
34 Ball and Brown (1968) referenced on FFJR (1967). FFJR (1967) was an unpublished paper in 1968 
but was referred to as FFJR (1969) after 1969 when it was published on International Economic 
Review.  
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They tracked the stock price performance of the good news firms relative to 
the bad news firms across the 18 month period starting 12 months before the 
current year earnings were announced. Abnormal performance index 
In addition, they performed tests in line with FFJR (1969) on log returns. 
The results were quite close to those from the simple returns.  
The event period was running from 12 months prior to the event 
announcement till 6 month after.  
• Abnormal performance index 
They traced out the value of one dollar invested at the end of month 12 and 
held to the end of some arbitrary holding period after abstracting from 
market effects. Basically, abnormal performance index (API)
35
 measured 
abnormal return over a certain holding-period: )1(
1
1 11

 

N
i
T
t
itt
N
API   
where N  was the number of securities and T was the end of some 
arbitrary holding period.  
Problems and modifications 
There were concerns about the stationarity of the market model parameters 
in FFJR methodology. Hence it has become commonplace for studies with 
monthly observations to use five to seven years of data (Blume 1971 and 
Gonedes 1973).  
Second, as both papers pointed out, if the event period is included in the 
period used to estimate the market model parameters, the coefficient 
estimates are biased because the disturbances (which contain the effects of 
the event and related occurrences) are not mean zero.  
                                               
35 For details, please refer to Fisher (1966).  
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Therefore subsequent studies, e. g., Scholes (1972), estimated the market 
model with data prior to the event period (estimation period) and measured 
the abnormal return during the estimation period as the prediction error, 
based on the security returns itR  and market returns mtR  and the 
parameter estimates. It is assumed that the coefficients are constant during 
the estimation and event periods.    
Also Ball and Brown (1968) noticed the possible correlation between 
market effects and abnormal returns in terms of inclusion of firm i  in the 
market index. In the income regression model, the first had been eliminated 
by exclusion of firm i  in calculation of market income. In the stock return 
model, although the market index contained the return on firm i , the 
violation was not serious since the return on security i  was only a small 
part of the index due to the index’s broad coverage. So any violation in this 
aspect had little effect on the empirical results. 
5.1.3 Development in research design since FFJR (1969) 
Since FFJR (1969) which introduced the methodology that is essentially the 
same as that which is in use today, a number of modifications have been 
developed. These modifications relate to complications arising from 
violations of the statistical assumptions used in the early work and relate to 
adjustments in the design to accommodate more specific hypotheses. In 
addition, the use of daily (and sometimes intraday) rather than monthly 
security return data has become prevalent, which permits more precise 
measurement of abnormal returns and more informative studies of 
announcement effects.  
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Assumptions 
In general, the assumptions underlying the hypothesis are the estimators of 
abnormal returns are (1) independent over time, (2) cross-sectional 
independent, and (3) normal distributed. The constant is also assumed to be 
constant over time. 
However in reality, these assumptions are frequently violated. King (1966) 
showed that market model residuals were contemporaneously correlated for 
firms in related industries. Beaver (1968) pointed out that event-induced 
heteroskedasticity was likely. That is, the abnormal return estimator would 
likely have a greater variance during the event period than in the 
surrounding periods. Mikkleson and Partch (1988) discussed that regression 
residuals (or prediction errors) were correlated since they were based on the 
same parameter estimates. Considerable bias may be introduced when these 
problems are not corrected.  
Many papers dealt with the practical importance of many of the 
complications and adjustments. Following is a series of classic studies on 
several modifications of the FFJR scheme.  
Brown and Warner (1980) 
The most famous papers are the work by Brown and Warner published in 
1980 and 1985. The 1980 paper considered implementations issues for data 
sampled at a monthly interval and the 1985 paper
36
 dealt with issues for 
daily data. 
They analyzed the specification and power of several modifications of the 
FFJR scheme with simulation procedures that used actual security return 
                                               
36 Will be introduced immediately after the 1980 paper.  
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data. This design has been followed in almost all subsequent methodology 
research.  
The basic idea behind the event study simulations is simple and intuitive. 
Different event study methods were simulated by repeated application of 
each method to samples that have been constructed through a random (or 
stratified random) selection of securities and random selection of an event 
date to each.  
If performance was measured correctly, these samples should show no 
abnormal performance, on average. This makes it possible to study test 
statistic specification, that is, the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis 
when it is known to be true.  
Further, various levels of abnormal performance were artificially introduced 
into the samples. This permits direct study of the power of event study tests, 
that is, the ability to detect a given level of abnormal performance. 
• Sample construction 
They constructed 250 samples of 50 securities each with a maximum of 250 
daily returns observations (-244, +5), the estimation period (-244, -6) and 
the event period (-5, +5).  
• Benchmark models tested  
A variety of models have been proposed, analyzed and/or used in practice to 
measure the normal rate of return, conditional on certain variables, and then 
to generate abnormal return estimates.  
Brown and Warner performed tests on abnormal returns estimated from 
different models.  
(1) Mean adjusted returns  
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Masulis (1980) assumed that the expected return for a security was equal to 
the mean return surrounding the event. Mean-adjusted returns were then 
calculated by subtracting the average return for stock i  during the 
estimation period ( iK ) from the stock’s return during the event period: 
iiti KR   where i  was the abnormal return for security i  with an 
expectation of zero and variance )(2 i .  
Although the constant mean return model was perhaps the simplest model, 
Brown and Warner found it often yielded results similar to those of more 
sophisticated models. This lack of sensitivity to the model can be attributed 
to the fact that the variance of the abnormal return was frequently not 
reduced much by choosing a more sophisticated model.  
(2) Market model 
FFJR’s market model represented a potential improvement over the constant 
mean return model. By removing the portion of the return that is related to 
variation in the market’s return, the variance of the abnormal return is 
reduced. This in turn can lead to increased ability to detect event effects.  
mtiiitit RR    
where
 mt
R  is the market portfolio return. 
 
Parameters are estimated using a pre-event period sample with OLS 
regression. The parameter estimates and the event period stock and market 
index returns are then used to estimate the abnormal returns. This method 
controls for the risk (market factor beta) of the stock and the movement of 
the market during the event period.  
The benefit from using the market model will depend upon the R square of 
the market model regression. The higher the R square the greater is the 
variance reduction of the abnormal return, and the larger is the gain. 
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(3) Market adjusted returns  
Latane and Jones (1979) assumed that the expected return at time t was the 
market return at the same time. The market-adjusted return was then 
calculated by subtracting the market return
tm
R  from itR : imitit RR  .  
This method was simpler than estimating market model abnormal returns 
because it was done in “one step”, rather than two.  
(4) Market and risk adjusted returns 
Ball and Brown (1969) presumed the expected return was generated from 
CAPM. Accordingly:  mtiiftitit RRR   )1( , where ftR  was the 
return on a minimum variance portfolio of risky assets which was 
uncorrelated with market portfolio or simply return on risk-free assets.  
The use of the CAPM was common in event studies of the 1970s. This 
model introduces the possibility that the results of the studies may be 
sensitive to the specific CAPM restrictions. Because this potential for 
sensitivity can be avoided at little cost by using the market model, the use of 
the CAPM has almost ceased. 
(5) Fama-MacBeth residuals 
The residuals removed the estimate effect of systematic risk of security i  
from real return of security: iitit R  21  , where i  was the 
estimate of the systematic risk of security i  over event period and the 
estimates of 1  and 2  were reported in Fama (1976, pp.357-360). 
(6) Control portfolio residuals 
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The residuals subtracted the average return on the market index in the 
months when securities experienced events from the return on portfolio 
which had approximately the same estimated systematic risk as the market 
index.  
Both these approaches assumed that the market model determined expected 
returns. 
• Statistic tests 
They employed several statistic tests dependent on various assumptions.  
(1) No-dependence adjustment test 
The test assumed abnormal returns from the estimation period were 
independence over time and across firms and had a same variance as those 
in the event period.  
The standard deviation of the average abnormal return for each security is 
then estimated on the basis of the standard deviation of the time series of 
abnormal returns of each firm during the estimation period T .  
N
TdTN
N
N
i
T
t
it
T
t
itN
i
i
 










1
2
1
0
)
1
(
11
1

  
Under the null hypothesis of no abnormal performance, the statistic was 
distributed as Student-t with dT   degrees of freedom. The degrees of 
freedom depend on how the standard deviation of abnormal returns was 
estimated. For example, in the case of prediction errors from the one-factor 
market model, the degrees of freedom are T-2.  
(2) Crude-dependence adjustment  
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In order to deal with potential cross-sectional dependence, Brown and 
Warner (1980) suggested that the standard deviation of average residuals 
should be estimated from the time series of the average abnormal returns 
over the estimation period under the assumption that the average abnormal 
returns were independent over time.  
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overall mean.  
Under the null hypothesis of no abnormal performance, the statistic was 
distributed as Student-t with dT   degrees of freedom.  
(3) Jaffe-Mandeler Methodology 
They formed sample securities into M portfolios, each of which contained 
securities experienced event in calendar month t. The statistic followed suit 
of crude dependence adjustment except changing the individual abnormal 
returns it  to portfolio abnormal returns ( mtP ).  
(4) Non-parametric tests 
When the assumption of normality of abnormal returns is violated, 
parametric tests are not well specified.  
Non-parametric tests are well-specified and more powerful at detecting a 
false null hypothesis of no abnormal returns. 
Sign test was a simple binomial test of whether the frequency of positive 
abnormal residuals equals 50%. It examined the null hypothesis that the 
proportion of sample securities having positive abnormal performance (e.g. 
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positive residuals) was equal to 0.5 and the alternative hypothesis that the 
proportion was greater than 0.5. Therefore: 
N
P
Z
5.0*5.0
5.0
 , where P was 
the proportion of security i  in event month having positive signs. The 
statistic has an approximate unit normal distribution. The advantage of the 
generalised sign test is that it took into account the evidence of skewness in 
security returns.  
Wilcoxon Signed rank test was carried out as in Lehmann (1975), taking 
into account both the sign and the magnitude of the abnormal performance. 
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Z , where K was the sum of the positive ranks of the 
absolute value of abnormal returns in event month. When N is large, the 
distribution of ranks of abnormal return, under the null hypothesis of 
equally likely positive or negative abnormal returns, is approximately a 
normal distribution with the mean rank of 
4
)1( NN
 and the variance of 
24
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.  
• Statistic power of event studies 
To assess the power of event study methods, Brown and Warner added a 
constant to each security’s return during a month designated as the event 
month. They used the models described above to estimate abnormal returns.  
(1) No event clustering:  
When a randomly selected month for each security was designated as the 
event month and parametric statistical tests were used, Brown and Warner 
found similar results for the various abnormal return measures. That is, 
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when abnormal performance was present each method rejects the null of no 
abnormal performance about as often as was expected owing to chance and 
the statistical power of the various methods was fairly similar.  
(2) Event clustering   
When the same calendar month was designated as the event month for each 
security and cross-sectional dependence in the abnormal return estimators 
was controlled for in statistical tests, Brown and Warner found results 
similar to those obtained when there is no clustering.  
However when dependence was not controlled for in the calculation of the 
test statistic, the mean-adjusted return method rejected the null too often 
when it was true since the estimated standard deviation was downward 
biased. For other method, the results were found not affected by controlling 
for dependence. Probably because the securities were randomly selected and 
were likely to have uncorrelated abnormal returns if the market return 
captured all the economy wide influences on security returns.  
(3) Uncertain event dates 
When the event month was not precisely known and abnormal performance  
of 5% was introduced, Brown and Warner rejected the null hypothesis of no 
effect in a one tailed test two to three times less often than when the event 
month was known. Actually the results showed the lower abnormal 
performance, the more powerful the methodologies were in reflecting 
abnormal residuals.  
• Summary 
Brown and Warner (1980) concluded that beyond a simple, one-factor 
market model, there was no evidence that more complicated methodologies 
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conveyed any benefit. In fact, evidenced was presented that more 
complicated methodologies could actually make the inferences worse.   
Brown and Warner (1985)  
They similarly examined the usefulness of the event study methodology 
when daily stock returns are used. They pointed out several problems that 
were more acute with daily returns than monthly returns: (1) nonnormality 
of returns, (2) the effects of nonsynchronous trading on the estimation of 
parameters and abnormal returns and (3) biased variance estimation of 
average abnormal returns.  
They examined mean-adjusted returns, market-adjusted returns and market 
model abnormal returns. 
They found that (1) the non-normality of daily returns had no obvious 
impact on event study methodologies although daily excess returns were 
highly non-normal. The results also indicated that the different methods 
were equally powerful when rejecting the null hypothesis when it was false; 
(2) procedures other than OLS for estimating the market model in the 
presence of non-synchronous trading conveyed no clear-cut benefit in 
detecting abnormal performance; (3) with non-normality and biases in 
estimating the market model, the choice of variance estimator affected both 
the specification and power of the tests. Evidence was shown that the 
specification of the test statistic was improved by using simple procedures 
to adjust the estimated variance to reflect autocorrelation in the time-series 
of mean daily excess returns. When the implication of adjusting variance 
estimates to account for dependence in the cross-section of excess returns 
were studied, only in special cases was such adjustment necessary to 
prevent misspecification. Tests, which assumed non-zero cross-sectional 
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dependence, were only about half as powerful and usually no better 
specified than those employed assuming independence.  
Overall, these results indicated that event studies with daily returns 
performed at least as well in practice as those with monthly returns. That is, 
the potential problems with daily returns were unimportant or easily 
corrected in the standard event study. Methodologies based on the OLS 
market model and using standard parametric tests were well specified under 
a variety of conditions. 
Critical comments on work by Brown and Warner 
Findings by Brown and Warner, with daily and monthly returns, that the 
mean- and market-adjusted return methodologies were as powerful as the 
OLS market model and risk-adjusted return techniques, were suspicious 
since the latter abnormal return estimators were likely to be less noisy. 
Secondly, the seemingly greater power of tests that did not control for 
cross-sectional dependence in Brown and Warner (1985) was questionable 
too. Ignoring cross-sectional dependence is supposed to reject the null too 
often when it is true, that is, to make Type I error.  
Chandra, Moriarty and Willinger (1990) argued that the relatively strong 
performance of the mean-adjusted return and the seemingly powerful test 
without controlling for cross-sectional dependence were a statistical artifact, 
as Brown and Warner used different test statistics for the methods being 
compared. They re-examined the Brown and Warner results and found that 
tests with the mean-adjusted return were less powerful than tests with 
market-adjusted and market model abnormal return estimates and there was 
no evidence of an increase in power from ignoring cross-sectional 
dependence when the same statistical test as used in each case.  
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Choice of estimation period   
Following Brown and Warner, the OLS market model is the mainstream in 
event studies to estimate event effect.  
Parameters of  and   are estimated using an estimation period sample 
with ordinary least squares regression. The parameter estimates and the 
event period stock and market index returns are then used to estimate the 
abnormal returns.  
• Length of estimation period 
It’s assumed that the beta estimate from the estimation period is stationary. 
However, empirical evidence shows that betas on individual stocks have not 
been stable over time (Blume 1971, Baesel 1974, Roenfeldt et al. 1978, 
Theobald 1981, Coutts et al. 1997 etc.). 
The pursuit for obtaining better beta estimates has been linked to the length 
of estimation period in the literature.   
Baesel (1974) reported the empirical finding that the stationarity of beta 
was, indeed, dependent upon the estimation period length over which beta 
factors were estimated. He found that beta stationarity was an increasing 
function of the calendar period used for beta estimation, indicating a longer 
estimation period would provide more appropriate beta estimate. He 
indicated an estimation period up to 108 months for the US data. 
Roenfeldt et al. (1978) investigated the effect varying the length of the 
second sub-period on the stability of individual security betas. They found 
that forecasting betas based on a 4-year period were more reliable for 3 and 
2-year periods, but not reliable for 1-year period.   
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Alexander and Chervany (1980) showed empirically that extreme betas 
were less stable compared to an interior beta. They proved it by using mean 
absolute deviation as a measure of stability. According to them, best 
estimation interval was generally four to six years.  
However increasing the length of the estimation period could also increase 
the probability of beta factors having changed due to occurrence of potential 
significant corporate events in the estimation period. Theobald (1981) 
showed that beta stationarity increased with the calendar period length but 
did not increase indefinitely. He measured beta stationarity with product 
moment correlation coefficient and a range was indicated in which 
correlation was maximized. He indicated that beta stationarity increased 
with estimation period length provided that a particular constraint upon the 
decline in correlation coefficients was fulfilled, indicating low betas 
stationarity of firms may not increase with the estimation period length. He 
suggested that the lower bound constraint upon the decline in correlations 
was fulfilled up to estimation periods of 180 to 210 months for U.K. data.  
Coutts et al. (1997) found in their results that when the market model was 
used within the event study framework, the quantitative results were 
extremely sensitive to the chosen estimation period, indicating beta was not 
stable over different time intervals.   
Daves et al. (2000) showed that for a given estimation period, daily returns 
provided a smaller standard error of the estimated beta than do weekly, 
two-weekly, or monthly returns and also concluded that a much shorter 
estimation period of two to three years was more appropriate for financial 
managers to use when estimating beta with daily returns, as opposed to a 
convention to use five to seven years with monthly data after FFJR (1969).  
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Odabaşı (2003) found with data from the Istanbul market, the more stable 
betas were obtained over a 2-year estimation period in the case of weekly 
returns, while it was a 4-year estimation period with monthly returns.  
Diacogiannis and Marki (2008) reported the mean standard errors of 
estimated betas for eight estimation periods ranging from one year to eight 
years with daily data from the Athens market. The results showed that the 
utilization of an estimation period of three years captured most of the 
maximum reduction in the standard error of beta estimated as compared to 
other periods.  
Using daily data of 625 Chinese listed companies which had IPOs from 
1995-1999, Xia et al. (2006) respectively selected the 2
nd
, 120
th
, 240
th
 and 
480
th
 trading date after the IPO as the beginning point of estimation window 
(that is, from the 2
nd
 trading day to two years after IPO) and six different 
estimation window lengths from 30, 60, 120, 240, 360 to 480 trading days 
(from 6 weeks to 2 years), and accordingly estimated 24 betas for every 
sample firm. They found that, the means of betas were gradually converging 
to 1 with longer estimated window given beginning point of window. The 
estimation period of 360 trading days from the 360
th
 trading day after the 
IPO yielded a beta closest to 1. The standard deviations showed a downward 
trend as the estimation windows were longer. The estimation period of 480 
trading days from the 2
nd
 trading day after the IPO presented smallest 
standard deviation of beta.   
In the literature of event studies, there is no consensus on an optimal length 
of the estimation period. Actually in studies using daily data, the choice of 
estimation period was somewhat arbitrary (Aktas 2007), such as from day 
-245 till day -6 relative to the event day (Ball and Brown 1980, 1985), the 
year ending 50 days before the event (Fama and French 1993), from day 
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-250 till day -21 prior to the event (MacKinlay 1997), from day -250 to day 
-30 (Atkas 2007), from day -244 to day -6 (Ahern 2009), from day -200 to 
day -3 (Huang and Chang 2009) etc.. 
• Pre-event and post-event estimation period 
In most event-studies parameters are estimated using a pre-event period 
sample with ordinary least squares regression (Campell et al. 1997, Binder 
1998). 
In case when there is a step change in beta due to the event, abnormal 
returns can be calculated with a beta estimated from data following the 
event. Mandelker (1974) addressed this issue by separately estimating 
parameter coefficients using both pre- and post-event estimation period data 
on mergers. Since then the application of post-event estimation period has 
typically been done in limited circumstances and generally for long run 
studies using monthly data.  
Edmister et al. (1996) used post-event estimation period (51, 200) to 
minimize bias associated with underperformed abnormal returns in the 
pre-event period for firms chosen by S&P index because S&P selection was 
empirically found to significantly affect the systematic risks of choosen 
stocks. Agrawal et al. (1992) and Gregory (1997) used post-event estimation 
data in long-run studies of mergers.     
Pojezny (2006) studied European equity carve-outs and found the 
companies showed a significant change in their beta parameters. He then 
used both pre-event estimation period (-230, -51) and post-event estimation 
period (11, 190). He found the average difference between pre- and 
post-event estimation period parameters was significant, leading to bias 
abnormal returns if using pre-event estimation period only. However they 
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also found the magnitude of the bias seemed economically insignificant for 
shorter event periods but increased in event period length, implying longer 
event periods relative to the estimation periods need to test the robustness of 
their results to alternative specifications of the market model parameters. 
Furthermore, as suggested in the discussion of the estimation period length, 
a short post-event estimation window of no more than 6 months would by 
itself yield beta non-stationarity, indicating longer estimation periods 
relative to the event periods would satisfactorily minimize bias and improve 
beta estimates. In other words, as long as the estimation period is relatively 
long to the event period, the estimator of event effect in terms of abnormal 
returns is not biased and has little to do with whether pre- or post-event 
estimation period is adopted.       
• Noisy estimation period 
If estimation period is contaminated with confounding events, it is highly 
suspicious that the parameter stability or beta stationarity can be achieved.  
Actually in many research areas, the presence of contaminating events 
during the estimation window has been observed.  
(1) Information leakage  
Malatesta and Thompson (1985) showed that for partially anticipated events 
the market model disturbances were not mean zero during periods the event 
might have occurred but did not. This caused the abnormal return estimates 
to be biased when the standard event study methodology was used. Aktas 
(2007) suggested a shorter period, usually 30 days, can then be excluded 
between the end of the estimation period and the beginning of the event 
period to neutralize the impact of information leakages (or rumours) before 
the announcement.  
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(2) Other significant confounding events  
Thompson (1988) investigated the importance of extraneous individual firm 
events occurring during the estimation period. He tested their impact on the 
power of the classical event study methodology by removing them, on case 
by case basis, from the estimation period. He concluded that the extraneous 
individual firm events occurring during the estimation period had little 
impact on the power of the tests.  
His short estimation period (60 days) probably limited the frequency of such 
corporate events in his sample, explaining his conclusion.  
Furthermore when compiling the data for several hundreds (or thousands) 
observations, it has become impractical to analyze the estimation period on 
a case-by-case basis as in Thompson (1988). This may generate a significant 
risk of bias for the analysis of specific kinds of corporate events.  
• Summary 
The choice of estimation period affects the parameter estimates. Given the 
correlation with the market is not too low, longer estimation period may 
help to obtain a more proper estimate of parameters. It has been suggested 
in the literature that an estimation period is two to three years. In order to 
removing the effect from information leakage, usually a period immediately 
prior to the event time is excluded. This exclusion period is seemingly 
arbitrary decided and suggested to take 30 days in Aktas (2007). Removing 
the effect from noisy confounding events in the estimation period is 
impractical for a large sample size. Hence the results are possibly biased in 
this aspect, which could limit the interpretation.  
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Choice of event period 
Possibly the most crucial research design issue is the length of the event 
window used in an event study built on the OLS market model.  
• Event study assumptions  
The significance of an event study assumes (1) markets are efficient, (2) the 
event was unanticipated, and (3) there were no confounding effects during 
the event window. It is likely that significant events occur quite frequently 
since many of the firms under examination are large, diversified, 
multinational firms.  
Under the assumptions, it is inferred that a short event window will capture 
the significant effect of an event and at the same time effectively control for 
the confounding effects.  
However many studies are based on long event windows (see Table 1 in 
McWilliams and Siege 1997). In fact, 181-day event windows are not 
uncommon. And the authors have not stated whether they controlled for 
confounding effects. 
• Trade-off over the length of event period  
Ryngaert and Netter (1990) indicated the nature of the event being studied 
should determine the length of the event window used. For example, where 
there was evidence of information leakage, the window should include some 
time prior to the announcement of the event so that abnormal returns 
associated with the leakage would be captured. But they didn’t think it 
necessary to include any days after the announcement since market 
efficiency implied almost instantaneous adjustment in stock price to the 
arrival of new information. 
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MacKinlay (1997) suggested it was customary to define the event window 
to be larger than the specific period of interest to permit examination of 
periods surrounding the event, at least the day of the announcement and the 
day after the announcement. He actually employed an event window 
comprised of 20 pre-event days through the event day to 20 post-event days. 
But they didn’t seem to control for confounding events.  
McWilliams and Siege (1998) argued that it should be long enough to 
capture the significant effect of the event, but short enough to exclude 
confounding effect. They demonstrated that with long event windows, it 
was highly likely that firms experienced confounding events. Additional, in 
a scenario where there was uncertainty about when information was 
revealed, long windows could be justified. In this case, they referred to 
techniques in Salinger (1992), which subtracted and controlled for the 
impact of confounding events
37
. 
• Summary  
When there the event date is certain and the market is efficient, a short event 
window is preferred in the hope of controlling for the possible confounding 
events. 
Choice of market index 
In the literature, it has been suggested that a broad-based stock index was 
used for the market portfolio with OLS market model (FFJR 1969, Binder 
1998). 
• Equal weighted index versus value weighted index 
                                               
37 See details beblow. 
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Brown and Warner (1980) found that event study tests based on a market 
model using a value weight index were severely misspecified.  
Campbell and Wasley (1993) found that the choice between an equal weight 
or value weight market index was important in event studies using 
NASDAQ data and strongly recommended using the NASDAQ equal 
weight market index. 
Based on Asia-Pacific financial market returns data, Corrado and Truong 
(2008) found that the use of an equal weight index to compute market model 
excess returns provided better test specification than use of a value weight 
index. 
Arithmetic return versus Logarithm return 
The continuous compounded return (logarithm return) was firstly used in 
FFJR (1969) while subsequent researchers generally use arithmetic returns.  
Ball and Brown (1968) tested on both arithmetic return and logarithm return 
and found the results were quite close. Their results didn’t detect any 
significant difference between using the two kinds of returns. But they used 
monthly data which were less problematic in normality than daily returns.  
Brown and Warner (1985) used arithmetic return with daily data and found 
nonnormality of the individual abnormal return estimators did not cause the 
average abnormal return estimator to be nonnormally distributed and hence 
had little impact on the results.  
Kothari and Warner (1997), and Barber and Lyon (1997) showed that log 
returns were negatively skewed, such that test-statistics were unlikely to be 
well specified. Corrado and Trung (2008) also reported that generally the 
arithmetic returns were positively skewed and log returns were negatively 
skewed.  
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Dissanaike and Le Fur (2003) theoretically proved that cross-sectional 
average logarithm return (log CAR) was equivalent to the log of the 
cross-sectional geometric mean. Rothstein (1972) proved if price functions 
were positive, continuous and differentiable, geometric mean measured the 
performance of a portfolio that was continuously rebalanced to equal 
weights. But Rothstein (1972) also pointed out that continuous re-balancing 
couldn’t be literally implemented by a portfolio manager since it involved 
high transaction costs. Even if the transaction costs were zero, it was 
questionable to use average log CAR. Given that the researcher was trying 
to measure effects around the event, introducing the additional effect of 
continuously rebalancing could contaminate the results. Secondly, in a more 
realistic world where price functions were stochastic, Brennan and Schwartz 
(1985) showed that geometric mean actually underestimated the value of a 
continuously rebalanced portfolio, indicating average log CAR could yield a 
biased return on a continuously rebalanced portfolio. They suggested that 
abnormal performance index was more appropriate than that average log 
CAR to measure the return earned over a particular horizon. If the objective 
was to test whether sample firms persistently earn abnormal returns, average 
CARs were considered more appropriate
38
 than log CAR as the former was 
based on a series of successive buy-and-hold returns, whereas the latter was 
based on a series of log geometric means, which would yield an unrealistic 
return. 
In reality, majority studies didn’t follow FFJR (1969) to use log returns but 
stick to simple returns. 
                                               
38 But not appropriate to measure the return ‘earned’ when one invests in a sample of firms over a 
particular horizon (see Barber and Lyon, 1997). 
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Event date uncertainty 
Ball and Torous (1988) explicitly took into account the uncertainty about 
the event dates 
Using a maximum likelihood estimator, they simultaneously estimated, for 
each day of the event window, the abnormal returns, their variance and the 
probability of an event. Using simulations, the authors showed that their 
approach as more powerful (more frequently detecting simulated abnormal 
returns) than the classical ones when the event date was uncertain.  
This paper is not that relevant since the event dates regarding the 
Full-circulation reform were certain and known. 
Development in parametric tests under a variety of conditions 
The standard assumptions for using the market model are: the residuals are 
independent over time and across securities as well as normally distributed. 
Also it’s assumed there is no heteroskedasticity. 
• Cross-sectional dependence 
As introduced in Brown and Warner, the crude dependence adjustment 
techniquely controlled for cross-sectional dependence.  
Time-series dependence 
Mikkleson and Partch (1988) discussed that regression residuals were 
correlated since they were based on the same parameter estimates and used 
a test statistic which incorporated the time-series dependence. 
• The MP test 
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i  is the security i ’s 
estimated variance of abnormal returns during the estimation period T .    
Salinger (1992) followed the MP test and analyzed the bias in hypothesis 
tests about cumulative average abnormal returns when average abnormal 
estimators were correlated. The degree of bias depends on the number of 
observations in both the estimation period T  and the event period P . 
When P  is small relative toT , the uncorrected (biased) test statistic is 
very close to the corrected (unbiased) one. But, when P  is relatively large, 
the bias is substantial. Salinger (1992) indicated that intertemporal 
correlation could be ignored for very short event windows ( P  is small 
relative to T ) without inducing serious errors while for longer event 
window ( P  is relatively large to T ), it was important to include the square 
root component to adjust for intertemporal correlation.  
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For example, Cowan (1993, Table I.1) showed that when 5P  and 
100T , the uncorrected test statistic was expected to exceed the corrected 
one by 1.6%. When 60P and 100T , the figure was 25.2%. The 
parameter estimation errors due to confounding events in longer event 
period could be effectively reduced using the MP test.  
• Event-induced heteroskedasticity 
Brown and Warner verified that event studies work well when an event has 
an identical effect on all firms. But they also warned that when an event has 
differing effects on firms, the variance of returns would increase and 
common methods might fail.  
Boehmer et al. (1991) provided a simplest solution to the problem of 
event-induced heteroskedasticity, which became a standard method in the 
literature and was used in many classical empirical studies (Aktas, 2007). 
Boehmer et al. proposed a statistic test (BMP test) to deal with this problem 
(the BMP test).  
In this test, the abnormal return estimates are first standardized by their 
estimated standard deviation (assuming no event-induced 
heteroskedasticity), based on the residual variance from the estimation 
period: 
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0iSR : the security i ’s standardized residual on the event day;  
iS : the security i ’s estimated standard deviation of abnormal returns during 
the estimation period T ;  
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calculated cross-sectionally in the event period and the significance of the 
estimate of the average standardized abnormal return is tested using the 
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In effect, the procedure of this method assumes that the event-induced 
increase in variance is proportional to the estimated period variance for each 
firm and is similar across securities. In other words, the increase in variance 
is a constant multiplying the estimated period variance for each firm.  
Boehmer et al. (1991) found in simulations that with this method the 
frequency of rejection of the null was essentially equal to the nominal size 
of the test when the null hypothesis of no abnormal performance was true. 
When the null was false, their method rejected the null more often than the 
other methods
39
 for which the true size of the test was equal to the nominal 
size. In general, their test was unbiased and more powerful than other well 
specified alternatives when there was an increase in the variance. When 
there was no change in variance, their test was well specified even, but less 
powerful as the variance in this case was overestimated.  
                                               
39 No Dependence Adjustment method from Brown and Warner (1980), the Patell’s (1976) 
Standardized-residual test, the sign test, the Cross-sectional test and the method-of-moments 
estimation from Froot (1989).  
156 
 
This test is designed to control for the cross-sectinoal variation in event 
time.      
Development in non-parametric tests  
Non-parametric tests typically make fewer assumptions about the data. 
Generally a nonparametric test assumes the distribution is unknown or 
nonnormal and measures central tendency by the median.  
Previous studies have shown that abnormal returns distributions show fat 
tails and are right skewed (Serra 2002). Parametric tests reject too often 
when testing for positive abnormal performance and too seldom when 
testing for negative abnormal performance. As alternatives to parametric 
test, in this case, non-parametric tests are well-specified and more powerful 
at detecting a false null hypothesis of no abnormal returns. 
In a 1980 paper, Brown and Warner claimed that when applied to stock 
returns, the nonparametric sign test was misspecified and lacking in power. 
Zivney and Thompson (1989) argued that this claim was incorrect and 
stemmed from confounding the mean and median of a distribution and from 
not correcting for the different natural levels of significance. After restating 
Brown and Warner’s results, they found that in general the sign test 
appeared as powerful and well-specified as the t-test; and when applied to 
market-adjusted returns and market- and risk-adjusted returns 
methodologies, the sign test appeared more powerful than the t-test. 
Corrado (1989) introduced a non-parametric rank test of significance, which 
has been used in classical empirical studies (Aktas 2007). His rank test 
merged the estimation and event windows in a single time series. His rank 
procedure transformed the distribution of security abnormal returns into a 
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uniform distribution across the rank values regardless of any asymmetry in 
the original distribution.  
• The Corrado rank test 
To implement the rank test, it is first necessary to transform each firm’s 
abnormal returns in ranks [ )( itit rankK  ] over the combined period S  
that includes the estimation and the event window. That is, for firm i  , 
abnormal returns are sorted over the combined period and a rank is assigned 
to each day of the combined period.  
The test then compares the ranks in the event period for each firm, with the 
expected average rank under the null hypothesis of no abnormal return, 
equal to the mean rank of  25.0 SK   when S  is odd and of 
 2SK   when S  is even. The test statistic for the null hypothesis is: 
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This statistic is distributed asymptotically as unit normal (Z distribution) 
and the degree of freedom is S . The use of ranks neutralizes the impact of 
the shape of the AR distribution (e.g., its skewness and kurtosis and the 
presence of outliers). It should therefore represent an attractive alternative 
way of neutralizing contaminating events within the estimation window.  
Corrado (1989) found his rank test was better specified under the null 
hypothesis and more powerful than its traditional parametric counterparts 
(cross-sectional independence test and crude dependence adjustment test) 
under alternative hypothesis.  
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Cowan and Sergeant (1996) showed that if the return variance was unlikely 
to increase, then Corrado's rank test provided better specification and power 
than the BMP test in Boehmer et al. (1991). With variance increases this test 
was, however, misspecified.  
Corrado and Zivney (1992) refined the Corrado’s rank test to account for a 
variance increase during an event period. They standardised the abnormal 
returns as Boehmer et al. (1991) did and then ranked the stanardised 
abnormal returns, which were then used to compute the rank test statistic as 
Corrado (1989) did. They further refined the sign test. They assigned 
positive one, negative one and zero signs to each day's observation for 
abnormal returns above, below and equal to the sample median of the 
abnormal returns in the estimation period which was zero. They found that 
without event-induced increase in variance, both the standardised rank test 
and the median-based sign test were better-specified than the traditional 
parametric test. In the presence of an event date variance increase, 
non-parametric tests were less severe in terms of misspecification than the 
traditional parametric tests. Furthermore the rank test dominated the sign 
test and the traditional parametric test.  
Campbell and Wasley (1993) demonstrated that traditional parametric event 
study tests were poorly specified with NASDAQ returns data but the 
non-parametric rank test in Corrado (1989) was robustly specified with 
these data.  
With actual daily security returns, Corrado and Truong (2008) data revealed 
that the parametric test statistics (the BMP test from Boehmer et al. 1991) 
were more prone to misspecification with Asia-Pacific returns data than 
non-parametric tests (the standardised rank test and the median-based sign 
test introduced in Corrado and Zivney 1992). With both US security market 
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data and Asia-Pacific returns data, the non-parametric rank test statistics led 
with the greatest test power, followed by the non-parametric sign test 
statistics, and then the parametric test statistics. The ranking of test statistics 
by test power was essentially the same as that found in previous studies 
using similar simulation methods in Brown and Warner (1980, 1985). In the 
presence of a doubled event-date excess returns variance, some 
misspecification was observed with all test statistics examined. Nevertheless 
the standardised rank test introduced in Corrado and Zivney (1992) were 
better specified than the others.  
Ahern (2009) showed that the combination of OLS market model and the 
parametric tests (crude dependence adjustment test in Brown and Warner 
1980, 1985 and the BMP test in Boehmer et al. 1991) produced incorrect 
rejection rates under the null hypothesis for securities that were grouped by 
size, prior returns, and book-to-market ratios and the power of the 
parametric tests to detect abnormal performance were lower than the 
nonparametric tests (stanardised rank test and median-based sign test in 
Corrado and Zivney 1992) under the alternative hypothesis.  
Generally speaking, non-parametric tests are well-specified and outperform 
parametric tests under a variety of conditions.  
An alternative to OLS market model 
An alternative to the OLS market model is known as the parameterized 
model, proposed by Izan (1978) uses dummy variables to estimate the 
abnormal returns accruing to the firm on the d th day of the event window: 
ititimtiiit DRR    where itD  is a dummy variable for the d th 
day in the event window, and i  is the estimate of the abnormal return on 
day d of the event window. In this framework, the mean of the market 
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model residual mtiiit RR   during the event period is reflected in the 
estimate of i , because by construction the mean of the disturbance it
must be zero. 
According to Binder (1997), a standard assumption in the system of this 
equation is that the disturbances are independent and identically distributed 
within each equation, but that their variances differ across equations. It is 
also assumed that across equations the contemporaneous covariances of the 
disturbances are nonzero, but that the noncontemporaneous covariances all 
equal zero.  
Brockett et al. (1999) developed an event-study method with the GARCH 
(Generalized AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity) model. They, 
however, ignored the importance of event-induced variance, a phenomenon 
that is emphasized in Brown and Warner (1980, 1985), Boehmer, 
Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991), and Corrado (1989).  
Savickas (2003) used a GARCH model with dummy variables to evaluate a 
simple test statistic that accounted for the stochastic behavior of volatility 
during both event and nonevent periods. The test did not require the 
volatility effect to be the same across firms in the sample. He addressed the 
conditionally heteroskedastic behavior of volatility and the event-induced 
variance increase in a single model: 
ititiitiiiit
ititimtiiit
Ddchbah
DRR


 1,
2
1, 

 where 
iiiiiii dcba ,,,,,,  are parameters to be estimated, ith  is the estimated 
standard deviation of the abnormal returns, which incorporates the 
event-induced variance through the coefficient id . However their test 
would also be biased in the presence of cross-sectional dependence.   
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5.1.4 Summary 
The event studies have been developing the event-study methodology under 
a variety of conditions. There is no unique structure of an event-study 
method. Nevertheless these studies have provided a general flow of 
analysis.  
FFJR (1969) proposed an OLS market model which was verified as 
appropriate in Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) to estimate the abnormal 
returns.  
In many studies, a long event-window was selected (see Table 1 in 
McWilliams and Siege 1998). However the theory of market efficiency 
suggests that stock prices should response to an event immediately, which 
has been empirically supported. The fact that confounding events would 
contaminate the results also casts doubt on the application of a long event 
window.  
The choice of estimation period was somewhat arbitrary in the literature 
(Aktas 2007). From the perspective of parameter stationarity, a long 
estimation period is indicated. But potential confounding events in the 
estimation period would affect the parameters estimates. For a large sample 
size, it is unrealistic to remove the confounding events on a case-by-case 
basis.  
A logarithm return is not necessarily better than a simple return because (1) 
Brown and Warner (1985) showed non-normality of individual abnormal 
returns had little impact on the results; (2) non-normality could be corrected 
with non-parametric tests, (3) logarithm returns were found negative skewed 
empirically; (4) logarithm CAR was proved theoretically to yield biased 
results (Dissanaike and Le Fur 2003).  
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Prior research indicates that the choice of equal weight index is better than a 
value weight index in terms of test specification, i.e. Corrado and Truong 
(2008).  
Many adjustments have been made to the test statistics to account for 
dependence over time and across firms, and event-induced variance 
(problem of heteroskedasticity). Generally speaking, non-parametric tests 
outperform parametric tests in event studies under a variety of situations.     
5.2 Market Efficiency in China stock markets 
A market is said to be informationally efficient if asset prices in the market 
immediately and completely reflects all available information at all times. 
The Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) indicates that it is impossible to 
make economic profits by trading on the basis of the information as the 
arbitrage profits from exploiting the information gradually absorbed in stock 
prices should be all exploited in equilibrium. Therefore, an implication of 
the EMH is that asset returns are not predictable with respect to the 
available information. 
The idea of the EMH emerged as early as the beginning of the twentieth 
century in the theoretical contribution of Bachelier (1900) which was the 
first to model the formulation for a random walk in security prices, as noted 
by Dimson and Mussavian (1998). Fama (1965, 1970) distinguished 
different types of efficiency depending upon the information set considered.  
• Weak-form Efficiency: it implies that current prices incorporate all 
historical price and volume information. In a weak-form efficient market 
prices will adjust to news without delay and therefore no excess returns 
can be earned by studying the past pattern of price changes. Weak-form 
efficiency is often associated with the random-walk hypothesis, where 
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future price changes are independent of price changes in the past. In this 
case, no charts or analysis based only on past prices can help to achieve 
abnormal profits. In other words, no profits are left unexploited; 
consequently, the result is a fair game in the end. However various 
anomalies such as seasonal and day-of-the week effects may be present. 
• Semi-strong efficiency: it implies all publicly available information is 
fully reflected in the stock price. Thus, one cannot make abnormal 
profits by using publicly known information. An implication of 
semi-strong efficiency is professional security analysts and portfolio 
managers are not able to outperform a simple index fund providing this 
fund is efficient. Furthermore, the mention of abnormal profits implies 
that there has to be a definition of normal profits.  
• Strong-form efficiency: it implies all available information even private 
(insider) information would already be incorporated into market prices.  
Semi-strong efficiency implies weak-form efficiency. Strong efficiency 
implies semi-strong and weak efficiency. If the weak-form of the EMH can 
be rejected, then also the semi strong and strong-form of the EMH can be 
rejected. They are termed ‘nested hypotheses’.  
5.2.1 Empirical Evidence on Efficient Market Hypothesis  
There is a great deal of demonstrative research on the quantities and 
qualities of information which are reflected in security prices.  
Weak-form efficiency 
Most early empirical works have presented evidence supporting the 
weak-form of market efficiency. Studies have attempted to test this 
hypothesis by examining the correlation between the current return on a 
security and the return on the same security over a previous period(s). If the 
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random walk hypothesis was true, then correlation would expect to be zero. 
A violation of weak-form EMH is a presence of correlation in stock returns. 
Supportive evidence on weak-form EMH was found in Osborne (1959), 
Fama (1965), Fama (1970) etc.. However more recent studies on 
autocorrelation in stock returns have shown mean reversion in stock prices, 
such as Poterba and Summers (1986) and Engel and Morris (1991). Fama 
(1991) suggested positive autocorrelation infers predictability of returns in 
the short horizon (typically six to twelve months), and negative 
autocorrelation reflects predictability in the long horizon.  
In late 1980s and early 1990s, studies of market efficiency have used the 
variance ratio test in addition to the serial correlation and runs tests. 
However, the results are ambiguous. Lo and MacKinlay (1988) and 
Huang(1995) rejected the random walk hypothesis while Lee (1992) found 
the random walk hypothesis still held with weekly return series for the 
majority of the western stock markets examined.   
More recently, unit root tests have been added to examine weak-form EMH 
together with serial correlation, run test and variance ratio test. According to 
the results in Al-Loughani and Chappel (1997), the series of FTSE 30-share 
index does not follow a random walk. Worthington and Higgs (2004) 
showed that the random walk hypothesis was not rejected in major 
European developed markets. Gilmore and McManus (2003) found strong 
evidence against the random walk hypothesis for East European stock 
markets.  
Overall, recent studies have found developed markets not to be completely 
consistent with weak-form efficiency compared with early results. But the 
results are mixed and conflicting for emerging markets.  
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Semi-strong efficiency 
In a semi-strong efficient market, stock prices should incorporate 
fundamental information about the economy and individual companies. If 
the semi-strong EMH were true, stock market would response to the 
announcement of public information instantaneously and unbiasedly.  
Event studies provide a direct test of the hypothesis of semi-strong form 
market efficiency by examining the reaction of stock prices or returns to the 
announcement of firm-specific events, such as stock split and dividend 
issues, bonus and right issues which can affect the stock prices and returns. 
The magnitude of the abnormal stock price performance (excess returns) in 
the period surrounding the event announcement date is a measure of the 
impact of events. The presence of significant non-zero abnormal returns 
before the announcement indicates the investors have anticipated the 
information or they have access to inside information. The presence of 
significant non-zero abnormal returns persisting after the announcement 
implies overreaction or underreaction in response to the information. A 
significant abnormal return on the event announcement date is consistent 
with the null hypothesis that stock prices completely, immediately and 
accurately reflect the announcement event.  
Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (FFJR) (1969) examined 940 stock splits on 
the NYSE between 1927 and 1959. In their studies, abnormal returns 
appeared immediately following the announcement of the splits.  
Scholes (1972) tested the stock prices responses to the announcement of 
secondary distribution and found the price decline persisted 14 days after 
the announcement and the price decline was corresponded to block selling 
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of insiders. Therefore, the market inefficiently reflects the announcement of 
the secondary distribution. 
Brown et al (1977) conducted a combined study on announcements of 
profits and announcements of dividends, as they are usually released 
simultaneously. Semi-strong form efficiency can be inferred as the results 
showed that returns on the shares reflected the content of the two sources of 
information precisely and instantly.  
Rendleman et al (1987) tested the behaviour of stock prices during the 
weeks surrounding an earnings announcement. They distinguished between 
expected earnings and unexpected earnings, and maintained the proposition 
that only unexpected earnings announcements pass on new information to 
investors. The unexpected earnings were categorised into ten groups, from 
high value (positive) to low value (negative). They found that 
post-announcement drifts of returns show that stock prices overreacted to 
the announcements, which is inconsistent with the semi-strong form 
efficient market hypothesis. Foster et al (1984) and Bernard and Thomas 
(1990) also presented that the stock prices failed to fully reflect the 
implication of current earnings. Previously announced earnings predict the 
future abnormal returns.  
Lukose and Narayanan (2002) examined the reaction of stock prices around 
the date of announcement of stock splits and ex-split date. The result of 
abnormal returns around the ex-split day showed that much of the abnormal 
returns took place on day 0 and day +1. Amitabh Gupta and Gupta.O.P 
(2007) maintained that stock splits were associated with positive abnormal 
returns around the announcement. Strictly speaking, both papers were not 
that supportive of semi-strong EMH as abnormal returns were observed 
surrounding other than the exact event dates.   
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Overall it’s hard to conclude on whether the markets are empirically 
semi-strong efficient as the results are really ambiguous. Moreover, any test 
using the event study methodology is a joint hypothesis of market efficiency 
and asset pricing.  To identify abnormal returns requires an estimate of a 
normal return which will be given by the asset pricing model.  If the asset 
pricing model such as a market model is a poor reflection of a normal return 
then there will be an inappropriate benchmark from which to measure the 
abnormal return.  
5.2.2 Empirical Evidence on China stock markets 
As the Chinese economy has been growing rapidly with great reforms 
towards a market-oriented economy, the efficiency of the Chinese stock 
markets has been important in academic research.   
Weak-form EMH  
A substantial number of studies have attempted to determine the extent to 
which the Chinese stock market is weak-form efficient. 
Yu (1994) examined data of Shanghai stock market before 1994 and 
concluded Shanghai stock market was not weak-form efficient.  
Wu (1996) examined efficiency in both Chinese stock markets, on the early 
stage of development in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Using the 
serial correlation test on eight and twelve individual shares for the period 
from June 1992 to December 1993, he found Chinese stock markets to be 
weak-form efficient. 
Liu et al. (1997) examined daily closing prices on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges using the ADF unit root and cointegration tests 
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from the period May 21, 1992 to December 18, 1995.
40
 The ADF unit root 
test was used to test for randomness in each stock exchange share price 
index, and cointegration and causality tests were used to examine the 
relationship between the two share price indexes. Their results suggested 
that the random walk for both the Shanghai and Shenzhen was accepted, 
indicating that each market was individually efficient. Results of the 
cointegration test found a stationary long-run relationship between two 
stock prices (a stochastic relationship should be found if cointegrated). In 
addition, the causal relationship between the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
indexes was found to be bidirectional (no causal relationship was expected 
if the markets were efficient). Consequently, the cointegration and causality 
test results suggested that the two Chinese stock markets were inefficient 
collectively.  
Laurence et al. (1997) tested for weak-form efficiency in the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges, and causality among these Chinese stock 
markets with each other and with the U.S. and Hong Kong stock markets. 
Their data included 1000 daily observations for Shanghai A-share, Shanghai 
B-share, Shenzhen A-share and Shenzhen B-share indices, Hong Kong 
stock exchange index and the Dow Jones industrial average for the U.S. 
from the period March 1993 to December 1996. They found the presence of 
significant serial correlation in daily return series in all four Chinese stock 
shares, however the magnitude of serial correlation decreased after the year 
1994, indicating that the Chinese stock market were gradually moving to 
becoming efficient. They also observed a causal relationship between 
B-share stock markets to the A-share stock markets, implying that foreign 
markets exerted a significant influence on the markets open only to Chinese 
                                               
40 For details, please refer to Said and Dickey (1984) and Banerjee, Dolado, Galbraith, and Hendry 
(1993).  
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nationals. In addition, they found a weak causal effect from Hong Kong to 
the Chinese stock markets, and a strong causal effect from U.S stock market 
to Chinese stock markets and Hong Kong stock market. Based on the results, 
they argued that Chinese stock markets are gradually become more 
integrated into the global economy.  
Mookerjee and Yu (1999) tested the efficiency of Chinese stock markets 
from the period December 19, 1990 to December 17, 1993 for the Shanghai 
stock exchange and from the April 3, 1991 to December 17, 1993 for the 
Shenzhen stock exchange. Their data included 759 daily closing prices for 
the Shanghai exchange and 727 daily closing prices for the Shenzhen 
exchange. Employing the serial correlation and the runs tests, they observed 
that there were significant inefficiencies present on both exchanges. Their 
study also tested for the presence of seasonal anomalies on both exchanges 
and found significant weekend and holiday effects, but no January effects. 
According to them, the reasons for inefficiency in Chinese equity markets 
included the restricted supply of stocks, the large holding of shares by the 
Government, excessive volatility due to abrupt policy changes by the 
authorities, the inadequate infrastructure, both physically and legally, and a 
shortage of expertise and geographical segmentation of markets. 
Darrat and Zhong (2000) used the variance ratio test of Lo and MacKinlay 
(1988) and a model-comparison method to examine whether or not stock 
prices in both Chinese markets follow a random walk. They concentrated 
their investigation of the market behavior on daily data of the A-share 
closing index prices of the Shanghai exchange from December 20, 1991 to 
October 19, 1998 and the Shenzhen exchange from April 4, 1991 to October 
19, 1998. Their results indicated that A share indices on both Chinese stock 
markets did not follow a random walk. The prices of A-share indices 
exhibited positive autocorrelation, implying the potential for predictability. 
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They suggested that the inefficiency probably arose from thin trading, 
asymmetric information, ineffective legal structures and lack of 
transparency. 
Lee et al. (2001) investigated time-series features of stock returns and 
volatility in four of Chinese stock exchanges, using daily returns of 
Shanghai A share and B-share and Shenzhen A-share and B-share indices 
for the period 1990 to 1997. They observed that Chinese stock market did 
not follow a random walk hypothesis. They found the presence of negative 
serial correlation in return series indicating the possible mean reversion in 
returns.  
Lima and Tabak (2004) tested the random walk hypothesis for the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock exchanges using daily returns from the period June 
1992 to December 2000 for both A-share and B-share indices. Employing 
the variance ratio tests, the random walk hypothesis was rejected for 
B-shares for the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges, but not for A-shares for 
both exchanges. They suggested that A-shares in Chinese stock exchanges 
were weak-form efficient. According to them, B-share markets were not 
weak-form efficient possibly due to being less liquid or active than A-share 
markets and making up no more than 5% of the total market capitalisation.  
Zhang and Li (2008) utilized tests based on ranks and signs suggested by 
Wright (2000) together with the traditional variance ratio test to examine the 
behaviour of some Chinese stock indices. They used daily price data from 
21 February 1992 to 2 December 2005 for Shanghai A and B-share indices, 
from 6 October 2002 to 2 December 2005 for Shenzhen A and B-share 
Indices. The results suggested that the null hypothesis of random walk 
behaviour of the index series examined in the study is rejected. The 
rejection of nonrandom movement in the series examined was much 
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stronger for the former time than the latter time after 1996, which suggested 
the evolving market efficiency of Chinese stock market. 
Charles and Darne (2009) examined the random walk hypothesis for the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets for both A and B shares, using daily 
data over the period 1992–2007. They used new and conventional multiple 
variance ratio statistics
41
. In addition, the paper investigated Chinese stock 
market efficiency over various sub-periods in order to analyze the effects of 
the important changes in the relationship between the banks and the stock 
market as well as the regulatory change that widened the B share market to 
include domestic investors.
42
 The results suggested that A-share market 
appeared more efficient than B-share markets, implying that liquidity, 
market capitalization and information asymmetry could play a role in 
explaining the weak-form efficiency. B-share markets became efficient after 
the re-entry of banks in the stock market but seemed to appear inefficient 
after the B shares opening to domestic Chinese investors. Nevertheless, the 
entry of Chinese investors on the B share market has positively influenced 
the B share market efficiency. 
My study concentrates on the China A-share markets as the China 
Full-Circulation Reform was supposed to only affect A-share markets 
through floatation of substantial Government-held A shares. Overall 
speaking, there is no consensus on weak-form China A-share market 
efficiency. Early studies based on early samples tend to reject the null that 
                                               
41 For more details, please refer to Whang-Kim’s (2003) subsampling test, Kim’s (2006) bootstrap 
test, which do not rely on asymptotic approximations, as well as the Chow-Denning (1993) test. 
42 Until 1996, banks had a dominant influence on the stock market. In 1996, regulations were further 
tightened by preventing banks from offering loans for stock transactions. In early 2000, the 1996 
regulations were reversed and banks resumed their position as important sources of funds for stock 
investment. Moreover, in February 2001, the Chinese Government adopted a more liberal policy that 
allowed domestic investors to invest in B share markets, which had only been available to foreign 
investors previously. 
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weak-form EMH holds for China A-share markets. On the other hand, 
recent studies including more recent data tend to support the weak-form 
efficiency in China A-share markets or present a pattern of becoming more 
and more efficient over time.  
Lo and Mackinlay (1989) demonstrated that the traditional statistical tests 
like autocorrelation and unit root were less powerful relative to the variance 
ratio tests in detecting serial correlations of stock returns. Moreover, 
Campbell et al. (1997) argued that the detection of a unit root cannot be 
used as a basis to support the random walk hypothesis.
43
 From this point of 
view, the results of early studies, such as Laurence et al. (1997), Mookerjee 
and Yu (1999), and Liu et al. (1997), may be flawed and biased.  
Also, Lo and MacKinlay (1988, 1990) and Miller et al. (1994) argued that 
thin trading would induce spurious positive serial correlations in the market 
index returns. None of the studies on weak-from of China stock markets 
efficiency mentioned above adjusted to the effect of thin trading although 
some of them acknowledged that thin trading could be the main source of 
their detected predictability, such as Laurence et al. (1997) and Darrat and 
Zhong (2000). Therefore the results of these studies could possibly reject 
the null of weak-form efficiency unnecessarily.   
Finally all these Chinese studies focus on the all-or-nothing notion of 
absolute market efficiency, making the verdict of whether a market is or is 
not weak-form efficient for the whole sample period under study. However, 
according to Self and Mathur (2006:3154), the true underlying market 
structure of asset prices is still unknown and the market behaves in line with 
an efficient market for a period but sometimes it behaves in such a way that 
                                               
43
 For recent critiques on the application of unit root tests, see Saadi et al. (2006a, 2006b) and 
Rahman and Saadi (2007, 2008).  
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researchers are able to systematically find anomalies to the behavior 
expected of an efficient market. On the other hand, Emerson et al. (1997) 
argued that it was not sensible to test market efficiency in its absolute sense 
for stock markets in Central and Eastern European transition economies that 
have just emerged as it took time for the price discovery process to become 
known, the market microstructures to develop, and market participants to 
become more experienced. They proposed a framework to gauge the 
changing degree of predictability, and hence evolving weak-form market 
efficiency. If the market under study becomes more efficient over time, the 
smoothed time-varying estimates of the autocorrelation coefficient would 
gradually converge towards zero and become insignificant. 
Compared to Laurence et al. (1997) and Zhang and Li (2008) within a 
time-invariant framework, Li (2003a, 2003b) employed a time-varying 
framework to examine the informational efficiency of China’s A-share and 
B-share markets over time, covering time periods from 1991 to 2001 and 
1992 to 2002 respectively. Li (2003a) showed that both the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen markets were inefficient at their initial development stages. 
However, the past decade saw a steady convergence of the two markets 
towards efficiency. Li (2003b) found The Shanghai A-share market was the 
first to have become efficient since 3 November 1997, followed by the 
Shenzhen A-share market (since 3 July 1998). The Shanghai B-share market 
has shown a convergence (albeit very slow) towards efficiency since 9 
December 1996. A similar trend was not observed for the Shenzhen B-share 
market.  
To sum up, China A-share markets (both in Shanghai and Shenzhen) are 
empirically more weak-form efficient in recent years than in early years. 
Consequently the China A-share markets are assumed to effectively reflect 
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the Full-circulation Reform which lasted from April 2005 till the end of 
2006. 
Semi-strong EMH 
Studies have been conducted of the reaction of Chinese stock prices to 
various important news announcements such as dividend increases or cuts 
and bonus and rights issues. 
Ma (2004) studied semi-strong form efficiency of China A-share stock 
markets based on four main events, (1) non-dividend issue, (2) cash 
dividend issue, (2) bonus issue and (4) rights issue, and two types of 
announcement, (1) proposal and (2) approval
44
. Samples from each type of 
event were constructed into 37 portfolios in total. Generally speaking, the 
results showed that China investors perceived non-dividend issue as ‘bad’ 
news and were pessimistic in responding to the announcement of cash 
dividend proposals probably because shareholders must pay tax for a cash 
dividend but not for a stock dividend according to Chinese regulations. The 
investors’ attitudes toward the announcement of bonus and rights issues 
depended on the specific scheme of the issues. Whether an announcement 
was followed by a further announcement of a new event also affected stock 
price behavior. The underreaction or overreaction of stock prices to the 
announcement has been found in twenty of thirty-seven portfolios. 
Therefore the hypothesis of semi-strong form market efficiency was rejected 
only partly for China’s stock markets in his study. 
                                               
44 According to the laws and regulation of China’s stock markets, important event such as dividend 
issue, bonus issues or rights issue, should be proposed in the meeting of Board of Directors, and 
approved in the Shareholders’ meeting before realized. Information related to the event must be 
published within a short period (usually two days) after the relevant decision is madeThe process 
from proposal of a dividend (or bonus and new rights) issue, to the approval and then the realization 
effectively constitutes three sub-events for every normal event, called proposal announcement, 
approval announcement and realization announcement respectively. 
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As the samples in Ma (2004) were taken before 1998, his findings were 
probably not very indicative on the efficiency of China A-share markets 
recently. Since the market microstructures are developing quickly and the 
investors are becoming mature in the past decade, China A-share markets 
are expected to be improved in efficiency as well.  
Conclusion  
In conclusion, China A-share markets are empirically weak-form efficient in 
recent years. There is some evidence against semi-strong efficiency but the 
hypothesis is not rejected fully using data more than ten years ago. Overall 
this is weak evidence against the semi-strong hypothesis.  
5.3 China’s reducing state shares in 2001 
In Chapter 3, the attempted effort to reduce state shares in the listed 
companies was confronted with dramatic market plunge down by around 40% 
within three month time after the announcement of Measures (2001) by the 
State Council in June 2001, which eventually forced China Government to 
pull out of this program one year later in June 2002. Measures (2001) aimed 
to initialize a scheme for reducing state shares.  
Many articles and book chapters talked about this unsuccessful movement 
by the Government and tried to give explanations.  
Wong (2006), Kim et al. (2003) and De Jonge (2008), attributed the market 
slump to dilution effect in the tradable A-share market, which feared it 
would be flooded with these state shares, in general twice as much as the 
tradable A shares.  
Green (2003) pointed out the initial scheme proposed in Measures (2001) 
failed to lay down reliable guidelines for when, and in what quantities, state 
shares would be sold. With plans for future sales unclear, investors on the 
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tradable A-share markets were left to fear a sudden tidal wave of equity that 
would destroy the value of their portfolios. These uncertainties deteriorated 
the potential dilution effect. He then suggested a credible timetable was 
required. 
Following Green (2003), Beltratti and Bortolotti (2006) blamed an equal 
pricing for tradable and non-tradable A shares envisaged in Measures 
(2001). In Chapter 2, since late 1990s, non-tradable A shares were sold 
occasionally in private transfers or auctions subject to the administrative 
approval from state-asset-management authorities. This was done in order to 
lift pressure from the state-owned banks which funded SOEs and had a rate 
of non-performing loans as high as 40%. According to Chen and Xiong 
(2001), the NTAS were priced at a discount of 70%-80% of the price of 
TAS in the informal markets. Equal pricing, therefore, was suspicious of 
transferring wealth from the private investors to the Government (the 
holders of NTAS).  
However none of them carry out an investigation into these events. They 
lack supportive and convincing evidences other than their descriptive 
opinions. 
Calomiris and his co-workers presented a paper published in Journal of 
Financial Economics in 2010, which is the only one studying this event 
empirically.  
5.3.1 Calomiris et al. (2010) 
The authors examined the market responses to the unexpected 
announcement of the sale of Government-owned shares in China in July 
2001 and to the subsequent cancellation of the program in June 2002, 
defined as Event 1 and Event 2 respectively. Under the dual share structure 
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of China stock markets, Government-owned shares were not allowed to 
trade in contrast to the otherwise identical tradable shares.  
Announcement effect  
They applied an event study method in line with MacKinlay 1997, using a 
standard market model to calculate the benchmark return and the abnormal 
return over day -1 through the event day 0 to day 1. Hence the cumulative 
abnormal return over the event window [-1, +1] was used as the primary 
measure of the event effect and denoted as CAR [-1, +1]. Day -1 and Day 
+1 were included to capture anticipation of the announcement and further 
impact of the announcement respectively. They reported in table 1 that CAR 
[-1, +1] for Event 1 was -10.49% while for Event 2 was 12.68%, indicating 
the stock market responded negatively to unanticipated further privatisation 
and positively to the cancellation of this scheme. Cross-sectionally, 
Government ownership had a negative impact on returns at the 
announcement of sales of Government-owned shares with a correlation of 
-0.2 and a symmetric positive impact at the cancellation announcement with 
a correlation of 0.22. 
Hypotheses 
Their sample consisted of 107 firms which issued both A and B shares. 
B-share prices which were traded by foreigners were employed. They 
showed that the A- and B-share markets were effectively segmented as there 
was a huge discount of B share relative to A shares
45
 and the boundaries 
within which A and B shares moved independently were very large. This 
segmentation indicated that quantities of B shares available for sale was 
unaffected by the potential sale of Government-owned shares in the tradable 
                                               
45 This finding was consistent with studies by Chelley-Steeley and Qian (2005) and Kim and Shin 
(2000) 
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A-share market. Assuming a downward sloping demand curve, using 
B-share returns to measure announcement effects avoided the dilution 
effects in the tradable A-share market.  
Without concern over price pressure from dilution, they attributed the 
findings to the peculiar trajectory of Chinese political and economic 
development. Despite the transition to the market-oriented economy, the 
political control over the country still remained firm and widespread. They 
argued that as a result, the benefits from Government ties could outweigh 
the positive effects on the efficiency gains from private control, which may 
be associated with improved governance, productive efficiency and strong 
incentive to maximize profit.  
Cross-sectional regression analysis 
They conducted 3-stage regressions.  
Firstly, they regressed abnormal event returns CAR [-1, +1] on state-owned 
shares. After controlling for firm size and profitability, results for Event 1 
showed Government ownership has a significant negative coefficient at 
conventional levels, indicating Government ownership was associated with 
benefits to Government-connected firms in China where Government 
continued to exercise substantial control over the economy. Results for 
Event 2 were of opposite signs to those of Event 1 and comparable in 
magnitudes. 
In the second stage, they pooled abnormal returns from both events
46
 to 
examine total impact. The estimated coefficients were similar in magnitude 
to preceding results but of higher level of statistical significance. The 
dummy of companies that employed at least one city-level officials in senior 
                                               
46 They used using negative CAR [-1, +1] for the cancellation event (Event 2) and included Event 2 
dummy variable. 
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management, a measure of personal political ties, had a significant positive 
coefficient at conventional levels, indicating personal ties could substitute 
for institutional connections related to Government ownership. 
Finally, they identified and investigated possible sources of 
Government-related benefits through which Government ties affected firm 
value: (1) local Government discretion in preferential economic 
policymaking, as proxied by the location of the firm in a Special Economic 
Zone; (2) extent of preferential loan access, as proxied by the leverage; (3) 
social benefits or obligations, as proxied by the ratio of retired employees 
supported and commonwealth expenditure deflated by sales. The results 
showed that local Government-related benefits varied with the local 
Government discretion and firms with higher existing pension burdens  
relating to their Government connections benefited the most from the 
privatisation announcement (Event 1) eliminating their institutional 
connections to Government.  
In the appendix, they introduced a subsequent movement by the 
Government to float all non-tradable A shares in 2005. The holders of 
non-tradable A shares were permitted to sell their shares subject to 
negotiation with the holders of tradable A shares about a proper 
compensation. When the 2005 reform was at the experiment stage 
(including the macro events such as the initial launch of reform on April 29, 
the subsequent announcements of two pilot groups and the announcement to 
extend the reform to the rest of the firms See Figure 4.1), there was 
discussions on whether B shareholders would receive compensation as the 
A shareholders. Supporters argued that any compensation should accrue to 
tradable A and B shareholders equally since they were supposed to have 
identical rights according to corporate law in China. Opponent argued that 
B-share investors should not be compensated as the presumed adverse 
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supply effect of new shares in the domestic A-share market would not affect 
the B-share market. They reported Government ownership was a significant 
and positive predictor of B-share returns in the experiment stage, but could 
be biased due to the likely high compensation expected by B-share investors. 
It was becoming clear that B-share investors didn’t receive such 
compensation since the first B-share firm implemented a reform in October 
2005. The B-share returns around firm-specific events were reported to be 
irrelevant of the Government ownership.  
Critical analysis 
 Reliability of the results 
Calomiris et al. (2010) measured event effects using cumulative abnormal 
returns over a 3-day event period [-1, +1] but didn’t test whether the CARs 
computed were significantly different from zero. If the CARs were not 
statistically significant, they were no more than forecast errors. Therefore it 
made no sense to regress them, the forecast errors, on the variables of 
Government ties. In Table 1, though the coefficient of Government 
ownership was significant, the R square was no more than 5%, indicating 
most of the variation of the CARs calculated was unexplained. And the 
predictor of political personal ties was even worse with insignificant 
coefficient and a R square as low as 0.2%. Overall speaking, the estimators 
were not powerful in explaining CARs over the event period, supportive of 
the view that these CARs may be just noise and hence not as relevant to the 
estimators as the authors wished to see.   
 A signal of unfavorable information vs price pressure   
Calomiris et al. (2010) used B-share prices traded in B-share market, which 
is effectively segmented from domestic A-share market where were 
181 
 
supposed to accommodate an immense size of non-tradable A-shares. 
Consequently, their results should be unaffected by the price pressure from 
the potential sale of non-tradable A shares and should only reflect the 
impact of this attempted sale program on firm value.  
The outcomes showed that the overall B-share market responded negatively 
to the announcement further privatisation sales and positively to the 
announcement of cancellation, suggesting the attempted sale program 
signaled unfavorable information to the public investors. They argued that 
in China where political transition was far behind economic reform, 
Government divestment reduced Government-connected benefits, which 
outweighed the positive effects on profits from privatisation, and as a result 
had a negative impact on firm value. If this view holds, B-share investors in 
2005 reform should have been compensated as A shareholders were treated 
since firms would be devalued because the sale of Government shares 
eliminated Government-related benefits.  
However China Government didn’t conform to their conclusion. On the 
contrary, the Government was more concerned over the price pressure effect 
from the oversupply of shares in A-share market and insisted paying 
compensation to A shareholders only.  
One explanation is that their results presented were actually not that robust 
and convincing from a statistic view. Furthermore the market reactions 
could be just the effect of price pressure from the potential immense sales. 
As Perotti and Guney (1993) pointed out, it was not easy to distinguish the 
price pressure effect from the effect of implied unfavorable information to 
the public investors since both have a similar empirical implication: larger 
privatisation should be more underpriced.  
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This literature on the 2001 attempted effort which failed are either 
superficial with descriptive analysis lack of empirical evidence or like 
Calomiris et al. (2010), where the results are statistically unconvincing and 
the conclusion made is disappointedly abandoned by the Government.  
However the method used and the variables applied may be of referential 
importance. 
5.4 China’s Full Circulation Reform  
Only a few papers concerning the impact of China’s Full Circulation 
Reform on the stock markets have been found and collected probably due to 
the complications involved in this reform and the uncertainties in China’s 
emerging markets.  
Basically, China listed firms were guided and directed under a series of 
policies and relevant documents released by China Government to practice 
the FCR as shown in Figure 4.1 which sketches a timeline of these macro 
event dates. For each firm, there was a gradual procedure to put the reform 
proposal into effect as shown in Figure 4.3 which shows a timescale of 
firm-specific (micro) event dates.  
5.4.1 Beltratti and Bortololli (2006) 
This is perhaps the first paper discussing the issue of China FCR. They 
evaluated the stock price effects of the actual implementation of this reform 
in 368 firms which had completed the reform program before March 31st 
2006.  
Interested event dates  
They looked at four critical firm-specific event dates, the start date of an 
individual reform process, the date of the first resumption of trading after 
negotiation of the compensation plan, the record date for registered 
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shareholders, and the date of the second resumption after the announcement 
of the results from the shareholders meeting .  
Hypothesis 
The null hypothesis was that no price change was associated with the 
announcement and implementation of the reform for a given listed 
company, consistent with the idea that the no change in economic 
fundamentals was expected from such reform and that a future supply shock 
would completely offset the upward shift in demand due to improved 
governance and liquidity. 
Method employed 
They applied an OLS market model to measure the abnormal returns around 
the four critical dates and defined an estimation period from 120 days before 
till 10 days before the start date of an individual reform process. Their event 
window started from 10 days before till 10 days after a specific event date. 
Different event periods applied when the time interval between the first 
resumption and the second suspension was less than 10 days. They focused 
on the cumulative abnormal return over an event period and estimated the 
variance of the average CARs as (1) the cross-sectional variance across 
CARs of the different companies and (2) the sum of the company variances 
from the estimation period under the assumption of no cross-sectional 
dependence and normality of residuals.       
Results 
They found significant positive CARs around the first three event dates but 
a large decline on the last event date. The null hypothesis was thus rejected. 
They explained that the expectation of improved corporate governance 
outweighed the price pressure from the large-scale non-tradable-shares 
disposals. The precipitous fall on the second resumption date was due to the 
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stock traded from the record date of ex bonus. In their preliminary 
cross-sectional analysis, after controlling for firm characteristics, they found 
Consideration level irrelevant in explaining the abnormal returns 
accompanying the first resumption of trading but the quantity of tradable 
shares outstanding seemed to matter.  
Critical comments 
Their article is ambiguous and not fully explained in many parts. For 
example, they didn’t explain the reason they selected the explanatory 
variables nor did they explain the regression results presented. Regarding 
the price fall on the second resumption date, their one-sentence explanation 
was very confusing. Trading was actually suspended from the record date 
and it was impossible to trade stocks so as to drive the price down during 
this period.  
It was too early to conclude that the expectation of improved corporate 
governance determined the positive CARs observed. First, their long event 
window could contain some confounding events which would contaminate 
the real impact of an individual reform. Second, their estimates of CAR 
variance were not free of question. Actually they didn’t specify the 
underlying assumptions explicitly. For these estimators of the variances to 
be consistent the first estimator requires the abnormal returns to be 
uncorrelated in the cross section although cross-sectional homoskedasticity 
is not required. Campell et al. (1997) suggested non-clustering would be 
sufficient for this requirement. However it seems there is no definite 
non-clustering during China’s FCR as firms staged reforms in groups and 
the interval between groups is as short as five working days. The second one 
assumes time series independence and cross-sectional independence, which 
is a strong assumption. This may lead to severe bias in results. Third, there 
was no clear evidence that corporate governance was a significant 
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determinant because there was no revision suggested for corporate 
governance reform.  
5.4.2 Lu et al. (2008)  
This paper investigated the share market response to the Government launch 
of China’s FCR on April 29 2005 which was expected to affect all the listed 
firms with non-tradable shares as well as to the start date of an individual 
reform process which was various across firms.  
Hypotheses 
They predicted (1) share market reaction to the Government announcement 
of the reform on 29 April 2005 was non-zero. Like Beltratti and Bortololli 
(2006), they considered the potential benefits from improved governance 
and enhanced liquidity, as well as the negative effects from oversupply of 
non-tradable shares. But unlike Beltratti and Bortololli, they didn’t expect 
these effects to offset perfectly; (2) the share market reaction to the 
company’s commencement announcement to undertake the reform was 
positive due to the inclusion of Consideration scheme, though not yet 
negotiated with the holders of tradable-shares; (3) share market reaction was 
a function of the type / level of consideration as the consideration package 
signaled a company’s intention to protect minority shareholders. 
Research design 
They used the OLS market model and defined an estimation period as 120 
trading days prior to the event (-120, -1). However they calculated CARs 
over three event periods, (-1, 0), (0, +1) and (-1, +1). They didn’t introduce 
what kind of t statistic was used.  
After controlling for firm and reform characteristics, they ran three 
regressions with different variables of interest, share type, cash type, 
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combination type and size of Consideration. They argued that holders of 
tradable shares had different investment preferences and tax positions and 
therefore none of the methods was superior over the others.    
Results  
They found the investors held a negative view of the 2005 reform at the 
initial launch of by the Government probably due to the fear of a dilution 
effect based on past experience in 2001. After more information about the 
reform became known to the market, particularly the inclusion of 
consideration in this reform process, investors changed their initial view and 
reacted more positively to the individual company’s announcement to 
commence the reform.  
The regression results suggested that that existing holders of tradable 
A-shares earned significant abnormal returns when companies paid in cash 
or warrants or combination method, which was opposed to their expectation. 
And they didn’t provide a proper explanation.They found no relation 
between the level of consideration and share market response, suggesting 
that investors perceived the consideration to be fair and adequate.  
Critical comments 
Companies were suspended from the start day of the individual reform and 
there was no trading for a while, indicating there was no price available on 
that day (event day) and the subsequent day. They didn’t explain how they 
managed to calculate the 2-day and 3-day CARs around the individual 
company’s announcement to commence the reform, in the absence of data.  
Second their event window and estimation window overlapped on day -1 
relative to the event day. This may affect the estimation of parameters and 
calculation of t statistics, leading to biases in results.   
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5.4.3 Li et al. (2011) 
They studied the determinants of the Consideration levels. 
Hypotheses 
They hypothesized that that gains in terms of risk sharing played an 
important role in the determination of compensation. In his framework, the 
holders of NTAS asked the holder of TAS to share idiosyncratic risks, or 
unsystematic risks through selling NTAS. Higher idiosyncratic risks 
indicated greater gains from risk sharing for the holders of NTAS, and 
hence leading to higher Consideration to the holders of TAS.   
In addition, they also considered the bargaining power and firm 
performance, which could play important roles in the determination of 
compensation ratios. Higher bargaining power of NTAS holders and higher 
firm performance would result in lower Consideration paid to TAS holders. 
Results 
After controlling for firm characteristics, they showed that the size of 
compensation was positively associated with the gain in risk sharing, 
negatively associated with the bargaining power of the holders of NTAS and 
firm performance, consistent with their hypotheses.  
Critical comments 
They used the NTAS ownership to proxy for the weak bargaining power of 
the NTAS holders, which is questionable. They explained that higher NTAS 
ownership indicated stronger incentive of them to transform NTAS, and 
hence weaker bargaining power in determining Consideration. However the 
NTAS ownership could present the scale of sale or the percentage of 
Consideration payers. It’s hard to distinguish between these effects. 
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According to them, higher firm performance indicated less NTAS shares to 
be sold as the holders of NTAS would like to keep them. However the fact 
is NTAS had to be floated eventually independent of firm performance. 
Moreover Consideration is computed on the basis of the estimation of 
aftermarket price, as introduced in Chapter 4. One of the common 
approaches is to estimate the aftermarket price referring to the normal P/E 
ratio observed in the mature markets. The more profitable firms would 
estimate higher aftermarket price and hence produce less compensation 
mathematically.  
5.4.4 Ren et al. (2009)  
This paper investigated the effect of China’s FCR and its impact factors.  
They conducted a classic event study using an OLS market model, an 
estimation period of 100 days (-120, -21) and an event period of 41 days 
(-20, 20). Their estimator of the variance of CAR (-20, 20) was the 
cross-sectional variance across CARs of the different companies as Beltratti 
and Bortololli (2006) did.  
They showed that the reform had positive effects on Chinese stock market. 
They divided their sample by the reform groups, trading post and boards and 
found there was higher abnormal return in the reform groups which included 
more Chinese listed companies with high quality performances. The 
shareholders in Shenzhen Stock Exchange market received higher abnormal 
return than the shareholders in Shanghai Stock Exchange market. SME 
board had higher abnormal return than the main board.  
Critical comments 
They didn’t clarify which critical event date they focused on. Their choice 
of long event window may contaminate the results of CARs due to potential 
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confounding events included in the event window. They didn’t test whether 
the differences between his sub-samples were significant or not and hence 
their conclusions made are less convincing. 
5.4.5 Yeh et al (2009)  
This paper explored the issue of why corporate governance might play an 
important role in affecting the level of Consideration.  
Hypotheses   
They examined the relationships between Consideration and ownership 
structure, board structure and related party transaction respectively. 
• Ownership structure  
They hypothesized that Consideration level was positively correlated with 
the proportion of NTAS and the pledge ratio.  
There was an agency problem between the Government representatives who 
controlled the companies and the NTAS holders (the owners). A higher 
proportion of NTAS suggested a severer agency problem, leading to a 
higher Consideration. Guo and keown (2009), with a case study of Valin 
Steel Tube & Wire Co., Ltd., illustrated the challenges posed by agency 
problems in China, in terms of the conflicted interests and asymmetric 
information between the holders of NTAS and TAS. 
A higher pledge ratio (the percentage of NTAS that were pledged for bank 
loans) indicated that the NTAS holders were associated with a lower 
incentive to have firms run properly and were in greater need of funds, thus 
required higher Consideration.  
• Board structure 
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They hypothesized that board independence was negatively correlated with 
Consideration.  
• Related party transaction 
They hypothesized that related-party transactions of the firm was positively 
correlated with Consideration. There were agency problems associated with 
the use of internal markets inside a corporate group. Many studies found 
that related-party transactions were a commonly used device by which 
controlling shareholders expropriate wealth from minority shareholders 
(Shleifer & Wolfenzon, 2002; Wolfenzon, 1999).  
Results  
They occluded that firms with a weak governance structure or severe agency 
problems were required to have a higher level of Consideration.  
Critical comments 
First they used the NTAS ownership to proxy for the agency problem. This 
variable actually indicates more than the agency problem, i.e. it can be used 
to proxy for issue size too. Their interpretation of the results is hence less 
powerful as there is no evidence the agency problem dominates the results.  
Secondly, their regression results are not very supportive of their hypotheses. 
Except the variable of NTAS ownership, other variables of interests fail to 
show significance at the 5% level.  
5.4.6 Firth et al. (2010) 
This paper examined the role played by Government shareholders and 
mutual funds in China’s FCR.  
They found that state ownership (the major owners of non-tradable shares) 
had a positive effect on the final Consideration level (the revised 
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Consideration level announced on the first resumption day). In contrast, 
mutual fund ownership (the major institutional owner of tradable shares) 
had a negative effect on the Consideration level and especially in state 
owned firms. The evidence seemed consistent with their predictions that 
state shareholders had incentives to complete the reform quickly and exert 
political pressure on mutual funds to accept the terms without a fight.  
They also conducted event analysis of price effects around the first 
resumption day based on an estimation period of 60 days (-63, -4) and an 
event period of 7 days (-3, +3). They found significant positive returns 
following the announcement, implying that the final terms of the 
compensation were better than expected and/or there was a palpable relief 
that the firm could now move forward and management can concentrate on 
improving operating performance. They also found the Consideration ratio 
is a significant and positive determinant of the announcement effect.   
Critical comments 
The implied assumption behind their conclusion is: the bargaining powers 
of the holders of NTAS and TAS determined the level of Consideration. 
However in principle Consideration was to compensate the holders of TAS 
for any loss they were estimated to suffer after the reform, subject to which, 
the bargaining powers of the two parties had only second-order effects on 
the Consideration level. In the first place, the positive effect of the state 
ownership on the Consideration level could come from the pressure of 
dumping these shares in the markets. The negative effect of the mutual fund 
ownership on the Consideration level could come from the economic 
benefits associated with the mutual fund ownership.    
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5.4.7 Summary  
There are two main research interests in these preliminary studies: (1) the 
impact of China’s FCR on the stock prices and the important factors and (2) 
the determinants of Consideration.  
However there are quite a few problems. First there are queries about the 
reliability of their results. Consequently some of the conclusions they make 
are not that sound. Second due to the complication of China’s FCR, there 
are series of event dates, both macro policy dates which are expected to 
influence all the firms involved and firm-specific event dates which are 
various across companies. Most of the papers were cherry-picking on the 
event dates. For instance, they were commonly interested in the first 
resumption day but always missed the second resumption day. A partial 
analysis due to this preference of dates may lead to biased conclusions too.       
5.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter introduces the literature on event-study method, reviewing the 
development in the structure of an event study and important improvements 
in parameter estimation and statistics.  
Assuming market efficiency, event-study method is used to measure the 
event effect on stock prices. Next the market efficiency literature is 
reviewed, with a focus on China stock market efficiency. There is evidence 
China stock markets are at least weak-form efficient.  
China attempted to reduce state shares in June 2001 but failed due to the 
subsequent market crash. A few articles discussed this issue. Calomiris et al. 
(2010) suggested that the political benefits associated with the state 
ownership outweighed the benefits from private ownership. However the 
low R square cast doubt on their conclusions. Their conclusions implied that 
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the holder of B shares on the China stock market should receive 
compensation as the holder of A shares during China’s FCR, which was 
actually abandoned by China Government.  
Finally there are few qualified studies on China’s FCR, indicating this event 
hasn’t been investigated properly and further research in depth is needed.         
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Chapter 6. Data, Sample and Research Design 
According to Campell et al. (1997), although there is no unique structure of 
an event study, a classic design of event-study analysis can be conducted in 
five steps: (1) to define the event of interest and the event window, (2) to 
determine the selection criteria for the inclusion of a given firm in the study, 
(3) to model the normal returns so as to measure the abnormal returns, (4) to 
define an estimation period to estimate the parameters of the normal 
performance model, and (5) to design the testing framework for the 
abnormal returns. Binder (1998) pointed out the estimated abnormal returns 
for the sample firms were frequently used as the dependent variable in a 
regression with firm specific variables on the right hand side, indicating a 
sixth step: (6) to regress estimated abnormal returns against potential 
factors.  
This chapter generally follows this outline of an event-study procedure to 
illustrate the data and sample used to examine the effect of China’s FCR and 
present a particular picture of research design to fit this event study. 
6.1 Event definition 
The event of interest is China Full-Circulation Reform.  
6.1.1 Event description 
Basically, China listed firms were guided and directed under a series of 
policies and relevant documents released by China Government to practice 
the FCR as shown in Figure 4.1 which sketches a timeline of these macro 
event dates.  
Notice (2005) publicised on April 29 2005 initiated the reform with 
proposed measures aiming to maintain the market stability, including 
Consideration agreed to compensate the holders of tradable share for 
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estimated loss after the reform assuming a sloping downward demand curve. 
Guidelines (2005) followed to set out operational procedures for pilot firms. 
Subsequently two pilots, containing 4 and 42 firms respectively, were 
announced to take the trail reform, based on which Measures (2005) was 
stipulated and used to extend the successful trial of reform scheme and 
procedure from the experiments to the rest of firms involved. On Sep. 12
th
 
2005, the first group of 40 firms was announced to take the reform under the 
guide of Measures (2005). By the end of 2006, the last group of 32 firms 
was announced. 
For each firm, there was a procedure to gradually put the reform proposal 
into effect as shown in Figure 4.3 which shows a timescale of firm-specific 
(micro) event dates.  
The whole firm-specific process consists of two suspension periods. Trading 
of firm is firstly suspended when the initial proposal put forward by the 
holders of NTAS of a firm was announced by the board of director, together 
with the date of the shareholders’ meeting and the opinions of the 
recommending institution and the law firm. During the first suspension 
period, the board of directors and holders of NTAS interact with holders of 
TAS to receive comments and suggestions and form a consensus on the 
proposal. Once the agreed proposal is announced, the trading is resumed. 
Trading is suspended for the second time the next day of when registration 
starts for the shareholders’ meeting. During the second suspension period, 
the proposal is voted in the shareholders’ meeting. A pass is issued if the 
proposal wins a qualified majority of two-thirds of the votes from both the 
holders of NTAS and TAS. Trading is restarted if the proposal is accepted. 
If not, the firm needs to restart the reform in another around. 
Figure 6.1 is a collective picture of all the event dates in China’s FCR: 
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Guidelines (2005)  
May 8
th
 2005 
Notice (2005) 
April 29
th
 2005 
Measures (2005) 
September 5
th
 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               
               s u s
t 1      r e sstt 1      s u st 2        rest 2           
 
 
Figure 6.1 A collective picture of all the event dates in China’s FCR 
 
Actually the reform didn’t cause any changes, from an accounting view, in 
the book value of a firm involved. Table 6.1 below demonstrates the 
Balance Sheets of a firm called Shenzhen Accord Pharmaceutical before 
and after the firm taking the reform.  
This firm took 44 days to complete the reform. Initially the holders of 
NTAS planned to pay 0.25 share for per TAS held as released on the first 
suspension day, which was revised upwards to 0.3 share after the holders of 
NTAS and TAS negotiated over the terms in the reform proposal. In 
addition, the NTAS were banned from trading for the first 12 months and 
were permitted to sell no more than 5% / 10% in the next 12 / 24 months. 
The first suspension period lasted for 18 days, followed by a trial trading of 
14 days. The second period took 22 days during which the finalised 
proposal was voted through in the shareholders’ meeting held.  
Announceme
nt of the start 
of the reform 
 
Negotiation 
results released 
Next day of 
registration date 
for voting 
voting 
Announcement of the 
completion of the reform 
 
For all firms with 
non-tradable shares 
 
Pilot 1 
May 9
th
 05 
 
Pilot 2 
Jun 17
th
 05  
 
Group 1 
Sep 12
th
 05 
 
Group 64 
Dec 31
st
 06 
 
The timeline for each firm: 
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The holders of NTAS paid 16,465,680 shares (Consideration) to the holders 
of tradable shares, resulting in proportional change between the two 
categories of shares but the total equity kept intact. The non-tradable shares 
category was renamed as conditional tradable shares, and deceased by 
9.23% after the reform. The tradable shares category was renamed as 
unconditional tradable shares, and increased by 15% after the reform. The 
total equity remained the same.  
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General information about Shenzhen Accord Pharmaceutical taking the reform:  
Company Name: Shenzhen Accord Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. 
Code: 000028A/200028B 
Start FCR (first suspension): 06/03/2006        
First resumption: 23/03/2006        
Next day of registration (second suspension)  06/04/2006  
End FCR (second resumption): 28/04/2006 
Original Consideration: 0.25/TAS 
Revised Consideration: 0.3/TAS 
Restriction on floatation: 
 In compliance with regulations in Measures (2005) 
 Lock-up for the first 12 months (not sell any shares in the first 12 months from 
the end date of FCR) 
 Sell up to no more than 5% in the following 12 months. 
 Sell up to no more than 10% in the following 24 months. 
BS SHEET 
 Before taking the reform 
12/31/2005 
After taking the reform  
12/31/2006 
Total equity: 288,149,400.00 288,149,400.00 
NOTES TO BS SHEET 
By 12/31/2005  
(Before taking the reform) 
 By 12/31/2006  
(After taking the reform) 
Non-tradable shares Consideration paid Conditional tradable-shares 
State shares 124,864,740  -12,078,354  State shares 112,786,386 
Legal person 
shares 
53,513,460 -4,387,326  Legal person 
shares 
49,126,134   
Sub-total 178,378,200 -16,465,680 Sub-total 161,912,520 
Tradable shares Consideration 
received 
Unconditional tradable-shares 
A share  54,885,600  16,465,680 A shares 71,351,280 
B shares 54,885,600 0 B shares 54,885,600 
Sub-total 109,771,200 16,465,680 Sub-total 126,236,880  
Total 288,149,400 0 Total 288,149,400 
Table 6.1 Comparisons of the Balance Sheets before and after the firm taking the 
reform  
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6.1.2 Event dates of interest 
Macro-event dates 
According to Figure 6.1, there are three macro event dates, the releases of 
Notice (2005), Guidelines (2005) and Measures (2005), which aim 
respectively at every firm with non-tradable shares, firms in pilot groups 
and rest of the firms.  
The namelist of firms included in the pilot groups were not publicised in 
Guidelines (2005) therefore the market was uncertain about which firms 
would respond to this announcement. Due to the uncertainty over the 
interested firms, this macro event date is excluded from this event-study.  
Group announcement of list of firms 
In total, there are 66 groups including two pilots by the end of 2006. Each 
group is like a portfolio of several firms which volunteered to take the 
reform and then got through the scrutiny by the CSRC. The namelist of 
firms in the same group was then announced, informing the market these 
firms were approved by the CSRC to reform. The event dates are clustered 
for firms in the same group. There are 66 group event-dates. 
Firm-specific (micro) event dates  
Since each firm, at the firm-specific level, should undergo two suspension 
periods, which means two suspension dates should be excluded amid 
non-availability of data and two resumption dates should be investigated. 
6.1.3 Event windows 
As discussed in the literature, event window should be long enough to 
capture the significant effect of an event and at the same time effectively 
control for the confounding effects, but many empirical studies arbitrarily 
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defined their long event windows without further explanation (McWilliams 
and Siege 1997).  
Given China A-share markets (both in Shanghai and Shenzhen) are 
empirically more weak-form efficient in recent years than in early years (Li 
2003a, 2003b, Zhang and Li 2008, Charles and Darne 2009), stocks on 
China stock markets are expected to efficiently respond to the events.  
However confounding events are inevitable in the case of serial reforms. 
Table 4.2 shows that an average interval between groups are 5 working days, 
indicating an event window of (-5, +5) would involve confounding effects 
from two other group events. Especially when a firm averagely took about 
two months to complete a reform procedure, firms disclosed in groups 
within these two months would be meddling with each other frequently. 
Considering the noises from confounding events and weak-form efficient 
China stock markets, a short event-window is preferred.  
Following Calomiris et al. (2010) and Lu et al. (2008), an event window of 
(-1, +1) is defined, subject to data availability.  
For instance, the next day of Notice (2005) release was Saturday, 30
th
 April 
2005, followed with seven-day pubic holiday called Labours’ Day from 1st 
May till 7
th
 May. 8
th
 May 2005 was Sunday. Therefore the next trading day 
after Notice (2005) issuance was 9
th
 May 2005, which overlapped with the 
announcement of the first pilot group. Consequently the event window for 
Notice (2005) is (-1, 0). 
 
Usually each firm in the group would suspend trading one day subsequent to 
the group event-date, announcing the start of its reform and publicising its 
initial proposal. As a result, an event window of (-1, 0) applies for group 
announcement except for the first pilot group whose day -1 relative to its 
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announcement (the previous trading day) overlapped with the release of 
Notice (2005). The event window for the first pilot group is only the event 
day 0, 9
th
 May 2005.  
There is no data available before the two firm-specific resumption dates; 
hence an event window of (0, +1) applies in this situation.  
Event dates  Event window 
Notice (2005) on Apr. 29 2005 (-1, 0) 
Measures (2005) on Sep. 5 2005 (-1, +1) 
Group event-dates  (-1, 0) 
Two resumption dates (0, +1) 
Table 6.2 Summary of event dates and event windows 
 
6.2  Hypotheses development 
Table 6.2 shows the interested events in this study are the releases of Notice 
(2005) and Measures (2005), group announcement of list of companies, as 
well as 1
st
 and 2
nd
 firm-specific resumptions of trading. As shown in Figure 
6.1, these events assemble into a complete reform process. In other words, 
reform-relevant information has been publicised step by step along the 
timeline of these events.  
6.2.1 Release of Notice (2005) 
Notice (2005) was announced on April 29 2005 which formally launched 
China’s FCR for the first time to float non-tradable A shares held by the 
Government.  
Notice (2005) proposed relevant issues in line with Opinions (2004), 
published by the State Council with focuses on stability and healthy growth 
of market and protection of the lawful rights and interests of public 
investors. 
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Particularly, Notice (2005) set out the timescale of an individual reform 
process which should include two suspension stages, one is negotiation 
stage during which the holders of TAS and NTAS confer with each other on 
the reform proposal, the other is voting stage during which the reform 
proposal on mutual agreement will be voted in the relevant shareholders’ 
meeting. In addition, Notice (2005) granted the holders of TAS the equal 
weighted voting rights as the holders of NTAS and put on trading 
restrictions on the sale of Government shares after the reform. 
As can be seen from the details in Notice (2005), it was designed to 
maintain the market stability and protect minority interests and thus 
expected to offset the oversupply price pressure.  
Hypothesis 1: the average abnormal return is zero at the announcement of 
Notice (2005). 
6.2.2 Release of Measures (2005) 
Measures (2005) was announced on Sep 5 2005 and the first official 
document providing details about the implementation of NTAS reform. The 
program followed the principles established in the pilot reform.  
It decentralised decision making at the firm level, by allowing shareholders 
to bargain over the method and terms of the compensation. Furthermore, it 
safeguarded the interests of TAS holders by seeking no less than two thirds 
of the votes from the TAS owners, compensating them for the estimated loss 
due to the reform, diluted the risks by introducing a series of announcements 
dates, and prevented market slump by banning any sale of NTAS in the 12 
months and restricting the issue size in the following 24 months.  
In general, there is nothing new at this announcement but it summaries the 
pilot program and uses it as a best practice, with an aim to maintain the 
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market stability and protect the minority interests. This effort by the CSRC 
may have a positive impact on the market.   
Hypothesis 2: the average abnormal return is positive at the announcement 
of Measures (2005).    
6.2.3 Group-specific announcement 
The reform process was gradual and took place in orderly groups. Each 
group-specific announcement disclosed its respective namelist of companies, 
which was decided in two steps.  
First the stock exchanges set a deadline to accept reform proposals from 
companies wishing to participate. Next the stock exchanges examined all 
the applying firms and crossed out those they thought had problems. The 
selection standards may vary with the outlook into the future, and were 
adjusted all the time.  
The selection process indicates that the companies in the name list were 
self-confident that they were well prepared for the reform, which was 
confirmed by the stock exchanges which carried out scrutiny of the 
submitting firms and assessed the feasibilities of their proposals.     
Hypothesis 3: the abnormal return is positive at group-specific 
announcement. 
6.2.4 The first resumption of trading  
The trading in the shares of the stock was immediately suspended on the day 
when the board of directors publicised the reform proposal, including date 
of the shareholders’ meeting, a description of the reform proposal as well as 
the opinions of the recommending institution and the law firm.  
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Within 10 days after the announcement, the board of directors should assist 
the owners of NTAS in adequately communicating and negotiating with the 
holder of TAS of A-share market by such approaches as hosting an investor 
symposium, a press conference or an online road show, paying a visit to 
institutional investors and issuing a consultation paper and so on. In addition, 
the board of directors of the listed company publicly should disclose its 
hotline, facsimile and e-mail address in order to widely solicit opinions from 
tradable shareholders so as to lay a broad shareholder foundation for the 
reform plan. 
If the proposal was acceptable to both parties, an announcement of 
consensus would be made and trading resumed. Once trading resumed the 
proposal couldn’t be further modified. 
As the results disclosed with the 1
st
 trading resumption should reflect a 
mutual agreement between the holders of TAS and NTAS, there should be 
no surprise from the market and therefore no abnormal returns is predicted 
assuming a high rate of participation from the public investors.  
Hypothesis 4: the abnormal return on the 1
st
 resumption day is zero.  
6.2.5 The second resumption of trading 
When the shareholders’ meeting was approaching as scheduled, the 
registration process started for the shareholders’ meeting. And trading was 
suspended the next day of registration for the second time.  
Then the shareholders’ meeting was held. The proposal was voted and had 
to win a majority of two thirds of votes from the TAS and NTAS owners 
respectively. The board must publicise the voting results within 2 working 
days. If the proposal was accepted, the board should also publicly release 
the timetable for actual implementation of the reform. Trading was restarted 
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after the shareholder meeting ratifying the completion of the reform. If the 
proposal was not approved the board should apply for extension of 
suspension of the listed company’s shares from the next day of the 
announcement. The holders of NTAS of a listed company may redo the 
reform procedures from the very start but have to wait for at least three 
months. Only firms succeeded could resume trading.  
The completion of the reform indicates (1) the consideration would be paid 
soon and (2) the reform is successfully implemented. 
The bonus shares offered would effectively increase the number of tradable 
shares and with all other things remaining the same, the stock price would 
fall, like in a stock split. The other types of Consideration payment, such as 
cash or warrants, can be converted to equivalents in bonus shares based on 
Table 6.6 and could cause similar price fall. Furthermore, as implied in the 
price behavior on ex-dividend day, it has been widely observed that the 
price would drop by approximately the amount of dividend, which strongly 
suggests that the price at the 2nd resumption of trading is expected to drop 
by the amount of Consideration, like the price-drop on ex-dividend day.  
This decline in return may be reduced by the positive effect from the good 
news of successful completion implied on the 2
nd
 resumption day. 
Hypothesis 5: the abnormal return on the 2
nd
 resumption day is negative.   
6.3 Sample selection 
After identifying the event of interest, it is necessary to determine the 
selection criteria for the inclusion of a given firm in the study.  
As reported in the China Securities Journal, 1305 out of the 1,345 target 
companies had been successfully restructured within 66 groups including 
two pilots. No subsequent group was announced. In fact all the firms at least 
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tried once to implement the reform. Those which failed the first time may 
come back and start a new round to restructure. However the rest 40 firms 
were actually very tough ones and considered outliers. Some of them even 
haven’t succeeded by now.  
An initial sample consists of 840 companies which successfully completed 
their reforms with 66 groups and have available data on the reform from 
Sina Finance, trading and market data from DataStream and corporate 
information from Resset Database. Sina Finance records the process and 
operation of China Full-Circulation Reform at firm-level, including reform 
proposal, critical dates and other details in implementation. Resset Database 
is a high standard China-based financial research database where firm 
characteristics information is constructed in a standardised format.  
6.3.1 Selection criteria  
However the initial data is reduced down to 599 companies for the 
following reasons: 
 Firms that were aged or listed less than two years till April 29 2005 are 
deleted because the data processing in an event-study requires at least 
two years of consistent data prior to China FCR. The two years are 
essential to estimate the normal returns if without the reform, which are 
discussed in details later in this chapter.  
 Firms back-door listed47 within two years prior to the announcements of 
FCR are withdrawn. Back-listing replaces a listed firm with a new entry. 
The data of the replacee firm has little connection with that of the 
replacing firm other than the listing code. In other words, a firm newly 
                                               
47 A back-door listing company is seeking listing on exchanges by acquiring an already listed 
company. A back-door listed company may alter the core business of the previous one and thus lead 
to a discontinuity and inconsistency in firm data. 
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back-door listed is no different from a firm newly-listed except that the 
former inherits an already-existent listing code while the later is 
allocated a new code. Therefore a back-listing history within two years 
indicates no consistent data is available.  
 Exceptional firms that didn’t conform to a general FCR prospectus are 
removed. For example, firms that invented a new paying method of 
Consideration, not included in any of above introduced, are deleted. And 
firms which paid Consideration to TAS holders for NTAS holders are 
disposed as well.  
The eventual sample consisted of 599 companies.  
6.3.2 Sample summary  
Before the reform, there are in total 1345 firms with non-tradable shares, 
60.78% listed on SHSE and 39.33% listed on SZSE. In the sample, there are 
193 (32.22%) companies listed on SZSE and 406 (67.78%) on SHSE, 
approximately resembling the total population in terms of the ratio of 
number of firms listed on each stock market. The most distinct differences 
between two stock exchanges are the relative size and the characteristics of 
listed companies of two exchanges. While most companies listed on the 
SHSE are large and state-owned, those on the SZSE are small, joint 
ventures and export-oriented. The market capitalization of the SHSE is 
nearly 3 times larger than the SZSE. According to Liu (2010), development 
speed of SZSE is faster than that of SHSE. Average P/E ratio of SZSE is 
little higher than that of SHSE.  
My sample has an overwhelming number of 550 (91.82%) companies 
issuing A shares only, a minority of 34 firms issuing both A and B shares 
and 15 firms cross-listed on HKSE issuing both A and H shares. China 
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domestic A-share markets are segmented from the B- and H-share markets 
due to significant price discrimination. But companies issuing both A and B 
shares or A and H shares are required to provide financial and accounting 
information under International Financial Reporting Standards in addition to 
domestic GAAP, indicating more transparency in information disclosure 
and closer relationship with international markets for domestically 
dual-listed China firms.        
 SZSE SHSE Total 
A 171 379 550 
A&B 18 16 34 
A&H 4 11 15 
Total 193 406 599 
Table 6.3 Sample data by listing venues and share-types 
 
A proportion of 58.59% sample companies belong to the manufacturing 
industry, indicating China manufacturing companies, most of which are 
carried forward from the planned economy, played a key role in this reform. 
The second and third largest industries are real estate and IT industries, 
accounting for 6.51% and 6.34% of the total sample. These two industries 
were inexistent in the planned economy and have been developing quickly 
recently due to the internet bubble and the housing boom in the past decade. 
The proportions of other industries vary from 0.5% to 5.18%.   
Four financial firms are included in my sample although it is common 
practice in many empirical studies in finance to exclude financial services 
firms from the samples used in different stages of the analysis due to the 
relatively high debt levels and other unique features, like in Firth (2010). 
Foerster and Sapp (2004) found that excluding financial service firms from 
empirical asset pricing tests could impact the corresponding inferences. It 
may influence both the identification of the number of risk factors found to 
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be significant and the corresponding betas. Consequently, exclusion of 
financial firms may misrepresent a full picture of China’s FCR.     
Code of Industry 
Classification  
(1st level) 
Name of Industry Classification Total Proportion 
I Farming, Forestry, Animal 
Husbandry And Fishery 
3 0.50% 
II Mining And Quarrying 11 1.84% 
III Manufacturing 351 58.60% 
IV Production & Supply Of Power, Gas 
& Water 
31 5.18% 
V Construction 13 2.17% 
VI Transportation, Storage 26 4.34% 
VII Information Technology Industry 38 6.34% 
VIII Wholesale And Retail Trades 28 4.67% 
IX Finance, Insurance 4 0.67% 
X Real Estate 39 6.51% 
XI Social Services 18 3.01% 
XII Transmitting, Culture Industry 4 0.67% 
XIII Integrated 33 5.51% 
Total  599  
Table 6.4 Sample data by industries 
 
One of the most remarkable features of China’s FCR is the introducing of 
Consideration, which aimed to inducing the minority holders of TAS to hold 
the shares by offering them proportional bonus so as to maintain the 
tradable A-share market. While paying consideration was a common feature 
of the reform, there was some variety in the type of consideration; variously, 
individual companies used shares, cash, warrants, or any combination of 
these methods. There is no compelling evidence to suggest that a particular 
type of consideration is superior over the other, as holders of tradable shares 
have different investment preferences and tax positions (Lu, 2008).  
Table 6.5 provides a detailed breakdown of different Consideration methods 
employed in the reform. A percentage of 73.29% companies of my sample 
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opted to pay bonus shares as the sole Consideration, 15.36% chose to pay 
shares out of the recapitalised earnings as the sole Consideration and 9.36% 
went for combinations. Only 6 cases selected to pay cash as the sole 
Consideration and 1 case to issue free warrants as the sole Consideration. 
However 25 more companies included cash payment in their combination 
plan of Consideration and 14 more included warrants. Paying shares 
effectively reduced the holding of non-tradable shares, while paying cash 
didn’t cause any change in the ownership. The distribution of Consideration 
methods is representative of the overall picture as Li et al. (2011) presented 
a similar breakdown with a larger sample size of 1107 companies (Table 1 
Panel A, Li et al. 2011).  
Consideration Plan Total % Average raw Consideration 
Size  
Shares Transfer (ST) only 439 73.46% 0.307 share per TAS  
Cash Payment (CP) only 6 1.00% ¥1.1 (≈ £0.073) per TAS  
Recapitalisation Issues (RI) only  92 15.19% 0.58 share per TAS 
Put/Call Warrant Issues (P/C) only 1 0.17% 0.8 share per TAS 
Share Split (SS) only 5 0.83% 0.63 share per NTAS  
Combinations 
Total   56  9.36% N/A 
CP + P/C +ST  1 0.17% N/A 
CP +ST 27 4.51% N/A 
CP+RI 1 0.17% N/A 
RI+ P/C 3 0.50% N/A 
RI+ST 14 2.34% N/A 
P/C +ST 10 1.67% N/A 
Total 599   
Table 6.5 Data by Consideration method 
 
Firth et al (2010) focused on firms that have offered shares as the sole 
Consideration to compensate TAS holders to ensure the comparability of 
compensation across firms and avoid the potential confounding effects that 
arose from the conversion and aggregation of different forms of 
compensation.  
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Li et al. (2011) modeled Consideration levels as the outcome of a bargaining 
process for his sample so as to make Considerations under different methods 
comparable and robust checked with Considerations constructed from 
WIND, a well-known data provider in China. However Consideration is 
adjusted through the bargaining process but determinate by the estimated 
market loss for the holder of TAS. Hou (2010) corrected this mistake and 
solved the implied value of Considerations and used a common proxy so as 
to compare different types of Considerations. The Consideration levels are 
reconciled and constructed following Hou (2010). For instance, 
Considerations for Share Transfer type and Cash Payment type are 
evaluated respectively as 1
)(



post
pre
post
postpre
ST
P
P
P
PP
C  and 
postpreCP PPC  , the derivation processes of which have been illustrated in 
Chapter 4 (4.2.8). CPC  can be converted into equivalent shares offered as 
post
CP
STCP
P
C
C  . Equivalent Consideration under share transfer type is used 
as the common proxy to compare different types of Considerations. Table 
6.6 summarises the valuation of Consideration of different types and the 
equivalents shares offered. The common proxy is denoted as STC . The 
estimated post-market prices and maturity prices ( postP and maturityatP  ), the 
strike prices of warrants ( PWTK  and CWTK ), the number of recapitalisation 
issues proportionally allocated to the holder of TAS ( RTT ), as well as the 
share split ratio ( SSR ) are provided in the reform proposals and available 
from Sina Finance.  
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Consideration 
Plan 
Consideration Valuation  Equivalent shares offered 
Shares Transfer 
(ST)  
post
postpre
ST
P
PP
C

  STST
CC   
Recapitalisation 
Issues (RI)  
T
T
P
P
C RT
post
pre
RI   




 

T
TT
CC RTRIST  
Share Split (SS) 
SSpost
pre
SS
RP
P
C
1
  SSSSST
RCC   
Cash Payment 
(CP) 
postpreCP PPC   postCPST PCC   
Put Warrant 
Issues (PWT)  
maturityatPWT
maturityatpre
PWT
PK
PP
C




  if 
exercised  
PWTST CC   
Call Warrant 
Issues (CWT)  
PWTmaturityat
maturityatpre
CWT
KP
PP
C





 if 
exercised 
CWTST CC   
Table 6.6 Conversion of Considerations of different type into equivalent shares 
offered  
 
In the sample, there are 27 firms which failed at the 1
st
 attempt and had to 
join in a later group to complete the reform. They are labeled with the final 
group number in which they succeeded. In this sense, they are not 
double-counted in the sample. Table 4.3 summarises how many times these 
firms failed.   
Some of the firms renewed efforts after failure within a month but many 
others took several months to prepare for another go. The average 
preparation time is 5 months and the maximum is 9 and half months. Firms 
in earlier groups seem to prepare longer for a come-back than those in later 
groups. 
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6.4 Benchmark models of normal returns 
Basically event study aims to assess whether there are any abnormal returns 
earned by security holders accompanying specific events where an abnormal 
return is the difference between observed return and expected return. 
Expected returns are estimated over a time period surrounding the event day 
using a return generating model. This time period selected is called 
estimation period.  
In this sector, various return generating models are discussed and a most 
suitable model will be suggested. Later on in this chapter, the estimation 
period will be defined in the China context.      
To appraise the event's impact a measure of the abnormal return is required. 
The abnormal return is the actual ex post return of the security over the 
event window minus the normal return of the firm over the event window. 
The normal return is defined as the return that would be expected if the 
event did not take place:
 
)( ititit RER  , where it , itR , )( itRE  are the 
abnormal, actual, and normal returns, respectively, for time period t .  
A number of approaches are available to calculate the normal return of a 
given security and then to generate abnormal returns. Abnormal returns 
have been measured as (1) mean-adjusted returns (2) market-adjusted 
returns, (3) OLS market mode: deviations (prediction errors) from the 
market model, (4) deviations from the one factor Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) or (5) deviations from a multifactor model, such as the 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT). This section analyzes and appraises these 
various models. 
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6.4.1 Mean-adjusted model 
Mean-adjusted returns are calculated by subtracting the average return for 
stock i  during the estimation period from the stock’s return during the 
event period. This method does not explicitly control for the risk of the 
stock or the return on the market portfolio during the event period. 
iiti KR   where i  is the abnormal return for security i  with an 
expectation of zero and variance )(2 i , 
and iK is the average return for 
stock during the estimation period.  
Although the mean-return model is perhaps the simplest model, Brown and 
Warner (1980, 1985) found it no worse than those more sophisticated 
models in terms of the results produced, indicating the variance of the 
abnormal return is frequently not reduced much by choosing a more 
sophisticated model. However in the presence of cross-sectional 
dependence, they found mean-adjusted abnormal returns showed a 
downward-biased estimated standard deviation, which were not found in 
other models, indicating the alternative models controlled the 
cross-sectional dependence from the economy wide influences on security 
returns.  
Chandra, Moriarty and Willinger (1990) argued that the relatively strong 
performance of the mean-adjusted return and the seemingly powerful test 
without controlling for cross-sectional dependence were a statistical artifact, 
as Brown and Warner used different test statistics for the methods being 
compared. They re-examined the Brown and Warner results and found that 
tests with the mean-adjusted return were less powerful than tests with 
market-adjusted and market model abnormal return estimates and there was 
no evidence of an increase in power from ignoring cross-sectional 
dependence when the same statistical test as used in each case.  
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6.4.2 Market-adjusted returns 
Latane and Jones (1979) assumed that the expected return at time t  was 
the market return at the same time. The market-adjusted return was then 
calculated by subtracting the market return
tm
R  from itR : imitit RR  . 
The market- adjusted return model can be viewed as a restricted market 
model with i  constrained to be zero and i  constrained to be one. 
Because the model coefficients are pre-specified, an estimation period is not 
required to obtain parameter estimates. MacKinlay (1997) and Binder 
(1998) both suggested considering the possibility of biases arising from the 
imposition of the restrictions. 
6.4.3 OLS Market model 
The market model is a statistical model which relates the return of any given 
security to the return of the market portfolio:
 mtiiitit
RR  
 
where
 
it  is the zero 
mean disturbance term.  
Parameters are estimated using an estimation period sample with OLS 
regression. The parameter estimates and the event period stock and market 
index returns are then used to estimate the abnormal returns. This method 
controls for the risk (market factor beta) of the stock and the movement of 
the market during the event period. According to Campell et al. (1997), the 
variance of the abnormal return using the market model is theoretically less 
than or equal to the abnormal return variance using the mean-adjusted 
model, dependent on 
2R  statistic. The higher 
2R is, the lower variance for 
the market model, which will carry over into all the aggregate abnormal 
return measures. As a result, using the market model can lead to more 
precise inferences. 
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In some instances there are problems with parameter estimation, for 
example, the occurrence of confounding events during the estimation 
period. 
For the statistical model, the assumptions that asset returns are jointly 
multivariate normal, independently and identically distributed through time, 
and cross-sectionally independent across securities, are imposed. While the 
assumptions are strong, inferences using the normal return models tend to 
be robust to deviations from some of the assumptions (Brown and Warner 
1980, 1985) and a proper modification of estimator of residual variance in 
the statistic tests, from the analysis point of view, can help to correct the 
problems of violation of assumptions (Brown and Warner 1980, 1985, 
Mikkleson and Partch 1988, Boehmer et al. 1991, Corrado 1989, Corrado 
and Zivney 1992).
    
Since FFJR (1969), the OLS market model has been widely accepted in 
event studies to estimate normal return and abnormal return, such s 
Mikkelson and Partch (1984,1986), Loderer et al. (1991), Errunza and 
Miller (2003) etc.  
6.4.4 Capital Asset Pricing Model 
The CAPM is an economic model which cast restrictions on the statistical 
models to provide more constrained normal return models. The CAPM is an 
equilibrium theory where the expected return of a given asset is determined 
by its covariance with the market portfolio.  
The use of the CAPM is common in event studies of the 1970s. However, 
deviations from the CAPM have been discovered, implying that the validity 
of the restrictions imposed by the CAPM on the market model is 
questionable (Fama et al. 1996). This has introduced the possibility that the 
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results of the studies may be sensitive to the specific CAPM restrictions. 
Because this potential for sensitivity can be avoided at little cost by using 
the market model, the use of the CAPM has almost ceased (MacKinlay 
1997). 
6.4.5 Arbitrage pricing theory 
The APT due to Stephen Ross (1976) is an asset pricing theory where the 
expected return of a given asset is a linear combination of multiple risk 
factors. A general finding is that with the APT the most important factor 
behaves like a market factor and additional factors add relatively little 
explanatory power (Brown and Weinstein 1985). Thus the gains from using 
an APT motivated model versus the market model are small.  
6.4.6 Other factor models 
The market model is an example of a one factor model, motivated by the 
benefits of reducing the variance of the abnormal return by explaining more 
of the variation in the normal return.  
Another variant of a factor model is a procedure which calculates the 
abnormal return by taking the difference between the actual return and a 
portfolio of firms of similar size, where size is measured by market value of 
equity. In this approach typically ten size groups are considered and the 
loading on the size portfolios is restricted to unity. This procedure implicitly 
assumes that expected return is directly related to market value of equity. 
Other multifactor models may include industry indexes in addition to the 
market. The variance reduction will typically be greatest in cases where the 
sample firms have a common characteristic, for example they are all 
members of one industry or they are all firms concentrated in one market 
capitalization group (MacKinlay 1997). 
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Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) found that beyond a simple, one-factor 
market model, there was no evidence that more complicated methodologies 
conveyed any benefit. Ahern (2009) also reported that the use of multifactor 
models did not decrease the forecast error bias compared to simpler 
methods.  
6.5 Measuring abnormal returns 
The preceding discussion indicates that when a large sample of unrelated 
securities is used or the event dates are not clustered in calendar time, the 
OLS market model estimator of the average abnormal return is generally 
unbiased and under these conditions the market model estimator also 
appears to be efficient (Binder 1998). Even if some of the assumptions are 
not met, statistical techniques can be employed to handle the violations and 
improve hypothesis testing.  
In this study, the OLS market model is used as normal return model to 
predict abnormal returns, consistent with the majority event studies in the 
literature.    
mtiiitit RR   , where i  and i  were the OLS values (parameters) 
from the estimation period of security i , itR  is the return of security i  at 
time t , mtR  is the corresponding market return at time t  and it  is the 
zero mean disturbance term (abnormal return). 
6.5.1 China stock market efficiency 
Early studies based on early samples tend to reject the null that weak-form 
EMH holds for China A-share markets. On the other hand, recent studies 
including more recent data tend to support the weak-form efficiency in 
China A-share markets or present a pattern of becoming more and more 
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efficient over time (Lima and Tabak 2004, Zhang and Li 2008, Charles and 
Darne 2009). In this sense, the market model is appropriate to use for study 
of the stock prices responding to events on China stock markets.  
6.5.2 A-share market index 
The sample companies are listed either in Shanghai or Shenzhen stock 
exchanges.  
The Shanghai Securities Exchange Index is a value-weighted average 
market-capitalization index (Lee et al. 2001). The Shanghai Stock Exchange 
share price index series are divided into 4 categories in 13 different indices. 
Among them, the SHSE Composite Index, SHSE 180 Index, SHSE A-Share 
and SHSE B-Share Index are the most important ones. SHSE Composite is 
the earliest compiled, which comprise all A-share and B-share companies 
listed on the SHSE. Components of SHSE 180 Index are 180 stocks selected 
from the most representative stocks from A-share pool. SHSE A-Share 
Index includes all A-share companies, while B-Share Index consists of all 
B-share companies listed on the exchange.  
The Shenzhen Securities Exchange Index is also a value-weighted average 
market-capitalization index (Lee et al. 2001). The SZSE publishes 10 
different indices. On the SZSE, the main indices are the SZSE Composite 
Index, SZSE Component Index; SZSE A-Share Index; and SZSE B-share 
Index. They are basically similar to the indices on the SHSE.  
It has been suggested that a broad-based stock index was used for the 
market portfolio (FFJR 1969, Binder 1998). Therefore SHSE A-Share Index 
and SZSE A-Share Index are selected for firms listed in SHSE and SZSE 
respectively.  
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Brown and Warner (1980) found that event study tests based on a market 
model using a value weight index were misspecified. Based on Asia-Pacific 
financial market returns data, Corrado and Truong (2008) found that the use 
of an equal weight index to compute market model excess returns provided 
better test specification than use of a value weight index. However the index 
on China stock markets is value-weighted, indicating the results may be 
biased to some extent.  
6.5.3 Arithmetic Returns  
Market indexes are universally calculated from arithmetic returns, so are the 
index on China stock markets. To avoid a compatibility issue arising from 
the use of logarithmic returns of individual firms in a market model based 
on market indexes constructed from arithmetic returns, the arithmetic return 
is applied.  
The security return for firm i  is computed as a ratio of the security price 
on day  t  in relation to the security price on day 1t : 
1
1


t
tt
it
P
PP
R
. 
With a sample size of 599 companies, there are 599 sets of security returns.  
The advantage of using log returns in some cases, for example in FFJR 
(1969), is that the log returns are expected to be symmetrically distributed, 
which is consistent with the normality assumption underlying the statistic 
normal return model.  
However Ball and Brown (1968) tested on both simple return and logarithm 
return and found the results were quite close. Brown and Warner (1985) 
found nonnormality of the individual abnormal return estimators had little 
impact on the results.  
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Kothari and Warner (1997) and Barber and Lyon (1997) showed that log 
returns were negatively skewed and highly peaked, indicating normality was 
not achieved with log returns. Corrado and Trung (2008), with data on 
Asian-Pacific markets from 1994 – 2006, reported the arithmetic / log 
returns from all return populations were positively / negatively skewed and 
highly peaked. Specifically, they reported that on China SHSE the 
arithmetic / log returns had a skewness of 0.35 / -0.2 and a kurtosis of 16.11 
/ 15.92 and on China SZSE the arithmetic / log returns had a skewness of 
0.35 / -0.25 and a kurtosis of 18.34 / 17.93. Both arithmetic returns and log 
returns on China stock markets are basically non-normal distributed, 
indicating the advantage of using log returns vanished.  
Furthermore the majority of event studies used arithmetic returns rather than 
log returns when calculating abnormal return with the market model (Binder 
1998).  
6.5.4 Estimation period 
Once a normal performance model has been selected, the parameters of the 
model must be estimated using a subset of the data known as the estimation 
window. Defining a proper estimation period usually brings up three 
questions: (1) how many days are included in the estimation period; (2) 
which side relative to the event window, pre-event or post-event, generates 
the estimation period; and (3) how to remove the possible noise from 
confounding events in the estimation period?  
Length of estimation period  
There is no consensus on an optimal length of estimation period in the 
literature of event studies. Actually in event studies using daily data, the 
choice of estimation period was somewhat arbitrary (Aktas 2007). By 
convention, the preference of estimation period usually includes one year 
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(around 240 trading days), such as from day -245 till day -6 relative to the 
event day (Ball and Brown 1980, 1985), the year ending 50 days before the 
event (Fama and French 1993), from day -250 till day -21 prior to the event 
(MacKinlay 1997), from day -250 to day -51 (Pojezny 2006), from day -250 
to day -30 (Atkas 2007), from day -244 to day -6 (Ahern 2009), from day 
-200 to day -3 (Huang and Chang 2009) etc.. 
Another line of literature on beta estimates has been discussing the beta 
stationarity associated estimation period length.  
Baesel (1974) depicted the stationarity of individual beta as an increasing 
function of the estimation period length. Roenfeldt et al. (1978) investigated 
the effect varying the length of the second sub-period on the stability of 
individual security betas and found 4-year period estimation period was 
most reliable. Theobald (1981) showed that beta stationarity increased with 
the calendar period length but did not increase indefinitely. He suggested an 
optimal estimation period of 180 to 210 months for U.K. monthly data. 
Daves et al. (2000) concluded that a much shorter estimation period of two 
to three years was more appropriate for financial managers to use when 
estimating beta with daily returns. Diacogiannis and Marki (2008) showed 
that the utilization of an estimation period of three years captured most of 
the maximum reduction in the standard error of beta estimated as compared 
to other periods with Athens stocks. With China daily data, Xia et al. (2006) 
found that the mean of beta was the closest to 1 for an estimation period 
from 1.5 to 2 years starting from 1.5 years after the interested event. The 
smallest standard deviation came with an estimation window of 2 years 
starting from 6 weeks after the interested event. Their results suggested an 
estimation period of 2 years.  
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In this study, the estimation period will arbitrarily take 2 years, a moderate 
period between the requirement of beta stationarity and the conventional 
preference of estimation period in event studies.   
Pre-event estimation period 
The most common choice, when feasible, is to use the period prior to the 
event window for the estimation window (Ball and Brown 1980, 1985, 
Corrado and Zivney 1992, Boehmer et al. 1991, MacKinlay 1997, Cowan 
and Sergeant 1996, Atkas 2007 etc.).  
In case when there is a step change in beta due to the event, abnormal 
returns can be calculated with a beta estimated from data following the 
event (Mandelker 1974). The application of post-event estimation period 
has typically been done in limited circumstances and generally for long run 
studies using monthly data (Edmister et al. 1996, Agrawal et al. 1992 and 
Gregory 1997). Pojezny (2006) found there was significant difference 
between pre- and post-event estimation period, but the bias in results was 
insignificant according to short event window, indicating there is no point of 
using post-event estimation period if the estimation period is relatively long 
to the event period.  
This study uses daily returns and focuses on short event window of no more 
than three days, which is sufficiently short relative to a 2-year estimation 
period. Therefore, pre-event estimation period will be applied, which is also 
consistent with most of the event studies.     
Neutralising the risks of information leakage  
Considering the impact of information leakages (or rumours) before the 
announcement, a short period, , Aktas et al. (2007) suggested 30 days can 
usually be excluded between the end of the estimation period and the 
beginning of the event period to neutralize the impact.  
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Before the formal launch of China’s FCR, Dr. Shang Fulin, Chairman of 
CSRC, frequently gave public speeches as well as held meetings and 
discussions with relevant important parties. There are risks of information 
leakage and therefore 30 days prior to the event day are excluded, following 
Aktas (2007).  
Uniform estimation period 
Although my sample consists of 599 companies, a uniform estimation 
period is applied for all of the sample companies for the following reasons. 
• A chaos of confounding events 
The sample companies staged reform in 66 groups spanning from May 
9
th
 2005 to Dec 31
st
 2006. Firms arranged in the same groups started 
reform around the same time. The time interval between groups is 5 
trading days. In the sample, averagely 45 trading days were taken to 
complete an individual reform process, sufficiently long to allow 
another 9 groups to announce reforms. If various estimation periods 
relative to various groups of firms were applied, there would be great 
chances that previous reform announcements, at group- and 
firm-specific level, are included. This overlapping would contaminate 
the estimation periods and lead to beta estimates less meaningful 
because reform announcements of firms in previous groups would 
simultaneously affect concurrent security prices of firms in subsequent 
groups. If these price movements due to earlier announcements were 
included in the estimation periods for the subsequent groups of firms, 
the beta estimations for them would be biased and the variance of 
residuals would be overestimated, leading to a downward bias in the 
significance test.    
225 
 
This kind of contamination in estimation period was also highlighted in 
Fuller et al. (2002), which also argued earlier takeover attempts would 
be included in the estimation period of acquisitions and hence bias beta 
estimations.          
Previous studies have documented intra-industry information transfer 
between announcing and non-announcing firms in various settings such 
as earnings announcements (Foster 1981, Freeman and Tse 1992), 
management forecasts (Han et al. 1989), sales announcements (Olsen 
and Dietrich 1985), bankruptcy announcements (Lang and Stulz 1992), 
bond rating adjustment (Akhigbe et al. 1997), dividend change 
announcement (Firth 1996), security offerings (Szewczyk 1992) and 
stock split announcement (Tawatnuntachai and D’Mello 2002). In the 
scenario of China’s FCR, those results suggest that earlier reform 
announcements of firms could convey information about key elements 
in the reform proposal and process for other firms within the same 
industry, synchronously affecting their security prices at that time.      
Prior research has also suggested that large firms’ reactions to common 
information lead those of small firms (Lo and MacKinlay 1990, Brennan 
et al. 1993), large announcing firms contain useful information to 
non-announcing firms (Asthanta and Mishra 2001), and announcing 
firm’s financial reporting signal is useful in assessing the stock prices of 
non-announcing firms in the business affiliate (Huang and Chang 2009), 
such as cross-shareholding of listed firms, which is a very common 
practice among China listed firms (Guo and Yakura 2009). In the 
scenario of China’s FCR, those results suggest that information transfer 
between firms in earlier groups and later groups vary across size and 
degree of mutual relationship, indicating it’s difficult to measure these 
complicated effects.     
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Furthermore, the initial launch of China’s FCR on April 29 2005, as 
well as other macro event dates, would be included if various estimation 
periods relative to various groups of firms were applied.   
• No superior solutions 
A natural solution is removing these confounding events to eliminate the 
contamination effects. Thompson (1988) removed individual firm events 
occurring during the estimation period on case by case basis. However 
this operation is impractical for a large sample size.  
Aktas et al. (2007) introduced a two-state market model, one 
corresponding to a low variance regime, and the other to a high variance 
regime. According to them, this model took into account the probability 
of the occurrence of contaminating firm-specific events in the estimation 
period. Firstly this method didn’t account for effects from other firms 
announcing in the estimation period. Secondly there is no definite 
evidence this method is superior in handling contamination from own 
announcements in the estimation period. Klein et al. (2009) reported 
similar results with constant mean model and two-state market model, 
indicating this sophisticated method were not superior over a simple 
model in the presence of contaminated estimation period.  
• Summary 
There would be a complex of confounding events within an estimation 
period if various estimation periods relative to various groups of firms 
were applied, which would eventually lead to biases in parameter 
estimations. Removing the confounding events on a case by case basis is 
unrealistic in this study due to a large sample size and difficulty in 
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defining the complicated effects from announcements made by other 
firm.  
Therefore a uniform estimation period is proposed for all the sample 
companies, which covers two years from Mar 31
st
 2003 to Mar 31
st
 
2005, 30 days before the formal launch of China’s FCR on Apr 29 2005. 
This uniform estimation period is relatively clean.  
One common concern is later groups of firms are more distant from the 
uniform estimation period than earlier groups of firms. For example, the 
last group of firms announced reform at the end of 2006, 14 months 
after the estimation period. Would this distance affect the beta 
estimations for later groups? Actually the period of 14 months are 
knowingly subjective to recursive effects from other firms, which would 
probably affect beta stability for firms in the last group. Comparatively 
speaking, the beta obtained from a moderately distant but relatively 
clean estimation period is more likely to meet the requirement of beta 
stationarity, which is essential to get better estimate of beta. Also Xia et 
al. (2006), with China daily data, showed that the standard deviation of 
beta mostly depended upon the length of estimation period, irrespective 
of the distance between the estimation period and the event day. The 
longest estimation period tested by them contained 480 trading days 
(almost 2 years) and showed small standard deviation of beta, even if the 
distance between the estimation period and the event day was 360 
trading days.  
Therefore, a uniform estimation period of 2 years and free of noises is 
supposed to produce stable beta estimates for all the sample companies.     
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6.5.5 Aggregation of abnormal returns 
The abnormal return observations must be aggregated in order to draw 
overall inferences for the event of interest. The aggregation is along two 
dimensions-through time and across securities. 
Aggregation through time 
The cumulative abnormal return is introduced to accommodate multiple 
sampling intervals within the event window (Campell et al. 1997). 
Define 
21 tt
CAR   as the cumulative abnormal return for security i  from 1t
 
to 
2t
 
where 
21 tt  , then 
2
1
21 )(
t
t
itttiCAR  .
 
 
Aggregation across securities and through time 
To aggregate across securities and through time, it’s assumed that there is 
not any correlation across the abnormal returns of different securities. 
Given a sample of N  securities, the individual securities’ abnormal 
returns can be averaged as: 
N
itt
N 1
1
 where t is the sample average of 
the N  abnormal return on day t . 
Then this sample average can be aggregated through time
 
using the same 
approach for an individual security. Define )( 21 ttCAR   as the cumulative 
average abnormal return from 1t
 
to 2t
 
where 21 tt  , then 

2
1
21 )(
t
t
tttCAR  .  
Referring to Table 6.2 which summarises the event windows for interested 
event dates, here are the average cumulative abnormal returns for each event 
date: 
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Event dates  Event window 
Notice (2005) on Apr. 29 2005 
 

 
0
1 1
)1,1(
1 N
it
N
CAR   
Measures (2005) on Sep. 5 2005 
 


 
1
1 1
)1,1(
1 N
it
N
CAR   
Group event-dates  
 

 
0
1 1
)0,1(
1 N
it
N
CAR   
Two resumption dates 
 

 
1
0 1
)1,0(
1 N
it
N
CAR   
Table 6.7 Summary of cumulative abnormal returns 
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6.6 Hypotheses Testing  
There are five hypotheses defined for each interested event.  
Hypothesis 1: the average abnormal return is zero at the announcement of 
Notice (2005). 
Accordingly, the null is the abnormal return is zero at the announcement of 
Notice (2005) ( 0NoticeAR ) and the alternative is the abnormal return is 
larger than zero ( 0NoticeAR ). This is one-tailed test. The critical region is 
under the right tail of the probability density curve (for a continuous 
distribution) of the test statistic.  
Not rejecting the null is supportive of Hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 2: the average abnormal return is positive at the announcement 
of Measures (2005).  
The null is the abnormal return is zero at the announcement of Measures 
(2005) ( 0MeasuresAR ) and the alternative is the abnormal return is not 
larger than zero ( 0MeasuresAR ). This is one-sided test.  
Rejecting the null is supportive of Hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 3: the abnormal return is positive at group-specific 
announcement. 
The null is the abnormal return is zero at the group announcement of name 
list of firms ( 0GroupAR ) and the alternative is the abnormal return is not 
equal to zero ( 0GroupAR ). This is one-sided test. 
Rejecting the null is consistent with Hypothesis 3.  
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Hypothesis 4: the abnormal return on the 1
st
 resumption day is zero.  
The null is the abnormal return is zero on the 1
st
 resumption day 
( 01 resAR ) and the alternative is the abnormal return is not equal to zero 
( 01 resAR ). This is two-sided test. 
Not rejecting the null is supportive of Hypothesis 4. 
Hypothesis 5: the abnormal return on the 2
nd
 resumption day is negative.   
The null is the abnormal return is zero on the 2
nd
 resumption day 
( 02 resAR ) and the alternative is the abnormal return is not equal to zero 
( 02 resAR ). This is one-tailed test. The critical region is under the left tail 
of the probability density curve (for a continuous distribution) of the test 
statistic.  
Rejecting the null is consistent with Hypothesis 5. 
6.6.1 Statistic tests 
In the literature, there are many statistic tests proposed under various 
assumptions. 
Traditional no-dependence adjustment test 
The test assumed abnormal returns from the estimation period are 
independence over time and across firms and have a same variance as those 
in the event period (Brown and Warner 1980).  
The standard deviation of the average abnormal return for each security is 
then estimated on the basis of the standard deviation of the time series of 
abnormal returns of each firm during the estimation period T .  
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  where it  is the 
abnormal return for firm i  computed using the OLS market model, N  is 
the number of sample firms, and T is the number of days in the estimation 
period. 
Under the null hypothesis of no abnormal performance, the statistic was 
distributed as Student-t with 2T  degrees of freedom.  
Crude-dependence adjustment 
When there is event-clustering, the cross-sectional dependence across 
securities would cause serious problem in testing null hypothesis. 
Cross-sectional dependence, if not controlled, can lead to biased results, 
mostly leading to tests rejecting the null too frequently.  
Brown and Warner (1980) contributed to the crude dependence parametric 
statistic test where the standard deviation of average residuals should be 
estimated from the time series of the average abnormal returns over the 
estimation period under the assumption that the average abnormal returns 
were independent over time. 
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where 


T
t
N
i
itit
TN 1
1
 is the 
overall mean, N  is the number of sample firms, and T is the number of 
days in the estimation period. 
Under the null hypothesis of no abnormal performance, the statistic was 
distributed as Student-t with 2T  degrees of freedom.  
233 
 
Time-series-dependence adjustment 
Mikkleson and Partch (1988) argued that regression residuals were 
correlated since they were based on the same parameter estimates. Ignoring 
autocorrelation would lead to the underestimation of variance of abnormal 
and over-rejection of null hypothesis. They proposed a test statistic which 
incorporated the time-series dependence.  
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, where 1t  is the first day of the event window and 
2t is the last day of the event window and )(
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cumulative abnormal return firm i , and 599N .  
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1)(   where P  is the number of 
days in the event window and equals 112  tt , mR  is the average market 
return during the estimation period T  and 
2
i  is the security i ’s 
estimated variance of abnormal returns during the estimation period T . The 
component in the bracket is a common approach to account for time-series 
dependence.  
The degree of bias from autocorrelation of individual abnormal returns 
depends on the number of observations in both the estimation period T  
and the event period P . When P  is small relative to T , the uncorrected 
(biased) test statistic is very close to the corrected (unbiased) one. But, when 
P  is relatively large, the bias is substantial. Salinger (1992) indicated that 
intertemporal correlation could be ignored for very short event windows ( P  
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is small relative to T ) without inducing serious errors while for longer 
event window ( P  is relatively large to T ), it was important to include the 
square root component to adjust for intertemporal correlation. 
Event-induced variance adjustment 
If the variance of stock returns increases on the event date, the estimated 
standard deviation of abnormal return from the estimation period is 
downward biased, leading to rejecting the null hypothesis too often. Dann 
(1981) showed that the event-induced standard deviation was more than 
three and half times as great as the estimation period in his study of stock 
repurchases.   
One remedy is to ignore the estimation-period residual variance and to use 
instead the cross-sectional variance in the event period itself to form the test 
statistic, such as in Dann (1981).  
Boehmer et al. (1991) provided a simplest solution to the problem of 
event-induced heteroskedasticity or event-induced variance, which became a 
standard method in the literature and was used in many classical empirical 
studies (Aktas, 2007).  
Firstly the abnormal return estimates are standardized by their estimated 
standard deviation (assuming no event-induced heteroskedasticity), based 
on the residual variance from the estimation period. By dividing each firm’s 
abnormal residual by its standard deviation, each residual has an estimated 
variance of 1.  
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 where  
0iSR : the security i ’s standardized residual on the event day;  
235 
 
iS : the security i ’s estimated standard deviation of abnormal returns during 
the estimation period 485T . 
Then the standard deviation of these standardized variants 0iSR  is 
calculated cross-sectionally in the event period and the significance of the 
estimate of the average standardized abnormal return is tested using the 
cross-sectionally estimated standard deviation. This method also requires 
that security residuals be cross-sectionally uncorrelated. The null hypothesis 
is the average standardized residual across N firms is equal to zero.  
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Non-parametric tests 
Non-parametric tests typically make fewer assumptions about the data. 
Generally a nonparametric test assumes the distribution is unknown or 
nonnormal and measures central tendency by the median. 
Corrado (1989) introduced a non-parametric rank test of significance, which 
has been used in classical empirical studies (Aktas 2007). His rank test 
merged the estimation and event windows in a single time series. His rank 
procedure transformed the distribution of security abnormal returns into a 
uniform distribution across the rank values regardless of any asymmetry in 
the original distribution.  
To implement the rank test, it is first necessary to transform each firm’s 
abnormal returns in ranks [ )( itit rankK  ] over the combined period S  
that includes the estimation and the event window. That is, for firm i  , 
abnormal returns are sorted over the combined period and a rank is assigned 
to each day of the combined period.  
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The test then compares the ranks in the event period for each firm, with the 
expected average rank under the null hypothesis of no abnormal return, or in 
other words, equal to the mean rank of  25.0 SK   when S  is odd 
and of  2SK   when S  is even. The test statistic for the null 
hypothesis is: 
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where S  denotes the days in the combined 
period, equal to the sum of estimation period and event period.  
This statistic is distributed asymptotically as unit normal (Z distribution) 
and the degree of freedom is T . The use of ranks neutralizes the impact of 
the shape of the AR distribution (e.g., its skewness and kurtosis and the 
presence of outliers). It should therefore represent an attractive alternative 
way of neutralizing contaminating events within the estimation window.  
Corrado and Zivney (1992) refined the Corrado’s rank test to account for a 
variance increase during an event period. They standardised the abnormal 
returns as Boehmer et al. (1991) did and then ranked the standardised 
abnormal returns, which were then used to compute the rank test statistic as 
Corrado (1989) did. Under a null hypothesis of no abnormal performance, 
the distributions of the rank test statistics rapidly converge to standard 
normal (Corrado and Truong 2008). 
They further refined the sign test. They assigned positive one, negative one 
and zero signs to each day's observation for abnormal returns above, below 
and equal to the sample median of the abnormal returns in the estimation 
period which was zero: )(signG iitit   , equal to +1, -1 or 0 when itG  
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was positive, negative or zero respectively. The median-based sign test is:
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. Under the null hypothesis of no abnormal 
performance, the distributions of signs test statistics converges rapidly to 
standard normal.  
6.6.2 Statistic power of tests 
Brown and Warner (1980) reported that in the absence of cross-sectional 
dependence, all the tests were well specified and powerful. In the presence 
of cross-sectional dependence, the crude dependence adjustment method 
didn’t explicitly outperform traditional no dependence adjustment method.  
In general, Boehmer et al. (1991) found their standardised cross-sectional 
test designed to solve event-induced variance was unbiased and more 
powerful than other well specified alternatives, such as traditional no 
dependence adjustment method from Brown and Warner (1980), when there 
was an increase in the variance. When there was no change in variance, their 
test was well specified even, but less powerful as the variance in this case 
was overestimated. 
Cowan and Sergeant (1996) showed that if the return variance was unlikely 
to increase, then Corrado's rank test (1989) provided better specification and 
power than the BMP test in Boehmer et al. (1991). With variance increases 
this test was, however, misspecified.  
Corrado and Zivney (1992) found that without event-induced increase in 
variance, both the standardised rank test and the median-based sign test 
were better-specified than the traditional parametric test. In the presence of 
an event date variance increase, non-parametric tests were less severe in 
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terms of misspecification than the traditional parametric tests. Furthermore 
the rank test dominated the sign test and the traditional parametric test. 
Aktas et al. (2007) found that in the absence of an event-induced increase in 
return volatility, Corrado’s rank test outperformed other tests with and 
without contaminating events in the estimation period under the alternative 
hypothesis. In the presence of an event-induced increase in return volatility, 
the rank test was comparatively the most powerful approach but not well 
specified under the null hypothesis.   
Corrado and Truong (2008) data revealed that the parametric test statistics 
(the BMP test from Boehmer et al. 1991) were more prone to 
misspecification with Asia-Pacific returns data than non-parametric tests 
(the standardised rank test and the median-based sign test introduced in 
Corrado and Zivney 1992). With both US security market data and 
Asia-Pacific returns data, the non-parametric rank test statistics led with the 
greatest test power, followed by the non-parametric sign test statistics, and 
then the parametric test statistics. The ranking of test statistics by test power 
was essentially the same as that found in previous studies using similar 
simulation methods in Brown and Warner (1980, 1985). 
Ahern (2009) categorised his data into high, medium and low groups based 
on the market capitalisation, prior returns, and book-to-market value of the 
sample firms. The results showed that the combination of OLS market 
model and the parametric test produced incorrect rejection rates under the 
null hypothesis. The power of the parametric test was lower than the 
nonparametric tests under the alternative hypothesis.  
To sum up, non-parametric tests are better specified under the null and more 
powerful in detecting abnormal returns than the parametric tests under a 
variety of conditions.  
239 
 
6.6.3 In the context of China Full-Circulation Reform 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of China 
Full-Circulation Reform on the stock prices of listed companies.  
Cross-sectional dependence 
Event clustering is a common practice during the reform. The macro event 
when Notice (2005) was released is supposed to affect all the listed firms 
with non-tradable shares, which means the event date is the same for those 
firms. Similarly the announcement of Measures (2005), the second macro 
event of concern, leads to event date clustering for the rest firms after the 
pilot groups. The group announcement indicates an identical event date for 
firms in one group. Even the two firm-specific resumption dates of an 
individual firm, as discussed, have great chance to overlap with 
announcements of other firms. Therefore cross-sectional dependence is 
implied in abnormal returns across securities. The adjustment to 
cross-sectional dependence, as suggested in Brown and Warner (1980), is 
called crude dependence adjustment test, which estimates the standard 
deviation of the day zero average excess return using the cross-sectional 
mean abnormal returns from the estimation period. This portfolio t-test 
explicitly takes into account any potential cross-sectional dependence in the 
security specific abnormal returns.  
Consequently, crude dependence adjustment test is employed in this study.  
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where it  is the abnormal 
return for firm i  computed using the OLS market model, 
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 is the overall mean, 599N  is the number of sample 
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firms, and 485T is the number of days in the estimation period from day 
-514 to day -30 relative to April 29 2005. 
The statistic test for the cross-sectional average CAR: 
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where P  is the number of 
days in the event window and equals 112  tt . Since the event window 
covers either 2 days or 3 days in this study, then P  is either 2 or 3.    
Time-series dependence 
The residuals based on the same parameter estimates are suspiciously 
correlated. Since the same estimation procedure is applied in this study, it’s 
better to take into account the time-series dependence. 
Based on the MP test, the event-day test statistic adjusted for time-series 
dependence is: 
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S   is the security i ’s estimated standard 
deviation of abnormal returns from the estimation period 485T , 
599N  is the number of sample firms, mR  is the average market return 
during the estimation period T , and mtR  is the market return on day t  
from the estimation period.  
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The denominator component in the bracket 
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common approach to adjust for time-series dependence. The longer the 
estimation period T is, the smaller effect from autocorrelation of residuals.    
The statistic test for the cross-sectional average CAR: 
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, where 599N  is the number of sample firms, 
and 485T is the number of days in the estimation period from day -514 
to day -30 relative to April 29 2005. 
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returns from the estimation period.  
When P  is small relative to T , the uncorrected (biased) test statistic is 
very close to the corrected (unbiased) one as the component in the bracket 
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Event-induced variance 
Many studies pointed out, the event-induced variance should be considered 
when conducting a statistic test since the problem of heteroskedasticity may 
lead to over-rejection of the null hypothesis. And the standardised 
cross-section test proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991) has become a standard 
to handle the event-induced variance.  
However in the scenario of China’s FCR, involved firms were going 
through the same procedure group by group under the scrutiny of the CSRC. 
Thus the cross-sectional variation was controlled to some extent.  
Even if there is significant cross-sectional variation so that the variance in 
the event period increases, with positive abnormal returns it only means the 
distribution shifts upwards and becomes wider. The location of the mean 
doesn’t change. The purpose of an event study is to examine whether firms 
react abnormally in an event against the benchmark normal return from the 
estimation period which is supposed to depict their usual behaviours. In 
other words, how significant the event-window abnormal returns are, 
against the benchmark mean which is zero. In this sense, it seems not that 
meaningful to control for the event-induced variance as long as the mean 
location keeps unchanged.  
Therefore the BMP by Boehmer et al. (1991) is not employed here.     
Non-parametric test 
In addition, non-parametric tests don’t require independence over time or 
across securities, or normality of residuals. As an alternative test, the 
standardised rank test in Corrado (1989) is employed in addition to the two 
parametric test.  
The test statistic for the null hypothesis is: 
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where S  denotes the days in the combined 
period, equal to the sum of estimation period and event period. As Table 6.7 
shows, the event window is either 2-day period or 3-day period, then S  is 
488 for the macro event of the release Measures (2005), and 487 for the 
release of Notice (2005), groups announcements and events of two 
firm-specific resumption of trading. )( itit rankK   is a rank assigned to 
each day of the combined period S  based on an ascending order of 
abnormal returns over the combined period S . K  is the mean rank, equal 
to 2442 S  when S  is 488 and equal to 24425.0  S  when S  is 
487.  
Many papers have shown that this test is leading in test power, ahead of 
other non-parametric tests as well as parametric tests (Campbell and Wasley 
1993, Cowan and Sergeant 1996, Aktas et al. 2007, Corrado and Truong 
2008, Ahern 2009).  
6.7 Cross-sectional Models  
According to MacKinlay (1997), theoretical insights can result from 
examining the association between the magnitude of the abnormal return 
and characteristics specific to the event observation. Often such an exercise 
can be helpful when multiple hypotheses exist for the source of the 
abnormal return.  
6.7.1 Hypotheses for regression 
There are five hypotheses developed for each interested event in this study, 
which are normal hypotheses with regard to the magnitude of abnormal 
244 
 
returns. Following are regression hypotheses on the coefficients of 
determinants of these abnormal returns drawn from each interested event.  
Release of Notice (2005) 
Hypothesis 1 states that the average abnormal return is zero at the 
announcement of Notice (2005) because Notice (2005) was designed to 
maintain the market stability and thus expected to offset the oversupply 
price pressure.  
Therefore there are two dynamics underlying the abnormal return at the 
announcement of Notice (2005).    
• Price pressure 
The first variable of interest is the issue size, which indicates the price 
pressure from the sale of non-tradable shares.  
Many papers have used the proportion of shares / firm value to be sold over 
the pre-event total firm shares outstanding / pre-announcement firm value to 
proxy for issue size, such as Scholes (1972), Masulis and Korwar (1986), 
Eckbo and Masulis (1992), Slovin et al. (2000), Cheung et al (2007). 
However this proxy for issue size has more than one implication. For 
instance, the study by Yeh et al. (2010) on China’s FCR used the proportion 
of NTAS to denote the agency problem or interest conflicts between the 
TAS and NTAS owners, which is criticised by me for ignoring its multiple 
implications. Perotti and Guney (1993) also pointed out that in a subsequent 
tranche of privatisation it was not easy to distinguish the market constraint 
(price pressure) from the unsystematic risks to be shared since both have a 
similar empirical implication: larger privatisation should be more 
underpriced. Choi and Nam (1998) provided a solution and used the 
245 
 
proceeds of each privatisation divided by market capitalization of domestic 
capital market of the country to proxy market constraint (price pressure) 
Hypothesis 1.1: the issue size is negatively related to the abnormal return at 
the announcement of Notice (2005). 
• Benefits from Notice (2005) 
Notice (2005) was to protect the interests of minority group – the holder of 
TAS in the reform from two aspects: applying equal weighted voting rights 
and introducing the negotiation process between the TAS and NTAS 
owners. Firms in which the conflicting interests of the TAS and NTAS 
owners were most severe were likely to benefit most from Notice (2005). In 
other words, more severe agency problems between the TAS and NTAS 
owners indicate more benefits under Notice (2005).   
Hypothesis 1.2: the agency problem is positively related to the abnormal 
return at the announcement of Notice (2005). 
Release of Measures (2005) 
Hypothesis 2 states that the average abnormal return is positive at the 
announcement of Measures (2005) which summarised the pilot program and 
reiterates the determination to maintain the market stability and protect 
minority interests.   
Firms with worse agency problem would benefit more from Measures 
(2005).  
Hypothesis 2.1: the agency problem is positively related to the abnormal 
return at the announcement of Measures (2005). 
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Group specific announcement 
Hypothesis 3 states that the abnormal return is positive as the firms in the 
name list disclosed at the group announcement were regarded as 
self-confident and also passed strict scrutiny by the stock exchanges.  
As Jiang et al. (2008) and Li et at (2010) indicated, the firms in earlier 
groups were more self-confident than those in later groups and may face 
stricter scrutiny as the stock exchanges always tried to set up examples in 
earlier groups for future reforms in later groups.            
Hypothesis 3.1: the group order is negatively related to the abnormal return 
at the group announcement.  
The first resumption of trading   
Hypothesis 4 states that the abnormal return on the 1
st
 resumption day is 
zero assuming a high rate of participation from the public investors. In other 
words, participating TAS holders didn’t respond to the announcement while 
non-participating TAS holders, if any, responded.    
A short negotiation period (1
st
 suspension period) indicates insufficient 
solicitation and a diversified ownership may be an obstacle to have enough 
participants. A higher non-participating ratio would yield abnormal return 
closer to zero at the 1
st
 trading resumption. In other words, negotiation 
period (1
st
 suspension period) and diversified ownership are positively 
related to the magnitude of the abnormal returns at the 1
st
 resumption of 
trading (without respect to sign of abnormal returns). For this purpose, some 
transformation of abnormal return that abstracts from its sign has been 
initially proposed by Beaver (1968). This transformation is to take the 
square of the abnormal returns, used in many studies such as Landsman and 
Maydew (2002). Shorter negotiation period and lower ownership 
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concentration indicate lower participation ratio and hence more information 
content, which leads to higher squared abnormal returns. 
Hypothesis 4.1: the negotiation period and the ownership concentration are 
negatively related to the squared abnormal returns at the 1st trading 
resumption.  
The unexpected information for non-participating TAS holders may be 
reduced by previous examples.  
Mola and Loughran (2004) found that firms issuing equity within one year 
of a prior offering had significantly lower average discounts of seasoned 
issues than firms with no recent offerings, indicating frequent occurrence of 
similar events may mitigate the effect of subsequent events, assuming an 
efficient market. 
Therefore non-participating TAS holders in later groups would be more 
indifferent to the 1
st
 resumption announcement than those in earlier groups. 
Hypothesis 4.2: the group order is negatively related to the squared 
abnormal returns at the 1
st
 trading resumption. 
Non-participating TAS holders are expected to respond to the reform 
proposal including Consideration size which they didn’t know before the 
announcement. If the Consideration size was more than what they expected, 
there would be a positive abnormal return. Otherwise, there would be a 
negative abnormal return.  
Hypothesis 4.3: Consideration size is positively related to the abnormal 
returns at the 1
st
 trading resumption. 
Non-participating TAS holders may respond to various Consideration types 
as well. Lu et al. (2008) regressed event-window abnormal returns against 
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Consideration size as well as Consideration types, such as share type, cash 
type and combination type. They found existing holders of tradable 
A-shares earned significant abnormal returns when companies paid in cash 
or warrants or combination method, opposed to their expectation that none 
of the types was superior over the others as the holders of TAS had different 
investment preferences and tax positions.  
Consideration paid in shares (1) is uncertain and subject to risks of future 
price changes, and (2) locked their investment.  
Consideration paid in cash is (1) certain and (2) effectively allows the 
holders of TAS to reduce their investment by taking some cash out. Figure 
6.2 shows cash Consideration actually shifts the TAS owners’ original risk 
exposure upwards by the cash.   
                 cash 
                
 
 
Figure 6.2 Payoff when Consideration paid in cash 
 
Consideration in the form of warrants fixes the strike price at a future time. 
Put warrant actually hedges the risks exposed and eliminates the downside 
risks. Call warrants doubles the upside gains.  
Figure 6.3 shows the payoff from the put warrant offset the risk exposure 
(the left-side diagram) and the combined effect is like a call warrant (the 
green line in the right-side diagram).  
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Figure 6.3 Payoff when Consideration in the form of put warrant 
 
Figure 6.4 shows the payoff from the call warrant doubles the upside gain 
(the green solid line in the right-side diagram).  
                                                 
                
 
 
Figure 6.4 Payoff when Consideration in the form of call warrant 
 
Therefore cash type, or warrant type, or combination type which includes 
either cash or warrant, could have a positive impact on the abnormal returns.  
Hypothesis 4.4: Consideration dummy equal to 1 if paid in cash, or warrant, 
or combination including cash or warrant, is positively related to the 
squared abnormal returns at the 1st trading resumption.  
The second resumption of trading 
Hypothesis 5 states that the abnormal return on the 2
nd
 resumption day is 
negative because the free bonus shares offered would effectively increase 
the number of tradable shares and with all other things remaining the same, 
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drive the stock price down, like in a stock split, consistent with the literature 
on price drop-off by the amount of dividend on ex-dividend day.  
Hypothesis 5.1: Consideration size is negatively related to the abnormal 
return at the 2nd resumption of trading  
Secondly the successful completion of reform is more meaningful for 
companies with more serious agency problems and hence implies more 
favorable response from those non-participating investors.  
Hypothesis 5.2: Agency problem is positively related to the abnormal return 
at the 2nd resumption of trading  
6.7.2 Regression models  
A cross-sectional regression model is an appropriate tool to investigate the 
association implied in those regression hypotheses. The basic approach is to 
run a cross-sectional regression of the abnormal returns on the 
characteristics of interest.  
Regression Model 1 
Regression Model 1 is designed to investigate the hypotheses which define 
relationships between proposed determinants and the abnormal return at the 
announcement of Notice (2005).  
ii
iiiiiiiNoticei
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7654321




 
IS  denotes issue size, the value of NTAS divided by the pre-announcement 
market capitalization. 
AP denotes agency problem, the ratio of NTAS to TAS to proxy for the 
agency problems between the TAS and NTAS holders. Higher ratio 
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indicates more severe agency problem, and the minority of TAS holders 
would benefit more from the release of Notice (2005).  
Based on Hypothesis 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3, 1  are predicted to be negative 
while 2  is predicted to positive. 
I include several firm-level controls.  
FS controls for firm size effect on the CARs and is proxied with the 
logarithm of market capitalization.  
CG controls for the effect of governance quality on the CARs and is 
measured by the percentage of independent directors in the board.  
EPS controls for the effect of performance, earnings per share released in 
the financial reports preceding the reform; 
VOLcontrols for the effect of firm risk and is measured by the standard 
deviation of daily stock returns during the estimation period.  
LP controls for listing venue and is a dummy equal to 1 if listed in SHSE 
and zero if listed in SZSE. The most distinct differences between two stock 
exchanges are the relative size and the characteristics of listed companies of 
two exchanges. While companies listed on the SHSE are mostly large and 
state-owned, those on the SZSE are mostly small, joint ventures and 
export-oriented. Many papers document that the size of SHSE is bigger than 
that of SZSE in term of total number of listed companies and total market 
capitalization.  
ID controls for industry is a dummy equal to 1 if in the manufacturing 
industry and zero otherwise. In Table 6.4, there are 351 samples firms in the 
industry of manufacturing, accounting for 58.2% of the total sample. For all 
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the other first-level industries, the number of sample firms varies from 3 to 
39. Manufacturing firms are more likely to be long-established and large 
firms while non-manufacturing firms are comparatively newer and smaller. 
ST controls for share type, a dummy equal to 1 if issuing only A-shares and 
zero if issuing dual shares, like A and B shares or A and H shares. There are 
550 companies in my sample issue A-shares only and 49 companies issue 
both A and B or both A and H shares. The China FCR only affects domestic 
A-shares. In this sense, companies issuing A-shares only are fully involved 
while companies having dual shares are only partially involved. Dual-share 
companies may have relatively smaller proportion of A-shares than 
A-share-only companies. Secondly dual-share companies are required to 
prepare financial information in accordance with International Financial 
Reporting Standards while A-share-only companies only need to publish 
financial statements in line with China GAAP.  
Regression Model 2 
Regression Model 2 is designed to investigate the hypotheses which define 
relationships between proposed determinants and the abnormal return at the 
announcement of Measures (2005).  
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AP denotes agency problem, the ratio of NTAS to TAS to proxy for the 
agency problems between the TAS and NTAS holders.  
Based on Hypothesis 2.1 1  is predicted to be positive. 
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Regression Model 3 
Regression Model 3 is designed to investigate the hypotheses which define 
relationships between proposed determinants and the abnormal return at the 
group announcement.  
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GO is the ascending order of groups, starting from the 1st pilot group 
ranked 1, ending up with the last group announced at the end of Dec 2006 
ranked 66.  
Based on Hypothesis 3.1, 1  is predicted to be negative. 
Regression Model 4 
Regression Model 4 is designed to investigate the hypotheses which define 
relationships between proposed determinants and the abnormal return at the 
1
st
 resumption of trading.  
Hypothesis 4.1 and 4.2 relate the determinants to the magnitude of abnormal 
returns at the 1
st
 trading resumption. And according to Beaver (1968), some 
transformation of abnormal return that abstracts from its sign is to take the 
square of the abnormal returns.  
Regression Model 4A:  
iii
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NP  denotes the length of the negotiation period, measured in days.  
OC  denotes the ownership concentration, the logarithm of the number of 
shareholders.  
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GO is the ascending order of groups. 
Based on Hypotheses 4.1 and 4.2, 1 , 2  and 3  are predicted to be 
negative.  
Regression Model 4B: 
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CS denotes the Consideration size, adjusted on the same scale according to 
Table 6.6.   
CD denotes the Consideration dummy, equal to 1 if Consideration is paid in 
cash, warrant, or combination including cash or warrant and 0 otherwise. 
Based on Hypothesis 4.3 and 4.4, 1  and 2  are predicted to be positive.  
Regression Model 5 
Regression Model 4 is designed to investigate the hypotheses which define 
relationships between proposed determinants and the abnormal return at the 
2nd resumption of trading.  
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CS denotes the Consideration size, adjusted on the same scale according to 
Table 6.6.   
AP denotes agency problem between the TAS and NTAS holders, the ratio 
of NTAS to TAS. Higher ratio indicates more severe agency problem. 
Based on Hypothesis 5.1 and 5.2, 1  is predicted to be negative and 2  is 
predicted to be positive.  
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6.8 Concluding remarks 
This chapter introduces the research design for an event study on China 
Full-Circulation Reform, including selecting critical event dates and sample, 
identifying hypotheses for each event selected, justifying the use of market 
model to estimate normal returns and the application of uniform estimation 
period to estimate model parameters, illustrating suitable statistic tests for 
hypotheses testing, and defining regression hypotheses and relevant 
variables.  
 
  
256 
 
Chapter 7. Results and Analysis 
Empirical results of event study and from cross-sectional regression models 
are presented in this chapter.  
There are five interested events. For each of them, event-window abnormal 
returns are reported, together with the significance from three different 
statistic tests, crude dependence adjustment test (Brown and Warner 1980), 
time-series adjustment test (Mikkleson and Partch 1988), and rank test 
(Corrado, 1989).  
A multiple regression is run for each interested event. The event-window 
abnormal return is regressed against variables defined in the corresponding 
regression models introduced in the last section of Chapter 6.  
Secondly all these empirical results lead to insights about the mechanisms 
by which the China’s FCR event affected security prices, which are 
interpreted respectively.  
7.1 Empirical results of event-study  
There is a time sequence of the interested events, which are classified into 
three levels: macro level, group level and firm level, as shown in Figure 6.1. 
In the first place, results are presented and analyses are provided for each 
event separately. Afterwards an overall view is taken, which connects all 
these events and tells a continuous story of the full event effect of the China 
reform in 2005.  
7.1.1 Event of Notice (2005) issuance 
On April 29 2005, Notice (2005) formally launched China’s 
Full-Circulation Reform aiming to float non-tradable A shares held by the 
Government.   
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In Notice (2005), a timescale of process was set out for an individual reform, 
introducing the negotiation between the holders of TAS and NTAS on the 
reform proposal in the first suspension period as well as the equal voting 
system for the approval of the reform proposal in the second suspension 
period. In addition, Notice (2005) put on trading restrictions on the sale of 
Government shares after the reform.  
The measures proposed in Notice (2005) were to maintain the stability and 
healthy growth of market and protect of the lawful rights and interests of 
public investors, as required by Opinions (2004) which was released by the 
State Council.  
Hypothesis 1 predicts that the efforts in Notice (2005) to maintain market 
stability and protect minority interests would approximately offset the 
negative effect from the price pressure, which implies zero abnormal 
performance at the release of Notice (2005). 
Overall sample 
Table 7.1 presents the event effects in terms of the abnormal returns on the 
event day (Friday April 29 2005) and the trading day before (Thursday 28
th
 
April 2005) with a sample size of 599 companies. The next trading day was 
Monday, 9
th
 May 2005, and was excluded as it overlapped with the 
announcement day of the first pilot group. The results of three significance 
tests are provided as well.  
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TOTAL AR(-1) AR(0) CAR(-1,0) 
Average 0.006 -0.003 0.003 
BW 1.449 -0.686 0.441 
MP 8.512** -3.713** 10.582** 
Rank 1.698* -0.726  
Sample size 599 599 599 
Test statistic with one star on the upper right corner (*) indicates significance at the 5% 
level while with two stars (**) indicates significance at the 1% level 
BW: the crude dependence adjustment test (Brown and Warner 1980) 
MP: the time-series adjustment test (Mikkleson and Partch 1988) 
Rank: the rank test (Corrado 1989) 
Table 7.1 Summary of abnormal returns around Notice (2005) issuance 
 
MP test is designed to adjust for time-series dependence but assuming 
cross-sectional independence. Even if there is relatively moderate 
cross-sectional dependence in an event study with clustered event days 
could introduce considerable downward bias in the standard deviation and 
cause serious over-rejection of the null hypothesis of no abnormal 
performance, or Type I errors (Salinger 1992, Aktas et al. 2007, Kothari and 
Warner 2007, Kolari and Pynnönen 2010). The macro event of Notice 
(2005) publication is supposed to affect all companies with non-tradable 
shares and subsequently the cross-sectional dependence in event window 
could be large, which cast doubt on the high significances with MP test in 
Table 7.1.  
BW test is designed to control for cross-sectional dependence but assuming 
time-series independence. If there is large residual autocorrelation, the 
statistic could be biased upwards, leading to over-rejection of the null of no 
abnormal performance. In reality, there are 341 sample companies whose 
residual autocorrelations (1-day lag) from the estimation-periods are close to 
zero within the range of (-0.05, +0.05) and 73 sample companies with 
autocorrelations either larger than 0.1 or smaller than -0.1. Figure 7.1 shows 
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the histogram of the 1-day lag residual autocorrelations from the estimation 
periods for all the sample companies, with a step of 0.05.  
 
Figure 7.1 The histogram of autocorrelation 
 
Within the range between -1, perfect negative correlation, and +1, perfect 
positive correlation, the sample autocorrelation converges around 0.025 
with a maximum of 0.25. Generally speaking, the problem of time-series 
dependence is not very serious, indicating BW test by controlling 
cross-sectional dependence only may make fewer Type I error of rejecting 
the true null and is more likely to be sufficient to give proper significance. 
In Table 7.1, BW test presents much lower statistic figures than MP test and 
suggests insignificance for all abnormal returns and CAR (-1, 0). The 
conservative performance of BW test compared to MP test implies that at 
this event, the cross-sectional dependence prevails over time-series 
dependence.        
The rank test examines whether the position of the abnormal returns in 
event-window are significantly away from the centre position over the 
combined period (estimation period plus event period). As the rank test is 
free of distribution and doesn’t require independence across securities or 
over time, it provides a robust alternative to BW and MP tests.  
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Therefore BW test and the rank test seem more reliable than MP test at this 
event.     
The average abnormal return across securities on the day before the release 
of Notice (2005) is a positive (0.6%), significant at the 1% level according 
to MP test and at the 5% level according to the rank test but insignificant 
according to BW test. The rank test suggests there is probably some 
information leakage.  
On the event day of Notice (2005) issuance, the average abnormal return is 
-0.3%. Both BW test and the rank test report insignificance, indicating the 
null of no abnormal return performance is not rejected, which is consistent 
with Hypothesis 1.  
The average cumulative abnormal return over the event window (-1, 0) is 
0.3%, insignificant according to BW test, indicating no rejection of the null 
of zero abnormal performance and support for Hypothesis 1.  
The movement from the positive return on day -1 to negative return on day 
0 indicates that investors were initially drawn towards the good news with 
regard to protecting minority interests and then reacting down to 
contemplate the negative news of large sales of NTAS, which eventually 
lead to a statistically insignificant effect.  
Using a sample of companies included in the China Securities Index 300, Lu 
et al. (2008) found a significant negative effect during their event period (-1, 
0), one day before though April 29 2005, and attributed it to the fear of a 
dilution effect based on past experience in 2001 even though the Chinese 
Government was promising to protect the minority traded shareholders. 
They used an estimation period of only 6 months before the event which 
may bias their estimations of parameters and the final results. China 
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Securities Index 300 composes of the largest 300 companies listed on China 
stock markets, which may also affect their results as larger companies may 
be more vulnerable to the reform.  
Subsamples 
Part A in Table 7.2 shows the abnormal returns on each day in the event 
period, including days before and on April 29 2005, in two stock exchanges. 
There are 193 companies in my sample listed in the SZSE and 406 listed in 
the SHSE. While companies listed on the SHSE are mostly large and 
state-owned, those on the SZSE are mostly small, joint ventures and 
export-oriented. 
Part B in Table 7.2 gives the abnormal returns on each day in the event 
period, including days before and on April 29 2005, for subsamples divided 
by share types. There are 550 companies in my sample issue A-shares only 
and 49 companies issue both A and B or both A and H shares. The China 
FCR only affects domestic A-shares. In this sense, companies issuing 
A-shares only are fully involved while companies having dual shares are 
only partially involved. Dual-share companies may have relatively smaller 
proportion of A-shares than A-share-only companies. Dual-share companies 
are required to prepare financial information in accordance with 
International Financial Reporting Standards while A-share-only companies 
only need to publish financial statements in line with China GAAP.  
Part C in Table 7.2 displays the abnormal returns on each day in the event 
period, including days before and on April 29 2005, for manufacturing 
industry and non-manufacturing industry. In Table 6.4, there are 351 
samples firms in the industry of manufacturing, accounting for 58.2% of the 
total sample. For all the other first-level industries, the number of sample 
firms varies from 3 to 39. Manufacturing firms are more likely to be 
262 
 
long-established and large firms while non-manufacturing firms are 
comparatively newer and smaller.  
PART A 
Stock Exchange SZSE SHSE 
 AR(-1) AR(0) CAR(-1,0) AR(-1) AR(0) CAR(-1,0) 
Average 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.007 -0.005 0.002 
BW 0.852 0.254 0.684 1.733* -1.133 1.159 
MP 2.617** 1.318 2.267* 8.535** -5.418** 1.795* 
Rank 1.673* 0.325  1.653* -1.018  
Sample size 193 193 193 406 406 406 
PART B 
Share Type A Share Dual share 
 AR(-1) AR(0) CAR(-1,0) AR(-1) AR(0) CAR(-1,0) 
Average 0.006 -0.003 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.006 
BW 1.494 -0.747 0.431 1.245 0.249 0.862 
MP 8.232** -4.128** 2.364** 2.182* 0.849 1.746* 
Rank 1.724* -0.839  0.745 0.915  
Sample size 550 550 550 49 49 49 
PART C 
Industry Manufacturing  Non-Manufacturing 
 AR(-1) AR(0) CAR(-1,0) AR(-1) AR(0) CAR(-1,0) 
Average 0.004 -0.003 0.002 0.008 -0.003 0.005 
BW 0.996 -0.747 0.287 1.992* -0.747 0.719 
MP 4.544** -2.785** 1.013 7.823** -2.457** 3.091** 
Rank 1.722* -1.1  1.701* -0.085  
Sample size 351 351 351 248 248 248 
Test statistic with one star on the upper right corner (*) indicates significance at the 5% 
level while with two stars (**) indicates significance at the 1% level 
BW: the crude dependence adjustment test (Brown and Warner 1980) 
MP: the time-series adjustment test (Mikkleson and Partch 1988) 
Rank: the rank test (Corrado 1989) 
Table 7.2 Summary of abnormal returns around Notice (2005) issuance for 
subsamples 
 
In general, all subsamples yield very similar results as the overall sample: 
there is no rejection of the null of no abnormal return as the CARs (-1, 0) in 
all subsamples are positive but insignificant according to BW test, 
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consistent with Hypothesis 1. High MP test statistics may be overestimated 
due to serious event clustering and is thus not reliable.  
The information leakage seems serious for firms listed in the SHSE or in the 
non-manufacturing industry as both BW test and the rank test report 
significance of positive abnormal returns in the two subsamples on day -1.  
7.1.2 Event of Measures (2005) issuance 
On Sep 5 2005 Measures (2005) was announced and became the first 
official document providing details about the implementation of NTAS 
reform. This critical event date has never been paid attention in the literature 
on China FCR, although it led the reforms for all the remaining firms which 
were not involved in the pilot program and should be carefully investigated. 
The program was built upon the principles established in the pilot reform, 
such as negotiation with the TAS holders on Consideration levels and 
methods, equal-weighted voting rights for the minority of TAS holders and 
trading restrictions on the sale of NTAS. Basically there is nothing special at 
this announcement. But the CSRC made efforts to summarise and then 
formalise the best practices in the pilot program by officially filing 
Measures (2005) which reiterate the determination to protect minority 
interests and hence may have a positive impact on the market. Hypothesis 2 
predicts positive abnormal return at the release of Measures (2005). 
Overall sample 
Table 7.3 presents the event effects in terms of the abnormal returns on the 
event day (Monday Sep 5 2005), the trading day before (Friday Sep 2 2005) 
and the trading day after (Tuesday Sep 6 2005) with a sample size of 553 
companies, associated with the results of significance tests. The sample size 
is reduced from 599 to 553 as the firms in the pilot program are excluded. 
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Total AR(-1) AR(0) AR(1) CAR (-1, 1) 
Ave 0.01 0.012 0.008 0.03 
BW 2.49* 2.988** 1.992* 4.312** 
MP 14.256** 17.162** 11.931** 24.974** 
Rank 0.873 1.297 0.937 
 Sample size 553 553 553 553 
Test statistic with one star on the upper right corner (*) indicates significance at the 5% 
level while with two stars (**) indicates significance at the 1% level 
BW: the crude dependence adjustment test (Brown and Warner 1980) 
MP: the time-series adjustment test (Mikkleson and Partch 1988) 
Rank: the rank test (Corrado 1989) 
 Table 7.3 Summary of abnormal returns around Measures (2005) issuance 
 
The release of Measures (2005) also indicates event clustering for the 
remaining firms after the pilot program and hence MP test which doesn’t 
control for cross-sectional dependence may make Type I errors of rejecting 
the true null. Actually MP test statistics are very high in Table 7.2, 
suggestive of over-rejection of the null, and should be used with caution.  
The abnormal return is 1%, 1.2% and 0.8% on day -1, day 0 and day 1. BW 
test finds the abnormal returns significant at the 5% level on day -1 and day 
1 and significant at the 1% level on the event day, which rejects the null of 
no abnormal performance and supports Hypothesis 2. The positive abnormal 
returns seems persistent over the 3-day event window, indicating the 
information was obviously leaked before the event day and remained at a 
significant level after the event day.  
These abnormal returns on single days in the event window are reported 
significantly different from the estimated mean of zero by the parametric 
BW test and MP test. But the nonparametric rank test doesn’t report any 
significance of them, indicating the ranked-positions of these single-day 
abnormal returns are not significantly different from the centre position (the 
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mean rank) over the combined period which covers both estimation period 
and event window. 
The average CAR (-1, 1) is 3%, reported significant at the 1% level in both 
BW test and MP test, indicating the null of no abnormal performance is 
rejected at the release of Measures (2005), which is consistent with 
Hypothesis 2 that the investors seemed to react positively to the efforts 
made by the CSRC to show its determination to protect minority interests.  
Subsamples  
Part A in Table 7.4 shows the abnormal returns around Sep 5 2005 in two 
stock exchanges.  
Part B in Table 7.4 gives the abnormal returns around Sep 5 2005 for 
subsamples divided by share types.  
Part C in Table 7.4 displays the abnormal returns around Sep 5 2005 for 
manufacturing industry and non-manufacturing industry.  
  
266 
 
PART A AR(-1) AR(0) AR(1) CAR (-1, 1) 
SZSE 0.01 0.008 0.007 0.025 
BW 2.49* 1.992* 1.743 3.594** 
MP 8.261** 7.083** 5.564** 12.047** 
Rank 1.168 1.042 1.651  
Sample size 193 193 193 193 
SHSE 0.01 0.014 0.009 0.033 
BW 2.49* 3.486** 2.241* 4.744** 
MP 11.621** 15.962** 10.656** 22.028** 
Rank 0.695 1.274 0.607  
Sample size 406 406 406 406 
PART B AR(-1) AR(0) AR(1) CAR (-1, 1) 
A-share-only 0.01 0.012 0.008 0.03 
BW 2.49* 2.988** 1.992* 4.312** 
MP 13.794** 16.351** 11.083** 23.751** 
Rank 0.855 1.302 0.913  
Sample size 550 550 550 550 
Dual-share 0.009 0.013 0.012 0.033 
BW 2.241* 3.237** 2.988** 4.744** 
MP 3.632** 5.223** 4.583** 7.743** 
Rank 0.785 0.783 0.893  
Sample size 49 49 49 49 
PART C AR(-1) AR(0) AR(1) CAR (-1, 1) 
Manufacturing 0.011 0.012 0.008 0.031 
BW 2.739** 2.988** 1.992* 4.456** 
MP 11.322** 13.29** 9.008** 19.369** 
Rank 1.015534 1.138287 0.962363 
 Sample size 351 351 351 351 
Non-manufacturing 0.01 0.012 0.008 0.029 
BW 2.49** 2.988** 1.992* 4.169** 
MP 8.686** 10.861** 7.826** 15.769** 
Rank 0.1723 0.699627 0.352551 
 Sample size 248 248 248 248 
Test statistic with one star on the upper right corner (*) indicates significance at the 5% 
level while with two stars (**) indicates significance at the 1% level 
BW: the crude dependence adjustment test (Brown and Warner 1980) 
MP: the time-series adjustment test (Mikkleson and Partch 1988) 
Rank: the rank test (Corrado 1989) 
Table 7.4 Summary of abnormal returns around Measures (2005) for subsamples 
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All subsamples yield similar results as the total sample. There are positive 
abnormal returns in the 3-day event window. Both BW test and MP test 
report the 1% level significance of CARs (-1, 0). Basically, the null of zero 
abnormal performance is rejected for all the subsamples, consistent with 
Hypothesis 2.  
7.1.3 Group-specific announcement 
The reform process was gradually carried out group by group. There are in 
total 66 groups, starting with two pilot groups in early 2005 and ending with 
a group announced at the end of 2006.  
The namelist of firms was publicised at the group announcement. The 
selection process involves (1) first the stock exchanges set a deadline to 
accept reform proposals from companies wishing to pitch in and (2) the 
stock exchanges examined all the applying firms carefully and crossed out 
those they thought had problems or were not well-prepared yet. It’s like an 
honor to be included in the namelist which means the companies were 
self-confident that they were well prepared for the reform, and also passed 
the check by the stock exchanges. Hypothesis 3 predicts positive abnormal 
returns around the group announcements.  
Overall sample 
Table 7.5 shows the average abnormal return at various group 
announcements, associated with tests of significance results.  
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 AR(-1) AR(0) CAR (-1,0) 
Average 0.005 0.008 0.013 
BW 1.353 1.922* 1.891* 
MP 8.295** 11.486** 11.396** 
Rank 0.714085 1.219572  
Sample size 599 599 599 
Test statistic with one star on the upper right corner (*) indicates significance at the 5% 
level while with two stars (**) indicates significance at the 1% level 
BW: the crude dependence adjustment test (Brown and Warner 1980) 
MP: the time-series adjustment test (Mikkleson and Partch 1988) 
Rank: the rank test (Corrado 1989) 
Table 7.5 Summary of abnormal returns at group announcements 
 
Firms in the same group were publicised on the same day of group 
announcement, which indicates the event-clustering is inevitable and MP 
test may reject the null too frequently.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, the 2-day event-window CAR (-1, 0) is 
significantly positive (1.3%) in Table 7.5 at the 5% level according to BW 
test. The abnormal return is 0.5% on day -1 and insignificant, indicating 
there is no information leakage. The event-day abnormal return is 0.8%, 
reported significant at the 5% level by BW test. The rank test doesn’t report 
significance of the single-day abnormal returns on day -1 and day 0, 
indicating the ranked-position of these two abnormal returns are not 
statistically far from the ranked-position of the medium.  
The results suggest that the investors were happy about the news that their 
firms were in the final list. 
Ren et al. (2009) reported that there was a big difference among CAR (-20, 
20) values for different groups, with a minimum of -7.13% and a maximum 
of 31.94%, but the average CAR (-20, 20) was a positive. Their results were 
based on a sample size of 939 companies and an event period from 20 days 
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before the event through the event day to 20 days after. But they didn’t tell 
which critical event day they selected for investigation.  
Figure 7.2 shows the average CAR (-1, 0) curve at the 66 group 
announcements.  
 
Figure 7.2 CAR curve at the 66 group announcements 
 
Generally speaking, this CAR curve is volatile with a maximum above 6% 
and a minimum below -0.4% while the average CAR (-1, 0) is positive 
(1.3%), consistent with the findings in Ren et al. (2009). There is no wonder 
a 2-day event-window CAR is smaller in size than a 41-day event-window 
CAR in Ren et al. (2009). But what is clear is that there is no pattern in the 
time series to suggest that there was any learning through time from the 
successful implementation of the scheme.  
Subsamples  
Naturally each group is a subsample of firms. There are 599 sample 
companies and 66 time-sequential groups. Hence the average group size is 
about 9. In some cases, the group size can be as small as 2, which is far than 
enough to qualify as an unbiased analysis.  
If dividing the 66 groups into three categories, the first category covers the 
first 22 groups, from Pilot Group 1 to Group 20; the second category spans 
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from Group 21 to Group 42; and the third category include Group 43 to 
Group 64. These three categories are named early, middle and late stages.  
According to the full-size data in Table 4.2, there are 540 companies in the 
early stage, 598 companies in the middle stage and 221 companies in the 
late stage. Referring to my sample, there are 233, 268 and 98 sample 
companies in the early, middle and late stages respectively. The weights of 
each stage in my sample are similar to those in the full-size data, indicating 
my sample is representative of the full-size data from this viewpoint. 
TABLE 7.6 shows the abnormal returns of each stage and the results of 
corresponding significance tests. The 2-day event window from the previous 
day to the group announcement day (-1, 0) is applied. As firms in the same 
group usually suspended on the day immediately after the group 
announcement, the data is not available for most of the firms on day +1 
which is for this reason excluded from the event window.  
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 Early Stage (Pilot 1 - Group 20) 
 AR(-1) AR(0) CAR (-1,0) 
Average 0.005 0.007 0.012 
BW 1.245 1.743* 1.725* 
MP 4.219** 6.598** 6.232** 
Rank 0.461782 1.191598  
Sample size 233 233 233 
 Middle Stage (Group 21 - Group 42) 
 AR(-1) AR(0) CAR (-1,0) 
Average 0.007 0.01 0.017 
BW 1.743* 2.49** 2.444** 
MP 7.797** 9.791** 10.133** 
Rank 1.140257 1.370208  
Sample size 268 268 268 
 Late Stage (Group 43 - Group 64) 
 AR(-1) AR(0) CAR (-1,0) 
Average 0 0.003 0.003 
BW 0 0.747 0.431 
MP 0.648 1.544 1.263 
Rank 0.530923 0.410679  
Sample size 98 98 98 
Test statistic with one star on the upper right corner (*) indicates significance at the 5% 
level while with two stars (**) indicates significance at the 1% level 
BW: the crude dependence adjustment test (Brown and Warner 1980) 
MP: the time-series adjustment test (Mikkleson and Partch 1988) 
Rank: the rank test (Corrado 1989) 
Table 7.6 Summary of the abnormal returns for early, middle and late stages 
 
Hypothesis 3 holds for the early and middle stage. The CAR (-1, 0) is 1.2% 
in the early stage, which is significant at the 5% level according to BW test. 
The CAR (-1, 0) is 1.7% in the middle stage which is significant at the 1% 
level according to BW test.  
Hypothesis 3 is rejected for the late stage which shows insignificant CAR 
(-1, 0), indicating the investors in the late stage didn’t view the nomination 
as unexpected good news. As the full-size data in Table 4.2 suggests, the 
early and middle stages actually account for 83.74% of a total of 1,359 
companies. And the last group in the middle stage was announced on Jul 23 
272 
 
2006 while the Government set the end of 2006 as the deadline of the 
process in Measures (2005). The investors in the late stage were probably (1) 
more certain about the time-slot their firms would be in; and (2) less happy 
about their less enthusiastic firms (Jiang et al 2008), which would cause a 
fall in the abnormal returns. Alternatively there is an argument that the later 
groups had learnt from the earlier groups and were not over compensated by 
their schemes.  
7.1.4 Firm-specific 1st resumption day            
When the board of directors publicised the reform proposal, the trading of 
the shares of this stock was immediately suspended. 
The reform proposal included date of the shareholders’ meeting, a 
description of the reform proposal as well as the opinions of the 
recommending institution and the law firm.  
Within 10 days after the announcement, the board of directors should assist 
the owners of NTAS in adequately communicating and negotiating with the 
holder of TAS of A-share market by such approaches as hosting an investor 
symposium, a press conference or an online road show, paying a visit to 
institutional investors and issuing a consultation paper and so on. In addition, 
the board of directors of the listed company publicly should disclose its 
hotline, facsimile and e-mail address in order to widely solicit opinions from 
tradable shareholders so as to lay a broad shareholder foundation for the 
reform plan. 
If the proposal was acceptable to both parties, an announcement of 
consensus would be made and trading resumed. Once trading resumed the 
proposal was not allowed to be further modified. 
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As the results disclosed with the 1
st
 trading resumption should reflect a 
mutual agreement between the holders of TAS and NTAS, there should be 
no surprise from the market. Therefore Hypothesis 4 predicts no abnormal 
returns assuming a high rate of participation from the public investors.  
Overall sample 
Table 7.7 shows the abnormal returns around the firm-specific 1
st
 
resumption of trading, associated with the significance tests results. The 
2-day event window from the announcement day to the next trading day is 
applied. There is no data available before the resumption of trading and 
hence the day immediately before the 1
st
 resumption day is excluded.   
 AR(0) AR(1) CAR (0, 1) 
Average 0.031 0.012 0.043 
BW 7.819** 2.957** 6.222** 
MP 44.281** 17.499** 35.593** 
Rank 2.952** 0.852  
Test statistic with one star on the upper right corner (*) indicates significance at the 5% 
level while with two stars (**) indicates significance at the 1% level 
BW: the crude dependence adjustment test (Brown and Warner 1980) 
MP: the time-series adjustment test (Mikkleson and Partch 1988) 
Rank: the rank test (Corrado 1989) 
Table 7.7 Summary of abnormal returns around 1
st
 resumption day 
 
The 1
st
 resumption day is seemingly various from company to company 
since it is firm-specific, indicating the event-clustering may  not be that 
serious. But the event-clustering is still not uncommon because (1) firms in 
the same group may have great chance to share the same 1
st
 resumption day; 
(2) the five-working-day group interval may increase the chance for firms in 
different groups to have the same 1
st
 resumption day. For instance, 599 
sample companies have 207 1
st
 resumption dates. Averagely speaking, 
approximately every 3 sample companies share the same 1
st
 resumption 
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dates. Therefore MP test which doesn’t control cross-sectional dependence 
should be used with caution if used by itself. 
The abnormal return on the event day is 3.1%, significant according to all 
three tests. The abnormal return on day +1 is 1.2%, significant in BW test 
and MP test, indicating the event effect persists after the event day. The rank 
test statistic suggests insignificance which means the ranked-position of the 
abnormal return is not statistically significant away from the ranked-position 
of the medium. The CAR (0, 1) is 4.3%, significant in BW test and MP test. 
Conclusively, Hypothesis 4 which predicts zero abnormal performance is 
rejected, indicating the publication of the reform proposal on the 1
st
 
resumption day which should be a mutual agreement between the holders of 
TAS and NTAS is actually a positive surprise in the market. In other words, 
there were uninformed investors, probably non-participating investors who 
didn’t pitch in the discussion. The reform proposal, especially the level of 
Consideration, was more than what they expected.  
Significant positive returns at 1
st
 resumption day is observed in quite a few 
studies, such as Beltratti and Bortololli (2006), Lu et al. (2008) and Firth et 
al. (2010). 
Beltratti and Bortololli (2006) argued that the expectation of improved 
corporate governance outweighed the price pressure from the large-scale 
non-tradable-shares disposals and thus resulted in positive returns. This was 
a strange argument given that the process was not about improved 
governance rather more about protecting the interests of minorities.   
Lu et al. (2008) argued that investors reacted positively due to the inclusion 
of consideration in this reform process. However they later found no 
relation between the level of consideration and share market response, 
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suggesting that investors perceived the consideration to be fair and adequate, 
which contradicts their argument.  
Firth et al. (2010) argued that the final terms of the compensation were 
better than expected and/or there was a palpable relief that the firm could 
now move forward and management can concentrate on improving 
operating performance. They also found the Consideration level is a 
significant and positive determinant of the announcement effect. Their 
conclusion is like a combination of Beltratti and Bortololli (2006) and Lu et 
al. (2008).  
According to the reform process, the investors should agree on the reform 
proposal before the announcement of trading resumption and the negotiation 
process should take all related issues into account so as to reach a fair 
compensation plan. In this sense, there should be no surprise in the market. 
But none of papers explained this puzzle of over-compensation in reality 
(significant positive abnormal returns) and fair compensation in theory.  
My explanation introduces the concept of participation ratio. In theory, all 
TAS holders take part in and express their opinions fully. In reality, this is 
impossible. The reform process indicates that the firms are required to do as 
much as possible to solicitate the opinions from the public investors. But 
various investors may have various interests in a reforming firm. For 
example, if their shareholdings were quite small in the reforming firm, it 
may not be worthwhile for them to get involved. Or if their interests were 
diversified in several reforming firms in the same group or in the 
consecutive groups, they may be able to manage them all during a short 
period of time. And these non-participating investors may trust institutional 
shareholders to bargain for them and at the announcements of resumption 
found the final plan was more than what they wanted. Various reforming 
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firms may work variously to facilitate the solicitation. Some of them may 
make greater efforts than the others. There may be some investors who 
thought they were marginalised and were thus not very happy about the 
final plan. However, the average CAR (-1, 0) is significant and positive, 
indicating the overall effect tends to be overwhelmed by the 
non-participating investors rather than the marginalised investors. In 
addition, China stock market is labeled as a “highly-speculative” market 
(Wong, 2006) where there are many short-run arbitragers. The positive 
response from the non-participating investors may be exaggerated by the 
temporary speculative behavior in the market.     
Subsamples 
Part A in Table 7.8 shows the abnormal returns around the 1
st
 resumption 
day in two stock exchanges.  
Part B in Table 7.8 gives the abnormal returns around the 1
st
 resumption day 
for subsamples divided by share types.  
Part C in Table 7.8 displays the abnormal returns around the 1
st
 resumption 
day for manufacturing industry and non-manufacturing industry.  
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PART A SZSE SHSE 
 AR(0) AR(1) CAR (0, 1) AR(0) AR(1) CAR (0, 1) 
Average 0.026 0.009 0.035 0.034 0.013 0.047 
BW 6.473** 2.241* 5.031** 8.465** 3.237** 6.756** 
MP 21.138** 7.987** 16.781** 39.212** 15.749** 31.663** 
Rank 3.743** 1.075  2.411* 0.698  
Sample size 193 193 193 406 406 406 
PART B A-share-only Dual-share 
 AR(0) AR(1) CAR (0, 1) AR(0) AR(1) CAR (0, 1) 
Average 0.03106 0.01158 0.043 0.035 0.015 0.05 
BW 7.733** 2.883** 6.181** 8.714** 3.735** 7.187** 
MP 42.032** 16.16** 33.525** 14.003** 7.043** 12.126** 
Rank 2.799** 0.864  3.685** 0.388  
Sample size 550 550 550 49 49 49 
PART C Manufacturing Non-Manufacturing 
 AR(0) AR(1) CAR (0, 1) AR(0) AR(1) CAR (0, 1) 
Average 0.03 0.012 0.042 0.033 0.012 0.045 
BW 7.469** 2.988** 6.037** 8.216** 2.988** 6.469** 
MP 32.907** 13.274** 26.606** 29.671** 11.405** 23.664** 
Rank 2.555** 0.803  1.669* 0.258  
Sample size 351 351 351 248 248 248 
Test statistic with one star on the upper right corner (*) indicates significance at the 5% 
level while with two stars (**) indicates significance at the 1% level 
BW: the crude dependence adjustment test (Brown and Warner 1980) 
MP: the time-series adjustment test (Mikkleson and Partch 1988) 
Rank: the rank test (Corrado 1989) 
Table 7.8 Summary of abnormal returns around 1
st
 resumption day for subsamples 
 
These subsamples yield similar results as the overall sample. Significant and 
positive abnormal returns throughout the 2-day event window indicate 
contradictions with Hypothesis 4. In each subsample, the uninformed 
investors, either existing or new investors, found the reform proposal, 
particularly the level of Consideration, was more than what they expected. 
This surprise seems the largest in the dual-share subsample and the least in 
the SZSE subsample. This may simply be random chance.  
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7.1.5 Firm-specific 2nd resumption day     
When the shareholders’ meeting was approaching as scheduled in the 
reform proposal, the registration process started for the shareholders’ 
meeting. And trading was suspended the next day of registration for the 
second time.  
The proposal was voted on the shareholders’ meeting and had to win a 
majority of two thirds of votes from the TAS and NTAS owners 
respectively. The board must publicise the voting results within 2 working 
days. If the proposal was accepted, the board should also publicly release 
the timetable for actual implementation of the reform. Trading was restarted 
after the shareholder meeting ratifying the completion of the reform. If the 
proposal was not approved the board should apply for extension of 
suspension of the listed company’s shares from the next day of the 
announcement. The holders of NTAS of a listed company may redo the 
reform procedures from the very start but have to wait for at least three 
months. Only firms succeeded could resume trading.  
Hypothesis 5 predicts negative abnormal returns at the 2nd resumption of 
trading because the bonus shares offered would effectively increase the 
number of tradable shares and with all other things remaining the same, the 
stock price would fall, consistent with the literature which suggests that the 
price usually drops by approximately the amount of dividend on 
ex-dividend day, which could be extended to the payment of Consideration. 
In addition, the good news of successful completion of the reform plan may 
have positive impact, which may reduce the negative return.   
Overall sample 
Table 7.9 presents the abnormal returns at the 2nd resumption of trading, 
together with the significance tests. The 2-day event window from the 
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announcement day to the next trading day is applied. There is no data 
available before the resumption of trading and hence the day immediately 
before the 2
nd
 resumption day is excluded.   
 AR(0) AR(1) CAR (0, 1) 
 -0.14 -0.006 -0.145 
BW -34.826** -1.395 -20.912** 
MP -205.068** -7.755** -122.612** 
Rank -5.853** -1.341  
Test statistic with one star on the upper right corner (*) indicates significance at the 5% 
level while with two stars (**) indicates significance at the 1% level 
BW: the crude dependence adjustment test (Brown and Warner 1980) 
MP: the time-series adjustment test (Mikkleson and Partch 1988) 
Rank: the rank test (Corrado 1989) 
Table 7.9 Summary of abnormal returns around the 2
nd
 resumption day 
 
Like the 1
st
 resumption day, the 2
nd
 resumption day  also varies from 
company to company, indicating the event-clustering may be not that 
serious. But 599 sample companies have 281 2
nd
 resumption dates. 
Averagely speaking, approximately every 2 sample companies share the 
same 2
nd
 resumption dates. Therefore the event-clustering is still a problem 
though on a reduced basis. And MP test which doesn’t control 
cross-sectional dependence should also be used with caution if used by 
itself. 
The abnormal return is -14% on the event day, significant at the 1% level 
according to all three tests. On day +1, this negative return almost vanished, 
with -0.6% insignificant in both BW test and the rank test. The CAR (0, 1) 
of -14.5% is dominated by the negative abnormal return on day 0 and 
significant according to both BW and MP test.  
This result is consistent with Hypothesis 5 which predicts a negative 
abnormal return.  
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This critical final date is always missed in the studies on China FCR, 
probably intentionally because it seems bizarre to have a negative return of 
such magnitude. Only Beltratti and Bortololli (2006) talked about this large 
decline on the 2
nd
 resumption day and argued it was due to the stock traded 
from the record date of ex bonus, which was quite obscure. They didn’t give 
further explanation or evidence. 
As Hypothesis 5 indicates, the return would fall by the amount of 
Consideration, but the decline may be reduced by the positive effect of the 
good news implied on the 2
nd
 resumption day, a successful completion of 
the reform plan. The difference between the estimated abnormal return 
based on Consideration and the true abnormal return is the premium, which 
reflects the real market response.  
The average Consideration level (adjusted Consideration levels based on 
Table 6.6) is free bonus share of 0.295 for every TAS held, which indicates 
a decline in return by 22.78% and leads to an estimated abnormal return of 
-0.23
48
. The real abnormal return on the 2
nd
 resumption day is -0.14. 
Therefore there is an approximate premium of 9%. The empirical results are 
consistent with the implications of Hypothesis 5.  
Subsamples  
Part A in Table 7.10 shows the abnormal returns around the 2
nd
 resumption 
day in two stock exchanges.  
Part B in Table 7.10 gives the abnormal returns around the 2
nd
 resumption 
day for subsamples divided by share types.  
                                               
48 Estimated return assuming a drop by Consideration: 1)1(1)( 0  ii ConRE .
 
Estimated 
abnormal return: 
000 )()( miiii RREARE   .  
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Part C in Table 7.10 displays the abnormal returns around the 2
nd
 
resumption day for manufacturing industry and non-manufacturing industry.  
PART A SZSE SHSE 
 AR(0) AR(1) CAR (0, 1) AR(0) AR(1) CAR (0, 1) 
Average -0.189 -0.001 -0.19 -0.117 -0.008 -0.124 
BW -47.057** -0.249 -27.312** -29.131** -1.992* -17.825** 
MP -155.406** -1.497 -90.402** -141.938** -8.387** -86.601** 
Rank 3.743** 1.075  2.411* 0.698  
Sample size 193 193 193 406 406 406 
PART B A-share-only Dual-share 
 AR(0) AR(1) CAR (0, 1) AR(0) AR(1) CAR (0, 1) 
Average -0.146 -0.00515 -0.151 -0.074 -0.011 -0.085 
BW -36.284** -1.282 -21.706** -18.424** -2.739** -12.219** 
MP -206.999** -6.766** -123.155** -23.481** -4.445** -16.091** 
Rank 2.799** 0.864  3.685** 0.388  
Sample size 550 550 550 49 49 49 
PART C Manufacturing Non-Manufacturing 
 AR(0) AR(1) CAR (0, 1) AR(0) AR(1) CAR (0, 1) 
Average -0.149 -0.007 -0.156 -0.127 -0.004 -0.131 
BW -37.098** -1.743* -22.425** -31.62** -0.996 -18.831** 
MP -165.456** -7.389** -99.585** -121.864** -3.261** -72.082** 
Rank 2.555** 0.803  1.669* 0.258  
Sample size 351 351 351 248 248 248 
Test statistic with one star on the upper right corner (*) indicates significance at the 5% 
level while with two stars (**) indicates significance at the 1% level 
BW: the crude dependence adjustment test (Brown and Warner 1980) 
MP: the time-series adjustment test (Mikkleson and Partch 1988) 
Rank: the rank test (Corrado 1989) 
Table 7.10 Summary of abnormal returns around the 2
nd
 resumption day for 
subsamples 
 
Similar results are reported for all subsamples: a sharp decline in abnormal 
return at the 2
nd
 resumption of trading, consistent with Hypothesis 5. The 
largest decline in abnormal return is found in the SZSE subsample (-0.189) 
and smallest in the dual-share subsample (-0.074).  
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Table 7.11 summaries the subsamples’ estimated abnormal returns assuming 
returns falling by Consideration levels, the real abnormal returns and the 
premiums between.  
Subsample SZSH SHSE A-share-
only 
Dual-share Manufac
-turing 
Non-Manufa
-cturing 
Estimated 
AR 
-0.231 -0.224 -0.228 -0.211 -0.227 -0.226 
Real AR -0.189 -0.117 -0.146 -0.074 -0.149 -0.127 
Premium 0.042 0.107 0.082 0.137 0.078 0.099 
Table 7.11 Summary of premiums between estimated ARs and true ARs at the 2nd 
resumption of trading for subsamples 
 
The highest premium is found in the dual-share subsample (0.137) and the 
lowest in the SZSE subsample (0.042), indicating the investors holding TAS 
in the dual-share companies were the happiest about the successful 
completion while the investors holding TAS in the SZSE-listed companies 
were the most conservative.  
7.1.6 A full story 
Here is a full story of China FCR. 
The abnormal return is not significant around the release of Notice (2005), 
consistent with Hypothesis 1 which predicts the substance in Notice (2005) 
aiming to protect minority interest offset the negative effect from the price 
pressure. 
The abnormal return is positive and significant around the release of 
Measures (2005), consistent with Hypothesis 2 which predicts the efforts 
made by the CSRC to extend the successful protection of minority interests 
in the pilot program to the rest firms may have a positive impact in the price 
behaviour. 
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The average abnormal return is positive and significant around the group 
announcements, consistent with Hypothesis 3 which predicts the inclusion 
in the namelist disclosed at group announcement indicates self-confidence 
and approval from the stock exchanges and may have a positive impact in 
the price behaviour. 
The abnormal return is positive and significant at the 1st resumption of 
trading, rejecting Hypothesis 4 which predicts zero abnormal performance 
since a mutual agreement on the reform proposal shouldn’t be a surprise to 
the public investors who have joined in the negotiation. The results indicate 
that there were non-participating investors who found the proposal was 
more than what they expected. In addition, the speculative China stock 
markets may drive the return even higher. 
The abnormal return is negative and significant at the 2nd resumption of 
trading, consistent with Hypothesis 5 which predicts the return would fall by 
Consideration payment but the price-drop would be reduced in the wake of 
the successful completion of the reform.  
Figure 7.3 depicts the CAR curve following the timeline from the release of 
Notice (2005) by the CSRC to the firm-specific completion of reform on the 
2
nd
 resumption day. Approximately the market response is positive except 
on the 2
nd
 resumption day (the red line). However if the CAR is replaced by 
the premium on the 2
nd
 resumption day which removes the Consideration 
effect (the blue line), the CAR curve then moves upwards instead, indicating 
China FCR is, generally speaking, successful since the market reacted 
positively to the reform, opposite to the market crash following the 
attempted effort to reduced NTAS by the State Council in 2001.   
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Figure 7.3 CAR curve following the timeline   
 
7.2 Regression results  
Cross-sectional regressions are run against the CARs drawn from each of 
the five interested events to investigate the associations with the factors 
implied in the regression hypotheses.  
7.2.1 Regression results from Regression Model 1  
Hypothesis 1 states that the abnormal return is zero at the announcement of 
Notice (2005) because Notice (2005) was designed to maintain the market 
stability and thus expected to offset the oversupply price pressure, which is 
supported by the results that the average CAR around the release of Notice 
(2005) is 0.3% and insignificant.  
Hypothesis 1.1 predicts the issue size, which stands for the price pressure 
and is proxied as the NAV value of NTAS, provided in DataStream, divided 
by the pre-announcement market capitalization, is negatively related to the 
abnormal return at the announcement of Notice (2005).  
Hypothesis 1.2 argues that companies in which the conflicting interests of 
the TAS and NTAS owners were most severe were likely to benefit most 
from Notice (2005) and predicts the agency problem, which is measured as 
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the ratio of NTAS to TAS, is positively related to the abnormal return at the 
announcement of Notice (2005). 
Table 7.12 shows the coefficients of factors defined in Regression Model 1, 
together with the significance results of these coefficients.  
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  Average Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept  0.011 0.044 0.256 0.798 
IS 0.002 -0.09 0.161 -0.561 0.575 
AP 1.771 0.004 0.002 2.248 0.025 
ST  -0.009 0.006 -1.542 0.124 
ID  -0.006 0.003 -2.025 0.043 
LP  -0.004 0.003 -1.325 0.186 
FS 21.22 0.00009 0.002 0.046 0.963 
CG 0.296 0.002 0.016 0.147 0.883 
EPS 0.168 -0.03 0.011 -2.871 0.004 
VOL 1.954 0.001 0.0004 2.486 0.013 
R Square: 0.042 
F statistic: 2.858*, significant at the 5% level.  
Regress Model 1:
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IS (Issue Size): the value of NTAS divided by the pre-announcement market capitalization;  
AP (Agency Problem): the ratio of NTAS to TAS to proxy for the agency problems between 
the TAS and NTAS holders; 
ST (Share Type): a dummy equal to 1 if issuing only A-shares and zero if issuing dual shares, 
like A and B shares or A and H shares; 
ID (Industry Dummy): a dummy equal to 1 if in the manufacturing industry and zero 
otherwise; 
LP (Listing Place): a dummy equal to 1 if listed in SHSE and zero if listed in SZSE; 
FS (Firm Size): the logarithm of market capitalization;  
CG (Corporate Governance): the percentage of independent directors in the board;  
EPS (Firm Performance): earnings per share released in the financial reports preceding the 
reform; 
VOL (Firm Risk): the standard deviation of daily stock returns during the estimation period.  
Table 7.12 Summary of regression results from Regression Model 1 
 
The average IS  (Issue Size) is 0.2%, which means the total market 
capitalisation of tradable A-share market before the reform is 500 times the 
average value of NTAS across firms. The average annual trading volume is 
1.8% of the total market capitalisation of tradable A-share market before the 
reform, which means the average market liquidity could only allow no more 
than 9 companies to dump all the NTAS in one go. Consistent with 
Hypothesis 1.1, the coefficient of IS  is negative (-0.09). But this 
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coefficient is statistically insignificant due to a p-value of 0.56, indicating 
the price pressure from the sale of NTAS was not strongly affecting the 
market reaction around the release of Notice (2005) and hence a weak factor. 
It may be that the trading restrictions on the sale of NTAS assure the 
investors that dump of shares would not happen.      
Lu et al. (2008) found a significant negative effect around April 29 2005 
which is different from my finding of an insignificant return, and they 
attributed it to the fear of a dilution effect based on past experience in 2001. 
They didn’t further investigate the hypothesized relationship (for example, 
by regressing the abnormal returns against various dilution effects and other 
variables across firms) and there is no evidence for their argument.  
The average AP  (Agency Problem) is 1.771%, which implies the average 
NTAS ownership is 1.771 times the average TAS ownership. Consistent 
with Hypothesis 1.2, the coefficient of AP  (Agency Problem) is positive 
(0.004), and is statistically significant due to a p-value of 0.025, indicating 
the public investors of firms which had larger conflicting interests between 
the holders of TAS and NTAS would rank the announcement of Notice 
(2005) higher as they believed they would benefit more from it. This 
potential determinant AP  has never been used to explain the market 
response around the Notice (2005) issuance in the past.   
There are three controlling variables which are proved to be significant 
determinants of the CAR around the Notice (2005) issuance.  
ID , the industry dummy, equals to 1 if in the manufacturing industry and 
zero otherwise. The coefficient of ID  is negative (-0.006) and statistically 
significant because of a p-value of 0.043, indicating the firms in the 
manufacturing industry had lower CARs than those in the 
non-manufacturing industry. Manufacturing firms are more likely to be 
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long-established and large firms while non-manufacturing firms are 
comparatively newer and smaller. It seems the old firms which have a long 
history behind were more conservative about the news of reform than the 
new firms.     
EPS refers to the earnings per share preceding the reform and a proxy for 
firm performance. The average EPS  is 0.168. The coefficient of EPS is 
negative (-0.03) and statistically significant, according to a p-value of 0.004, 
which suggests the firms with higher performance had smaller CARs than 
those with lower performance. It seems the firms with higher quality were 
less keen on the reform than those with lower quality. In other words, the 
reform was more attractive to lower-quality firms which would benefit more 
from reducing non-tradable shares since private ownership and its legal 
status affected a firm’s performance positively and significantly (Hu et al., 
2004). 
VOL  refers to the stock standard deviation during the estimation period. 
The average VOL  is 1.954. The coefficient of VOL  is positive (0.001) 
and significant due to a p-value of 0.013, indicating the investors of firms 
with higher risks were convinced they would benefit more from the reform 
implied in the Notice (2005) issuance.    
In general, the public investors of firms with more serious agency problem, 
worse performance, higher volatility, or of shorter history were more 
favorable to the reform news implied in the release of Notice (2005). 
The R square is 4.2%, which indicates all the selected variables in 
Regression Model 1 can only explain 4.2% of the CAR variance. Most of 
the variability in the CARs hasn’t been explained. The F-statistic is 
significant, indicating the selected variables are when taken together 
powerful predictors.   
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7.2.2 Regression results from Regression Model 2  
According to Hypothesis 2, the average abnormal return is positive at the 
announcement of Measures (2005) since the efforts made by the CSRC to 
formalise the reform procedure for the purpose of protecting the minority 
interests are assumed have a positive impact on the market. Consistent with 
Hypothesis 2, the average CAR around the announcement of Measures 
(2005) is 3% and significant.  
Hypothesis 2.1 predicts that the agency problem is positively related to the 
abnormal return at the announcement of Measures (2005) as firms with 
worse agency problem may benefit more from filing Measures (2005) to 
extend the successful practice in protection of minority interests in the pilot 
program to the rest firms.  
Table 7.13 shows the coefficients of factors defined in Regression Model 2, 
together with the significance results of these coefficients.  
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  Average Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 
 
0.105 0.079 1.316 0.189 
AP 1.771 0.079 0.037 2.157 0.031 
ST 
 
-0.001 0.011 -0.048 0.962 
ID 
 
0.001 0.006 0.168 0.867 
LP 
 
0.003 0.006 0.44 0.66 
FS 21.22 -0.005 0.004 -1.291 0.197 
CG 0.296 0.052 0.033 1.591 0.112 
EPS 0.168 -0.012 0.021 -0.57 0.569 
VOL 1.954 0.0007 0.0009 0.804 0.422 
R square: 0.023 
F statistic: 1.512 
Regression Model 2: 
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AP (Agency Problem): the ratio of NTAS to TAS to proxy for the agency problems between 
the TAS and NTAS holders; 
ST (Share Type): a dummy equal to 1 if issuing only A-shares and zero if issuing dual shares, 
like A and B shares or A and H shares; 
ID (Industry Dummy): a dummy equal to 1 if in the manufacturing industry and zero 
otherwise; 
LP (Listing Place): a dummy equal to 1 if listed in SHSE and zero if listed in SZSE; 
FS (Firm Size): the logarithm of market capitalization;  
CG (Corporate Governance): the percentage of independent directors in the board;  
EPS (Firm Performance): earnings per share released in the financial reports preceding the 
reform; 
VOL (Firm Risk): the standard deviation of daily stock returns during the estimation period. 
 Table 7.13 Summary of regression results from Regression Model 2 
 
Consistent with Hypothesis 2.1, the coefficient of AP  (Agency Problem) 
is a positive (0.079) and statistically significant with a p-value of 0.031, 
indicating the public investors of firms with more serious conflicts of 
interests between the TAS and NTAS owners (the minority and majority 
shareholders) felt assured that they would be backed in the reform by the 
filing of Measures (2005) to reinforce the determination to protect minority 
interest.  
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None of the controlling variables have significant coefficients, suggesting 
these variables don’t have much power in explaining the CARs around the 
release of Measures (2005).  
This critical event of Measures (2005) issuance has never been investigated 
in the past and therefore no comparison can be made.  
The R square is 2.3%, which indicates all the selected variables in 
Regression Model 2 can only explain 2.3% of the CAR variance. Most of 
the variability in the CARs remains unexplained. The F-statistic is 
insignificant, indicating the selected variables are not very powerful 
predictors.  
7.2.3  Regression results from Regression Model 3  
Hypothesis 3 predicts the abnormal return is positive at group-specific 
announcement because the inclusion of companies in the list disclosed 
indicates that the companies in the name list were self-confident that they 
were well prepared for the reform and passed the scrutiny conducted by the 
stock exchanges. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, the average CAR around the 
group announcements is 1.3% and significant.      
As Jiang et al. (2008) and Li et at (2010) indicated, the firms in earlier 
groups were more self-confident than those in later groups and may face 
stricter scrutiny as the stock exchanges always tried to set up examples in 
earlier groups for future reforms in later groups.            
Hypothesis 3.1 predicts the group order, which is an ascending order of 66 
sequential groups, is negatively related to the abnormal return at the group 
announcement.  
Table 7.14 shows the coefficients of factors defined in Regression Model 3, 
together with the significance results of these coefficients.  
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  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept -0.092 0.044 -2.093 0.037 
GO 0.00005 0.0001 -0.45 0.653 
ST -0.004 0.006 -0.679 0.497 
ID -0.001 0.003 -0.259 0.796 
LP 0.002 0.003 0.471 0.638 
FS 0.005 0.002 2.369 0.018 
CG 0.027 0.018 1.48 0.139 
EPS 0.005 0.012 0.46 0.646 
VOL 0.0004 0.0005 0.867 0.386 
R square: 0.0234 
F statistic: 1.768 
Regression Model 3: 
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GO (Group Order): the ascending order of groups, starting from the 1st pilot group ranked 1, 
ending up with the last group announced at the end of Dec 2006 ranked 66; 
ST (Share Type): a dummy equal to 1 if issuing only A-shares and zero if issuing dual shares, 
like A and B shares or A and H shares; 
ID (Industry Dummy): a dummy equal to 1 if in the manufacturing industry and zero 
otherwise; 
LP (Listing Place): a dummy equal to 1 if listed in SHSE and zero if listed in SZSE; 
FS (Firm Size): the logarithm of market capitalization;  
CG (Corporate Governance): the percentage of independent directors in the board;  
EPS (Firm Performance): earnings per share released in the financial reports preceding the 
reform; 
VOL (Firm Risk): the standard deviation of daily stock returns during the estimation period. 
Table 7.14 Summary of regression results from Regression Model 3 
 
The group order GO  has a coefficient close to zero (0.00005) and is 
insignificant due to a p-value of 0.653, which rejects Hypothesis 3.1. The 
insignificant coefficient means the group order neither has any impact on 
the dependent variable of CARs, which suggests the investors didn’t see the 
later entries into the reform as an indication of less self-confident. As long 
as the firms registered when they thought they were ready and got approvals 
from the stock exchanges, the investors were satisfied.  
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The variable of firm size FS  has a positive coefficient (0.005) which is 
significant due to a p-value of 0.018, indicating the public investors of those 
larger firms were more optimistic when their firms were included in the 
namelists publicised at group announcements. One potential explanation is 
that larger firms may find it more difficult to draw proper reform proposals, 
may need to pluck up more self-confidence to submit the proposals to the 
stock exchanges, and may encounter higher level of examination by the 
stock exchanges, which could help to improve the public investors’ 
confidence in the market.     
The negative intercept (-0.092) is significant according to a p-value of 0.037, 
meaning the expected mean value of CAR is a negative significantly 
different from zero when all independent variables are set to zero.  
The R square is 2.34%, which indicates all the selected variables in 
Regression Model 3 can only explain 2.34% of the CAR variance. Most of 
the variability in the CARs remains unexplained. The F-statistic is 
insignificant, indicating the selected variables are not very powerful 
predictors.  
7.2.4 Regression results from Regression Model 4  
Hypothesis 4 predicts that the abnormal return on the 1st resumption day is 
zero. There should be no surprise from the market since a mutual agreement 
between the holders of TAS and NTAS had been achieved before the 
announcement of the 1st resumption. The average CAR at the 1st 
resumption of trading is 4.3% and significant, which rejects Hypothesis 4 
and indicates there were uninformed investors, probably non-participating 
investors who didn’t pitch in the discussion and the reform proposal, 
especially the level of Consideration, was more than what they expected. 
294 
 
Regression Model 4A 
A short negotiation period (1
st
 suspension period) indicates insufficient 
solicitation and a diversified ownership may be an obstacle to have enough 
participants. In other words, negotiation period (1
st
 suspension period) and 
diversified ownership are positively related to the magnitude of the 
abnormal returns at the 1
st
 resumption of trading (without respect to sign of 
abnormal returns). Hypothesis 4.1 predicts the negotiation period and the 
ownership concentration are positively related to the squared abnormal 
returns at the 1
st
 trading resumption.  
Mola and Loughran (2004) found that firms issuing equity within one year 
of a prior offering had significantly lower average discounts of seasoned 
issues than firms with no recent offerings, indicating frequent occurrence of 
similar events may mitigate the effect of subsequent events, assuming an 
efficient market. Hypothesis 4.2 predicts the group order is negatively 
related to the squared abnormal returns at the 1st trading resumption. 
Table 7.15 shows the coefficients of factors defined in Regression Model 
4A, together with the significance results of these coefficients.  
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  Average Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept  0.008 0.001 6.445 0 
NP 17.656 -0.00008 0.00002 -3.61 0.0003 
OC 0.221 -0.003 0.003 -1.075 0.283 
GO  0.00002 0.00003 0.509 0.611 
ST 
 
-0.001 0.002 -0.508 0.612 
ID 
 
-0.002 0.001 -1.726 0.085 
LP 
 
0.0004 0.001 0.354 0.723 
FS 21.22 -0.001 0.001 -1.015 0.311 
CG 0.296 0.004 0.005 0.693 0.488 
EPS 0.168 -0.006 0.003 -1.766 0.078 
VOL 0.018 0.00004 0.00014 0.296 0.768 
R square: 0.0383 
F statistic: 2.44**, significant at the 1% level 
Regression Model 4A: 
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NP (Negotiation Period): the length of the negotiation period, measured in days;  
OC (Ownership Concentration): the logarithm of the number of shareholders;  
GO (Group Order): the ascending order of groups, starting from the 1st pilot group ranked 1, 
ending up with the last group announced at the end of Dec 2006 ranked 66; 
ST (Share Type): a dummy equal to 1 if issuing only A-shares and zero if issuing dual shares, 
like A and B shares or A and H shares; 
ID (Industry Dummy): a dummy equal to 1 if in the manufacturing industry and zero 
otherwise; 
LP (Listing Place): a dummy equal to 1 if listed in SHSE and zero if listed in SZSE; 
FS (Firm Size): the logarithm of market capitalization;  
CG (Corporate Governance): the percentage of independent directors in the board;  
EPS (Firm Performance): earnings per share released in the financial reports preceding the 
reform; 
VOL (Firm Risk): the standard deviation of daily stock returns during the estimation period. 
 Table 7.15 Summary of regression results from Regression Model 4A 
 
The average negotiation period length NP  is 17.565 days. The coefficient 
of NP  is negative (-0.00008) and significant (p-value = 0.0003), 
supporting Hypothesis 4.1 which says that reforming firms coming out with 
shorter negotiation period indicate less sufficient solicitation from the side 
of reforming companies and hence have greater abnormal returns. The 
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finding of negative NP  impact is consistent with Lu et al. (2008) which 
also found that companies that took a longer period to work out a reform 
plan generated a lower CAR at the 1
st
 resumption of trading.  
The coefficient of ownership concentration OC  is negative (-0.003) as 
predicted in Hypothesis 4.2. However it is insignificant (p-value = 0.283), 
indicating this variable is not an important factor determining the CAR at 
the 1
st
 resumption of trading.  
The coefficient of group order GO  is positive (0.00002) and insignificant 
(p-value = 0.611), rejecting Hypothesis 4.2 which says firms in earlier 
groups would have greater abnormal returns. This result indicates which 
groups the reforming firms were in has no impact on the CAR at the 1
st
 
resumption of trading, inconsistent with the findings in Lu et al. (2008) 
which reported a significant negative coefficient and indicated later reforms 
had smaller positive market responses. Lu et al. (2008) included 208 sample 
companies from the largest firms listed in SZSE and SHSE, and their results 
may be biased by the sample selection. Furthermore, their sample size 
indicated there were averagely three companies in each group, which may 
bias the group performance as well.  
None of the controlling variables are significant, indicating these variables 
don’t have much power in explaining the CARs at the 1st resumption of 
trading.  
The R square is 3.83%, which indicates all the selected variables in 
Regression Model 4A can only explain 3.83% of the CAR variance. Most of 
the variability in the CARs remains unexplained. The F-statistic is 
significant, indicating the selected variables taken together are powerful 
predictors.   
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Regression Model 4B 
Non-participating TAS holders should also respond to the reform proposal 
including Consideration size which they didn’t know before the 
announcements. Hypothesis 4.3 predicts Consideration size is positively 
related to the abnormal returns at the 1st trading resumption. 
Consideration paid in shares is uncertain and subject to risks of future price 
changes. Consideration paid in cash is certain. Consideration in the form of 
warrants fixes the strike price at a future time. Put warrant actually hedges 
the risks exposed and eliminates the downside risks. Call warrants doubles 
the upside gains. Lu et al. (2008) found the public investors responded to 
various Consideration types as well. In light of Lu et al. (2008), Hypothesis 
4.4 predicts Consideration dummy equal to 1 if paid in cash, or warrant, or 
combination including cash or warrant, is positively related to the abnormal 
returns at the 1st trading resumption.  
Table 7.16 shows the coefficients of factors defined in Regression Model 
4B, together with the significance results of these coefficients. 
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  Average Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept  0.158 0.095 1.653 0.099 
CS 0.295 0.034 0.042 0.807 0.42 
CD  0.016 0.012 1.293 0.196 
ST  0.001 0.013 0.054 0.957 
ID  -0.013 0.007 -1.808 0.071 
LP  -0.001 0.007 -0.123 0.902 
FS 21.22 -0.006 0.004 -1.269 0.205 
CG 0.296 0.021 0.039 0.531 0.595 
EPS 0.168 -0.05 0.025 -1.97 0.049 
VOL 1.954 0.001 0.001 1.046 0.296 
R square: 0.019 
F statistic: 1.27 
Regression Model 4B: 
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CS (Consideration size): adjusted on the same scale according to Table 6.6;  
CD (Consideration dummy): equal to 1 if Consideration is paid in cash, warrant, or 
combination including cash or warrant and 0 otherwise; 
ST (Share Type): a dummy equal to 1 if issuing only A-shares and zero if issuing dual shares, 
like A and B shares or A and H shares; 
ID (Industry Dummy): a dummy equal to 1 if in the manufacturing industry and zero 
otherwise; 
LP (Listing Place): a dummy equal to 1 if listed in SHSE and zero if listed in SZSE; 
FS (Firm Size): the logarithm of market capitalization;  
CG (Corporate Governance): the percentage of independent directors in the board;  
EPS (Firm Performance): earnings per share released in the financial reports preceding the 
reform; 
VOL (Firm Risk): the standard deviation of daily stock returns during the estimation period. 
Table 7.16 Summary of regression results from Regression Model 4B 
 
The average Consideration size CS  is a payment of 0.295 bonus share for 
every TAS held, which is increased by 0.025 from the average of the 
original Consideration sizes publicised at the 1
st
 suspension of trading. 
There are 430 sample companies increased their Consideration sizes after 
the negotiation, 150 sample companies didn’t make any change in their 
Consideration sizes, and 19 sample companies decreased their 
Consideration sizes. The coefficient of CS is positive (0.034) and 
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insignificant (p-value = 0.42), indicating there is no relationship between the 
level of consideration and share market response and the investors perceived 
the consideration to be fair and adequate, rejecting Hypothesis 4.3 which 
predicts a significant positive relationship. This insignificant coefficient of 
CS  is consistent with Lu et al. (2008), but inconsistent with Firth et al. 
(2010) which on the contrary reported a significant and positive coefficient 
as Hypothesis 4.3 predicts. Firth et al. (2010) focused on firms that have 
offered shares as the sole consideration to compensate tradable A 
shareholders to ensure the comparability of compensation across firms as 
they didn’t convert and aggregate different forms of Consideration (e.g., 
warrants, cash). And their estimation period to calculate the abnormal return 
is only 60 trading days (-63, -4) before the 1
st
 resumption day. Therefore 
their conclusion may be biased.  
According to Table 6.5, there were 63 sample companies who used 
warrants, cash or combination to pay Consideration. The coefficient of 
Consideration dummy CD  is positive (0.016) and insignificant (p-value = 
0.196), suggesting the choice of Consideration type didn’t affect the market 
reaction at the 1
st
 resumption of trading and rejecting Hypothesis 4.4 which 
predicts a significant positive coefficient. This insignificant coefficient of 
CD  is inconsistent with Lu et al. (2008) which reported significant and 
positive coefficients of cash dummy, warrants dummy and combination 
dummy. Lu et al. (2008) included 3 sample companies which paid 
Consideration in cash, 1 sample company which used warrant type and 22 
sample companies which selected combination type, which indicates their 
results from Consideration type dummies are not very convincing.  
The firm performance controller, the variable of EPS , has a negative 
coefficient (-0.05) which is significant (p-value = 0.049), indicating the 
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public investors of less profitable firms were more pleased about the reform 
proposals released at the 1
st
 resumption of trading.  
The R square is 1.9%, which indicates all the selected variables in 
Regression Model 4A can only explain 1.9% of the CAR variance. Most of 
the variability in the CARs remains unexplained. The F-statistic is 
insignificant, indicating the selected variables are not very powerful 
predictors.    
Lu et al. (2008) reported an R square of 3.88% and insignificant F statistic 
for their regression model examining the relationships between the CARs at 
the 1
st
 resumption of trading and the determinants they defined, including 
the variables of group order, negotiation period and Consideration size. 
Firth et al. (2010) reported an R square of no more than 0.06% for their 
regression models examining the relationships between the CARs at the 1
st
 
resumption of trading and the determinants they defined, including 
Consideration size, state ownership and fund ownership.  
Generally speaking, the R square is relatively low in the regression models 
which investigate the associations between the market response at 1
st
 
resumption of trading and the common factors, indicating there may be 
some other important factors which haven’t been identified and further 
research and deeper insights are needed. 
7.2.5 Regression results from Regression Model 5  
Hypothesis 5 predicts that the abnormal return on the 2
nd
 resumption day is 
negative since the bonus shares offered would effectively increase the 
number of tradable shares and with all other things remaining the same, the 
stock price would fall. The average CAR of -14.5% at the 2
nd
 resumption of 
trading supports this hypothesis.  
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Hypothesis 5.1 predicts Consideration size is negatively related to the 
abnormal return at the 2
nd
 resumption of trading. 
Furthermore the decline in return may be reduced by the positive effect 
from the good news of successful completion implied at the 2
nd
 resumption 
of trading. The successful completion of reform is more meaningful for 
companies with more serious agency problems and hence implies more 
favorable response from those investors.  
Hypothesis 5.2 predicts agency problem is positively related to the abnormal 
return at the 2
nd
 resumption of trading.  
Table 7.17 shows the coefficients of factors defined in Regression Model 5, 
together with the significance results of these coefficients. 
  
302 
 
 
  Average Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept  1.028 0.294 3.504 0.0005 
CS 0.295 -0.758 0.135 -5.597 3.35E-08 
AP 21.22 -0.005 0.012 -0.373 0.71 
ST  -0.176 0.04 -4.398 1.30E-05 
ID  0.032 0.022 1.432 0.153 
LP  0.029 0.023 1.253 0.211 
FS 21.22 -0.039 0.013 -2.904 0.004 
CG 0.296 0.06 0.12 0.499 0.618 
EPS 0.168 -0.024 0.077 -0.311 0.756 
VOL 1.954 -0.00034 0.003 -0.108 0.914 
R square: 0.105 
F statistic: 7.685**, significant at the 1% level 
Regression Model 5: 
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CS (Consideration size): adjusted on the same scale according to Table 6.6;  
AP (Agency Problem): the ratio of NTAS to TAS to proxy for the agency problems between 
the TAS and NTAS holders; 
ST (Share Type): a dummy equal to 1 if issuing only A-shares and zero if issuing dual shares, 
like A and B shares or A and H shares; 
ID (Industry Dummy): a dummy equal to 1 if in the manufacturing industry and zero 
otherwise; 
LP (Listing Place): a dummy equal to 1 if listed in SHSE and zero if listed in SZSE; 
FS (Firm Size): the logarithm of market capitalization;  
CG (Corporate Governance): the percentage of independent directors in the board;  
EPS (Firm Performance): earnings per share released in the financial reports preceding the 
reform; 
VOL (Firm Risk): the standard deviation of daily stock returns during the estimation period. 
Table 7.17 Summary of regression results from Regression Model 5 
 
The coefficient of Consideration size CS  is negative (-0.758) and 
significant due to a very small p-value of 3.35E-08, consistent with 
Hypothesis 5.1 which predicts a significant and negative relationship 
between the market response at the 2
nd
 resumption of trading and 
Consideration size. In other words, the abnormal returns dropped more if the 
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investors were promised to receive higher Consideration, also supportive of 
Hypothesis 5. 
The coefficient of AP , the ratio of NTAS to TAS, is negative (-0.005) and 
insignificant (p-value = 0.71), indicating the non-participating public 
investors didn’t view the successful completion of the reform as a surprise, 
which rejects Hypothesis 5.2.  
The variable controlling firm size FS  has a negative coefficient (-0.039) 
which is significant (p-value = 0.004), indicating the investors of larger 
firms didn’t value the successful completion of the reform plan as high as 
those of smaller firms as larger firms may encounter more difficulties when 
carrying out the reform and proceeding with the sale of NTAS.   
The Share Type dummy ST  has a negative coefficient (-0.176) which is 
significant (p-value =1.30E-05), indicating the investors of firms issuing 
A-shares only held a less positive view of the successful completion of the 
reform plan than those of firms issuing A&B or A&H shares as the firms 
issuing A-shares-only may be influenced more in the reform implementation 
than those firms issuing dual-shares.  
The R square is 10.5 %, which indicates all the selected variables in 
Regression Model 5 can only explain 10.5% of the CAR variance, which is 
improved a lot compared to the other regression models. The F-statistic is 
significant at the 1% level, indicating the selected variables are relatively 
highly powerful predictors.  
No previous studies have ever investigated into the abnormal returns. They 
may be cherry-picking about the critical event dates in China FCR.   
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7.2.6 Summary of regression results    
According to the results from Regression Model 1, the issue size IS  is 
negatively related to the market response around the release of Notice 
(2005), consistent with Hypothesis 1.1. Meanwhile the agency problem 
AP  is positively related to the market response around the release of 
Notice (2005), consistent with Hypothesis 1.2 which predicts that the public 
investors of firms having more serious conflicts of interests between the 
holders of NTAS and TAS (the minority and majority shareholders) should 
benefit more from the substances in Notice (2005).  
According to the results from Regression Model 2, the agency problem AP  
is positively related to the market reaction around the filing of Measures 
(2005), consistent with Hypothesis 2.1 which predicts that the public 
investors of firms with more serious conflicts of interests between the TAS 
and NTAS owners felt assured that they would be backed in the reform by 
the filing of Measures (2005) with an aim to reinforce the determination to 
protect minority interest.  
According to the results from Regression Model 3, the group order GO  is 
not statistically related to the market response at the group announcement, 
rejecting Hypothesis 3.1 which predicts firms in earlier groups were more 
self-confident than those in later groups and may face stricter scrutiny as the 
stock exchanges. This result suggests that the investors were satisfied as 
long as the firms registered when they thought they were ready and got 
approvals from the stock exchanges, and the sequence of the group they 
were in doesn’t count.  
According to the results from Regression Model 4A, the negotiation period 
is negatively related to the market response at the firm-specific 1
st
 
resumption of trading, supportive of the first half of Hypothesis 4.1 which 
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predicts that reforming firms coming out with shorter negotiation period 
indicate less sufficient solicitation from the side of reforming companies 
and subsequently low participating ratio, and hence have greater abnormal 
returns. Meanwhile there is no significant relationship between the 
ownership concentration OC and the market response at the 1
st
 resumption 
of trading, rejecting the second half of Hypothesis 4.1 which predicts that 
firms with diversified ownership may have low participating ratio due to the 
diversified interests and hence have abnormal returns statistically different 
from zero. Also there is no significant relationship between the group order 
GO  and the market response at the 1
st
 resumption of trading, rejecting 
Hypothesis 4.2 which predicts firms in earlier groups should have greater 
abnormal returns. Neither the ownership concentration OC  nor the group 
order GO  is significant determinants of the magnitude of the market 
reaction at the 1
st
 resumption of trading.  
According to the results from Regression Model 4B, the Consideration size 
CS is not significantly related to the market response at the 2nd resumption 
of trading, rejecting Hypothesis 4.3 which predicts non-participating 
investors should respond positively to the reform proposal. The 
Consideration dummy CD  is not significantly related to the market 
response at the 2
nd
 resumption of trading, rejecting Hypothesis 4.4 which 
predicts non-participating investors should respond positively to 
Consideration in the form of cash, warrants and combination which reduced 
the downside risks or increased the upside risks. The results show that 
neither Consideration size CS  nor Consideration dummy CD  has any 
impact on the market response at 1
st
 resumption of trading. 
According to the results from Regression Model 5, the coefficient of 
Consideration size CS  is negatively related to the market response at the 
2
nd
 resumption of trading, consistent with Hypothesis 5.1 which predicts the 
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abnormal returns dropped more if the investors were promised to receive 
higher Consideration. There is no significant relationship between the 
agency problem AP  and the market response at the 2
nd
 resumption of 
trading, rejecting Hypothesis 5.2 which predicts the non-participating pubic 
investors of firms with more serious agency problem should more welcome 
the successful completion of the reform plan with an aim to protect their 
interests. Actually the non-participating public investors didn’t view the 
news as a surprise.  
7.3 Concluding Remarks 
There are five interested event dates for each sample firm: the releases of 
Notice (2005), the filing of Measures (2005), the group announcement, and 
the firm-specific 1
st
 and 2
nd
 resumption of trading.  
The price behaviours around these five critical event dates have been 
investigated using event-study method to see if there is any abnormal 
performance. Hypothesis 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 defined in Chapter 6 are examined. 
The empirical results suggest that (1) the substance in Notice (2005) aiming 
to protect minority interest offset the negative effect from the price pressure; 
(2) the efforts made by the CSRC to extend the successful protection of 
minority interests in the pilot program to the rest firms may have a positive 
impact in the price behavior; (3) the inclusion in the names disclosed at 
group announcement indicates self-confidence and approval from the stock 
exchanges and may have a positive impact in the price behavior; (4) there 
were non-participating investors who found the proposal was more than 
what they expected; (5) the return which should have dropped by 
Consideration size was improved a bit in the wake of the successful 
completion of the reform.  
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Furthermore the associations between hypothesized factors and the market 
responses around these five interested event dates are investigated with 
multiple regressions.  
The regression results indicate that (1) the negative impact of issue size IS  
on the market response around the release of Notice (2005) seems to have 
been neutralized by the positive impact of the substance released in Notice 
(2005); (2) the efforts by the CSRC to protect minority interests through 
filing Measures (2005) have a positively effect on the market response; (3) 
those firms which were included in the later groups are not necessarily less 
self-confident than those in the earlier groups; (4) as a proxy for 
participation ratio, the negotiation period NP  negatively affect the 
magnitude of the market reaction at the 1
st
 resumption of trading; and (5) 
those firms with higher Consideration size CS  seem to have lower market 
response at the 2nd resumption of trading.  
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Chapter 8. Conclusion 
China began its modernization program in the late 1970s and gradually 
reformed its state-owned enterprises. In the early 1990s, the Government 
partially privatized some state-owned enterprises through share issuances on 
the newly established China stock exchanges. For the listed state-owned 
enterprises, there are multiple classes of shares outstanding: (1) 
Yuan-denominated A-shares which are available for trading by domestic 
shareholders; (2) B-shares are available for trading by foreign investors in 
foreign currencies on the domestic stock exchanges; (3) H shares are 
allowed to trade on Hong Kong Stock Exchanges only and denominated in 
HK dollars. Most distinctively, the Government launched a split-share 
structure in which about two thirds of A shares were banned from trading 
and only about one third of A shares were freely-traded in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen exchanges. Non-tradable A shares were mainly held in the hands 
of the Government and its affiliates, and tradable A shares were mainly held 
by domestic investors. Tradable A shareholders received little protection 
and had limited power to affect firm management due to the minority 
shareholding in the listed companies. In addition, unlike the fixed lockup 
period in IPO and for letter stocks in the US (Siber 1991, Longstaff 1995), 
the constraint horizon in China was not explicitly specified in the IPO 
prospectuses.   
The early initiative in 2001 was to invite companies to sell their state shares 
to tradable shareholders without bargaining beforehand with tradable 
shareholders. This action resulted in a significant decline in stock prices, 
about 40 per cent within 15 days of the announcement. 
In 2005, the Government launched China Full-Circulation Reform to 
terminate the trading constraints and convert the non-tradable A shares into 
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freely-traded A shares. The State Council drew a blueprint for reforming the 
country’s capital markets, emphasizing the reforming firms should respect 
market rules and protect the interests of minority public shareholders.  
The reform was conducted gradually step by step as shown in Figure 6.1 
which sketches a timeline of this overwhelming reform at three levels. At 
the macroeconomic level, China listed firms were guided and directed under 
a series of policies and relevant documents released by China Government 
to practice China Full-Circulation Reform. At the group level, China listed 
firms involved were organized into groups to prepare for the reform. At the 
firm-specific level, the relevant firms listed in China should undergo a 
scheduled reform procedure. 
Notice (2005) publicised on April 29 2005 initiated the reform with 
proposed measures aiming to maintain the market stability, including 
Consideration agreed to compensate the holders of tradable share for 
estimated loss after the reform assuming a sloping downward demand curve. 
Guidelines (2005) followed to set out operational procedures for pilot firms. 
Subsequently two pilots, containing 4 and 42 firms respectively, were 
announced to take the trail reform, based on which Measures (2005) was 
stipulated and used to extend the successful trial of reform scheme and 
procedure from the experiments to the rest of firms involved. On Sep. 12
th
 
2005, the first group of 40 firms was announced to take the reform under the 
guide of Measures (2005). By the end of 2006, the last group of 32 firms 
was announced. 
For each firm, there was a procedure to gradually put the reform proposal 
into effect. The whole firm-specific process consists of two suspension 
periods. Trading of firm is firstly suspended when the initial proposal put 
forward by the holders of NTAS of a firm was announced by the board of 
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directors, together with the date of the shareholders’ meeting and the 
opinions of the recommending institution and the law firm. During the first 
suspension period, the board of directors and holders of NTAS interact with 
holders of TAS to receive comments and suggestions and form a consensus 
on the proposal. Once the agreed proposal is announced, the trading is 
resumed. Trading is suspended for the second time the next day of when 
registration starts for the shareholders’ meeting. During the second 
suspension period, the proposal is voted in the shareholders’ meeting. A 
pass is issued if the proposal wins a qualified majority of two-thirds of the 
votes from both the holders of NTAS and TAS. Trading is restarted if the 
proposal is accepted. If not, the firm needs to restart the reform in another 
around. A series of announcements for a certain event like this is not rare in 
China. For instance, the regulatory nature produces several announcement 
dates of equity offerings in China, such as board of directors meeting date, 
shareholders meeting date, CSRC approval date, and announcement to the 
public.  
Summarily, there are five interested event dates for each sample firm: the 
releases of Notice (2005), the filing of Measures (2005), the group date at 
which the name of companies were announced, and the firm-specific 1
st
 and 
2
nd
 resumption of trading. The other event dates are excluded from the study 
due to the data unavailability.  
8.1 Main Findings of the Thesis  
There are five main hypotheses for each interested event date during the 
reform: (1) Hypothesis 1 which predicts the substance in Notice (2005) 
aiming to protect minority interest offset the negative effect from the price 
pressure; (2) Hypothesis 2 which predicts the efforts made by the CSRC to 
extend the successful protection of minority interests in the pilot program to 
311 
 
the remaining firms may have a positive impact in the price behavior; (3) 
Hypothesis 3 which predicts the inclusion in the names disclosed at group 
announcement indicates self-confidence and approval from the stock 
exchanges and may have a positive impact in the price behavior; (4) 
Hypothesis 4 which predicts zero abnormal performance at the 1
st
 
resumption of trading since a mutual agreement on the reform proposal 
shouldn’t be a surprise in the market as the public investors were supposed 
to join in the negotiation; and (5) Hypothesis 5 which predicts the return at 
the 2
nd
 resumption of trading would fall by Consideration payment but the 
price-drop would be reduced in the wake of the successfully completion of 
the reform.  
The price behaviours around these five critical event dates have been 
investigated using the event-study method to see if there is any abnormal 
performance.  
8.1.1 Release of Notice (2005) 
The empirical results show that the cumulative abnormal return is not 
significant around the release of Notice (2005), consistent with Hypothesis 1, 
which also holds strongly even if examined with subsamples divided by 
listing place, share type or industry.  
Notice (2005) proposed relevant issues in line with Opinions (2004), 
published by the State Council with focuses on stability and healthy growth 
of market and protection of the lawful rights and interests of public 
investors. Particularly, Notice (2005) set out the timescale of an individual 
reform process which should include two suspension stages, one is 
negotiation stage during which the holders of TAS and NTAS confer with 
each other on the reform proposal, the other is voting stage during which the 
reform proposal on mutual agreement will be voted in the relevant 
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shareholders’ meeting. In addition, Notice (2005) granted the holders of 
TAS the equal weighted voting rights as the holders of NTAS and put on 
trading restrictions on the sale of Government shares after the reform. 
All the measures illustrated in Notice (2005) aimed to hear the voices from 
the holders of TAS and let them have the joint-decision powers on a range 
of issues regarding the reform which may hugely affect their interests. The 
findings suggest that the inspiring substance in Notice (2005) did effectively 
turn back the negative powers of the price pressure from the potential sale of 
large amounts of NTAS, which was blamed for having enormously hit 
China stock markets in the attempt by the State Council to reduce the state 
shares in June 2001.   
8.1.2 Release of Measures (2005) 
The cumulative abnormal return is positive and significant [CAR (-1,1) = 
0.03] around the release of Measures (2005), consistent with Hypothesis 2, 
which also holds strongly even if examined with subsamples divided by 
listing place, share type or industry.  
Measures (2005) decentralised decision making at the firm level, by 
allowing shareholders to bargain over the method and terms of the 
compensation. Furthermore, it safeguarded the interests of TAS holders by 
seeking no less than two thirds of the votes from the TAS owners, 
compensating them for the estimated loss due to the reform, diluted the risks 
by introducing a series of announcements dates, and prevented market 
slump by banning any sale of NTAS in the 12 months and restricting the 
issue size in the following 24 months.  
There is nothing new in Measures (2005) but it summaries the pilot program 
and uses it as a best practice to guide the reforms in the remaining firms, 
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with an aim to maintain the market stability and protect the minority 
interests. The filing of Measures (2005) reflects the determination of the 
CSRC to extend to a much broader dimension the measures which were 
proved to work efficiently to protect the minority interests in the pilot 
program. The results suggest that the public investors thought highly of this 
extension announcement and gave it a very warm welcome.        
8.1.3 Group-specific announcements 
The cumulative abnormal return is positive and significant [CAR (-1,0) = 
0.013] around the group announcements, consistent with Hypothesis 3 
which also holds strongly even if examined with subsamples divided by 
listing place, share type or industry.  
The reform process was gradual and took place in orderly groups. Each 
group-specific announcement disclosed its respective namelist of companies, 
which was decided in two steps.  
First the stock exchanges set a deadline to accept reform proposals from 
companies wishing to participate. Next the stock exchanges examined all 
the applying firms and crossed out those they thought had problems. The 
selection standards may vary with the outlook into the future, and were 
adjusted all the time.  
The selection process indicates that the companies in the name list were 
self-confident that they were well prepared for the reform, which was 
further confirmed by the stock exchanges which carried out scrutiny of the 
submitting firms and assessed the feasibilities of their proposals.  
The outcomes indicate that the public investors did get the message at the 
group announcements that the firms included in the publicised namelists not 
only had strong belief in their abilities to cope with the reform, but also had 
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survived the strict investigation by the stock exchanges, and furthermore, 
the NTAS owners of those firms were able to and ready to pay certain 
Consideration. Consequently, the combined effect led to a rising market.      
8.1.4 The first resumption of trading 
The cumulative abnormal return is positive and significant [CAR (0,1) = 
0.043] at the 1
st
 resumption of trading, rejecting Hypothesis 4 which is also 
rejected with subsamples divided by listing place, share type or industry.  
The trading in the shares of the stock was immediately suspended on the day 
when the board of directors publicised the reform proposal, including date 
of the shareholders’ meeting, a description of the reform proposal as well as 
the opinions of the recommending institution and the law firm.  
Within 10 days after the announcement, the board of directors should assist 
the owners of NTAS in adequately communicating and negotiating with the 
holder of TAS of A-share market by such approaches as hosting an investor 
symposium, a press conference or an online road show, paying a visit to 
institutional investors and issuing a consultation paper and so on. In addition, 
the board of directors of the listed company publicly should disclose its 
hotline, facsimile and e-mail address in order to widely solicit opinions from 
tradable shareholders so as to lay a broad shareholder foundation for the 
reform plan. 
If the proposal was acceptable to both parties, an announcement of 
consensus would be made and trading resumed. Once trading resumed the 
proposal couldn’t be further modified. The results disclosed with the 1st 
trading resumption should reflect a mutual agreement between the holders 
of TAS and NTAS. 
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However the significant results indicate that there were non-participating 
investors who found the proposals were more than what they expected, 
resulting in positive market reactions. In addition, the uncertainty 
surrounding the measures and the risk aversion of the investors contributed 
to this positive effect.  Of course, there is always the possibility of a 
moment of irrationality in the markets driving the shares up in price.  
8.1.5 The second resumption trading 
The abnormal return is negative and significant [AR (0) = -0.14] at the 2
nd
 
resumption of trading, but higher than the estimated abnormal return 
[EAR(0) = -0.23] if the price dropped by the size of Consideration, resulting 
in an actual premium of 0.09 which is consistent with Hypothesis 5.  
When the shareholders’ meeting was approaching as scheduled, the 
registration process started for the shareholders’ meeting. And trading was 
suspended the next day of registration for the second time.  
Then the shareholders’ meeting was held. The proposal was voted and had 
to win a majority of two thirds of votes from the TAS and NTAS owners 
respectively. The board must publicise the voting results within 2 working 
days. Trading was restarted after the shareholder meeting ratifying the 
completion of the reform. If the proposal was not approved the board should 
apply for extension of suspension from the next day of the announcement 
and prepare for a come-back plan. Only firms succeeded could resume 
trading.  
The results indicate that the price went down dramatically but less than the 
amount of Consideration to be paid, suggesting the public investors 
perceived the successful completions of reform and the settlement of the 
reform plans as encouraging news.   
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8.1.6 Some important regression results 
In addition multiple regressions are applied to examine the associations 
between the abnormal performances and the hypothesized determinants 
defined in Regression Hypotheses in Chapter 6.  
The issue size is negatively related to the market response around the 
release of Notice (2005), indicating the negative effect of the price pressure 
from the sale of non-tradable A shares. Meanwhile the agency problem 
between the majority and minority shareholders is positively related to the 
market response around the release of Notice (2005), indicating the minority 
public investors were happy about the substance in Notice (2005) aiming to 
protect their interests. The negative effect of the issue size and positive 
effect of the benefit for minority holder of tradable A shares disclosed in 
Notice (2005) seem to offset each other and coincide with Hypothesis 1.  
The agency problem between the majority and minority shareholders is 
positively related to the market reaction around the filing of Measures 
(2005), indicating the minority public holders were convinced by the 
determination of the Government to protect their interests.  
The group order is not statistically related to the market response at the 
group announcement, suggesting that the sequence of the group in which the 
firms were included didn’t affect the investors’ favorable perception of the 
selection process of firms included.  Therefore there was no significant 
learning in the market from earlier events which is perhaps a surprising 
result given evidence of earlier over payments to the tradable A 
shareholders.  
The negotiation period is negatively related to the magnitude of the market 
response at the firm-specific 1
st
 resumption of trading, indicating the 
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participation ratio of public investors, proxied by the negotiation period, is a 
key determinant of whether or not this announcement was a surprise in the 
market. Meanwhile there is no significant relationship between the 
ownership concentration and the magnitude of market response at the 1st 
resumption of trading, implying the ownership concentration didn’t affect 
the participation ratio of public investors. Also there is no significant 
relationship between the group order and the magnitude of market response 
at the 1
st
 resumption of trading, suggesting the sequence of the group in 
which the firms were included didn’t affect the extent to which the public 
investors reacted to the announcement.  
Both the Consideration size and the Consideration dummy are not 
significantly related to the market response at the 1
st
 resumption of trading, 
indicating Consideration size and types were considered fair and adequate 
by all public investors, both participating investors and non-participating 
investors. The significant and positive market reaction at the 1
st
 resumption 
of trading was not driven by Consideration size or types.  
The coefficient of Consideration size is negatively related to the market 
response at the 2
nd
 resumption of trading, indicating the price fell more if 
higher Consideration was to be paid. There is no significant relationship 
between the agency problem between the majority and minority 
shareholders and the market response at the 2
nd
 resumption of trading, 
implying that the non-participating minority investors didn’t view the 
successful completion of the reform as unexpected news.  
Overall speaking, this reform is more beneficial to firms with serious 
agency problems between the majority and minority shareholders, which 
can offset the fear of potential large sale non-tradable A shares into the 
market. The number of non-participating public investors who should 
respond to announcement of revised proposal at the 1
st
 resumption of 
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trading decreased with the negotiation period. Consideration size and type 
released at the 1
st
 resumption of trading was regarded as fair and adequate. 
At the 2
nd
 resumption trading, the Consideration size had an influential 
negative impact on the market response.  
8.2 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
The main methodology used in this thesis is the classic event-study method. 
And the reliability of my results is constrained to the accuracy of this 
method in the context of China stock markets.  A key assumption is that of 
market efficiency to guarantee that all the reaction is contained within the 
event window.  
8.2.1 The parameter estimates 
The parameters of  and   in the market model are estimated using an 
estimation period sample with ordinary least squares regression. The 
underlying assumption is that the beta estimate from the estimation period is 
stationary. However, empirical evidence shows that betas on individual 
stocks have not been stable over time (Blume 1971, Baesel 1974, Roenfeldt 
et al. 1978, Theobald 1981, Coutts et al. 1997 etc.). Shen et al. (1999) also 
found evidence that neither individual stock nor stock portfolio had a stable 
beta in China’s stock market.  
Many studies show that the beta estimate could be improved by choosing a 
relatively long estimation period (Roenfeldt et al. 1978, Theobald 1981, 
Daves et al. 2000, Xia et al. 2006 etc.) and suggest proper estimation 
periods in different contexts. But there is no consensus on how long an 
estimation period should be to get an appropriate beta estimate and in the 
literature, the choice of estimation period is arbitrary (Ball and Brown 1980, 
1985, MacKinlay 1997, Atkas 2007 etc.).  There is a trade-off in the choice 
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between a short period where there will be a statistical weakness in terms of 
lack of observations but a more likely stability in the underlying population 
beta parameter and a longer period which will reduce the variance of the 
estimator from more observations but at the expense of instability in the 
underlying beta parameter as the firm changes both business and financial 
risk.  My choice of 2-year estimation period is based on Xia et al. (2006) 
which found that China beta was stationary over an estimation period of 480 
trading days (2 years). My choice of estimation period may be subject to 
biases in Xia et al. (2006), such as the sample selected from ten years ago 
and the estimation periods tested were no more than two years. However 
Pojezny (2006) found the magnitude of the bias in abnormal returns seemed 
economically insignificant for shorter event periods but increased in event 
period length. Subsequently, my choice of no more than 3-day event period 
is short relative to 2-year estimation and may still produce robust and 
reliable results.  
Coutts et al. (1997) suggested that if event studies continued to be pursued 
in the applied finance literature, it was essential that tests of parameter 
stability were incorporated into this framework. Changes to the estimation 
period and cross-section sample employed, could be investigated, to see 
how sensitive the cumulative abnormal returns are to such changes.  
However, due to my large sample size, it seems impractical for me to 
conduct such tests company by company. Hence further research may be 
needed to test the parameter stability in China stock markets around 2005, 
which may improve the parameter estimation.  At this time the research 
design for this study has been informed by the best evidence available on 
parameter estimation. 
320 
 
8.2.2 Market index 
There is some evidence that the use of an equal weight index to compute 
market model excess returns provides a better test specification than use of a 
value weight index (Brown and Warner 1980, Campbell and Wasley 1993, 
Corrado and Truong 2008).  However, both the market indices in SHSE 
and SZSE are value-weighted average market-capitalization indices (Lee et 
al. 2001), which may lead to biased results.  Further research is called to 
take into account this problem. However this would require the construction 
of an equally weighted portfolio index which would be costly.  
8.2.3 Low R square  
There are in total 6 regression models carried out in this thesis. Except for 
Regression Model 5, the other regression models only yield no more than 5% 
R square, indicating most of the variability of the dependent variable of 
CARs has not been explained. This result of low R square is consistent with 
the similar studies on China Full-Circulation Reform (Lu 2008, Firth et al. 
2010 etc.), indicating there could be some undiscovered factors.  If there 
are other factors and if they are correlated with the explanatory factors used 
here in this study this will have a consequence for the interpretation of the 
estimated coefficients.  If however they are uncorrelated what has been 
said is robust and reliable with respect to omitted factors.   
Further research is needed to investigate whether there are more factors and 
whether they are correlated with the existing factors.  However it may well 
be that there is a large amount of unexplained variability in returns.  
8.3 An overall picture 
The unparalleled feature of ownership structures in China in which about 
two thirds of A shares were Government-owned and banned from trading, 
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and only about one third of A shares were freely-traded in SZSE and SHSE, 
can lead to divergent interests and incentive conflicts between tradable and 
non-tradable shareholders and has long been recognized as the source of 
many corporate governance problems in China (Sun and Tong 2003, Hu et 
al. 2004, Aivazian et al. 2005 and Wong 2006).   Over recent years, the 
state has undertaken a process to streamline and unify the various share 
classes. 
8.3.1 The failure of the attempted effort in 2001 
In early 2001, the central Government decided to sell its ownership of the 
listed enterprises to raise funds to replenish the newly established National 
social security fund which is a strategic reserve fund set up by the Chinese 
Government to mitigate the looming aging crisis in the country and help 
provide financial protection for the country’s pensioners. According to the 
Government strategy, the reduction of state shares should be mainly carried 
out on the assumption that the stock market could absorb what would in 
effect be very large trades without damaging the market prices and hence 
the confidence of the market participants. However the stock market 
reaction to this initial attempt was a market plummet, which lasted for quite 
a long period, indicating the confidence of investors in the A-share market 
was damaged severely in the short-run and failed to recover even in the 
long-run. This plan was therefore scrapped in 2002.  
8.3.2 The lessons learnt  
Many researchers, Wong (2006), Kim et al. (2003) and De Jonge (2008), 
attributed the market slump to dilution effect in the tradable A-share market, 
which feared it would be flooded with these state shares, in general twice as 
much as the tradable A shares.  This attribution was the exact opposite to 
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the government assumption about the ability of the stock markets to absorb 
such large trades.  
The attempted effort in 2001 planned to sell the state-shares no more than 
10% of the proceeds of IPOs (of companies to be listed) and Post-IPO 
issuances (of listed companies), which was very ambiguous. Green (2003) 
pointed out the June 2001 scheme failed to lay down reliable guidelines for 
when, and in what quantities, state shares would be sold.    
Moreover, Beltratti and Bortolotti (2006) stated that the 1
st
 attempt failed 
badly in 2001 because in an official release an equal pricing for TAS and 
NTAS was to be adopted. According to Chen and Xiong (2001), the 
government was ignoring the evidence that NTAS were priced at a discount 
of 70%-80% of the price of TAS in the informal markets. Equal pricing, 
therefore, was suspicious of transferring wealth from the private investors to 
the Government (the holders of NTAS).  
The minority TAS investors, though only possessed relatively one third of 
the total shares outstanding in the listed firms, dominated the tradable 
A-share market. The attempted effort in 2001 to float state shares in 
majority to the tradable A-share market agitated the investors, indicating 
that a premise to carry on the reform of reducing state ownership is to take 
into account the interests of the private investors namely the holders of TAS, 
to communicate with them effectively and to make compromise if 
necessary.  
Accordingly, the Government gradually took some steps to improve the 
situation the TAS investors were in.  
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The CSRC promulgated a mandatory Code (2002) which permitted proxy 
voting and cumulative voting methods to protect the rights of minority 
shareholders.  
The CSRC issued Provisions (2004), which regulated that listed companies’ 
major business decisions, such as asset restructuring and equity-for-debt 
plan, should win majority votes (more than one half) from voting holders of 
public shareholders in the general shareholders meeting. Given China’s vast 
territory and dispersed geographic location of investors, it is often difficult 
for many investors to attend shareholders meetings in person. Therefore, the 
Provisions require listed companies to provide online voting platforms for 
shareholders’ meeting. Listed companies must also actively pursue a system 
of cumulative voting when electing directors and supervisors which fully 
takes into account the opinions of minority shareholders.   
The State Council issued Opinions (2004) which indicated two things: (1) 
the Government was still hoping to reduce the state shares in the listed 
companies since the NTAS constituted a major hurdle for domestic financial 
development; and (2) the market slump following the initial attempt was so 
impressive that the Government was determined to prevent the reoccurrence 
of market depression in a next attempt. The Government decided to 
concentrate on protecting the interests of holders of TAS so that they 
wouldn’t feel unsure and keep selling shares if the Government was about to 
announce to reduce state shares.  
8.3.3 The China Full-Circulation Reform 
China Full-Circulation Reform has learnt from previous experiences and set 
up a scheme to protect minority interests. In general, it had four main 
features. 
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• The CSRC didn’t impose a one-size-fits-all solution and instead allowed 
companies to come up with proposals of their own. In other words, the 
companies decided for themselves what was the best solution given their 
particular shareholder structure financial situation. By eliciting a wide 
range of responses, such an approach should also reduce the risk of the 
market moving in one direction in response to a one-size-fits-all solution, 
as happened on the previous occasion.  
• Reform proposals were accepted or rejected on a two-thirds majority of 
those taking part in an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting, and the 
procedure was the same as that for a special resolution on important 
matters such as mergers, demergers and amendments to a company’s 
articles of incorporation.  
Votes were no longer put to all the shareholders together. No less than 
two-thirds of votes from the TAS owners must be sought separately so 
that the TAS owners won’t be outvoted. As previously mentioned in 
Provisions (2004) issued, the CSRC adopted this classified voting 
system in December 2004 for resolutions on important issues such as 
rights issues and important asset transactions in order to safeguard the 
rights of the owners of TAS. 
• The reform announcements were expanded into two suspension periods, 
defined by a series of four critical event dates, 1
st
 suspension and 
resumption and 2
nd
 suspension and resumption. The event information 
was released step by step on the four event dates and thus distributed the 
price effect and volatilities between the event dates. Furthermore, the 
market response around the previous event date might help to adjust the 
details to be released next. Consequently this arrangement protected the 
interests of minority TAS by diluting the risk and negative market 
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impact as well as leaving room for the NTAS owners to adjust to 
improve the market reactions. 
• This program also sought to avoid a situation where a sudden and 
massive release of share onto the market upsets the demand-supply 
balance. In particular, a 12 month lockup period was established for the 
holders of NTAS. Furthermore, in the two years after the expiration of 
the lock-up, a holder of NTAS with more than 5% of the total issued 
share capital of the listed company is further prohibited from trading on 
the stock exchange more than 5% (10%) of the company’s total share 
capital within 12 (24) months. The minority TAS holders were thus 
protected from the shock of large-scale sale in the A-share markets.  
The insignificant CAR at the release of Notice (2005), the first noticeable 
announcement day during the reform, suggests that the intention to protect 
the minority interests, as illustrated above, offset the negative influence of 
the potential large sale of NTAS.  
The significant and positive CAR at the release of Measures (2005), 
indicates that the announcement to extend the protection of minority 
interests to the remaining firms earned the public investors confidence in the 
market, especially when compared to the market crash in the failed attempt 
in 2001due to the lack of confidence in the market.   
The extraordinarily positive CAR at the group-announcements implies that 
the firms taking initiative to reform on the basis of protecting the minority 
interests under the monitoring by the stock exchanges provoked market 
uprising again. 
The significantly positive CAR at the 1
st
 resumption of trading when the 
revised reform proposal was released on the basis of negotiation between 
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the holders of NTAS and TAS suggests that the non-participating investors 
were satisfied with the specifics out of the discussion to protect their 
interests.  
The aggressive premium at the 2
nd
 resumption of trading after adjusting 
back the Consideration payment indicates that the implementation of 
protecting minority interests implied in the successful completion of reform 
in reality strongly boosting the market.  
To sum, the measures and the procedure taken by the Government to protect 
the minority interests in China Full-Circulation Reform effectively sort out 
the issue of potential market slump observed in the attempted effort to 
reduce the state shares in 2001. And the main objective of maintaining the 
market stability while floating the NTAS has been successfully achieved, 
according the empirical results.  
8.4 Contributions 
There are only a few papers investigating the market response to China 
Full-Circulation Reform (Beltratti and Bortololli 2006, Lu et al. 2008, Ren 
et al. 2009 and Firth et al. 2010). None of them looked at the reform as a 
continuous story. Instead, they were cherry-picking on the event dates. For 
instance, they were commonly interested in the first resumption day but 
always missed the second resumption day. Although Beltratti and Bortololli 
(2006) studied four firm-specific dates (1
st
 suspension and 1
st
 resumption as 
well as 2
nd
 suspension and 2
nd
 resumption), they ignored macro event dates, 
such as the release of Notice (2005) and Measures (2005). A partial analysis 
due to this preference of dates may lead to biased conclusions. In this thesis, 
all event dates relevant to the reform are investigated intensively and linked 
together. Each chain contributes to a part of a continuous story about the 
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reform and reveals how the reform was carried out step by step cautiously 
by the Government.  
Since the very start of the China economic reform, the Government has been 
playing an important role throughout. The China-marked gradual cautious 
approach, observed throughout the economic reform (Sinchen 1997 and 
Wong 2006), was praised by many researchers as one of the key reasons for 
China’s success (Sinchen 1997). Kazakevitch et al. (2005) argued that 
China reform was gradual in macroeconomic sphere but sharp in the 
microeconomic sphere in terms of “the boldness of the reforms and the 
rapidity of the changes China has made in moving to a market economy, 
which has exceeded that attempted in most countries”. My thesis also 
contributes to this line of literature by supporting with new evidence in 
China Full-Circulation Reform, which was completed successfully using a 
gradual cautious approach in macroeconomic sphere together with the 
“boldness” and “rapidity” in microeconomic sphere. The reform was 
carefully guided by the official document releases, experimented with the 
pilot program, and then extended to the majority firms group by group. At 
the firm-level, each reforming firm was gradually implemented through two 
suspension stages. At the same time, a majority of China listed firm with 
non-tradable shares successfully completed the reform over two years’ time. 
By the end of 2007, 1,254 firms were successfully restructured, representing 
over 97% of the market capitalization at the time.  
Thirdly the previous papers applied the event-study method somewhat 
arbitrarily and lacked a convincing and plausible illustration of the 
application in the context of China stock markets, which weakens the power 
of their results and conclusion. In this thesis, the process of conducting an 
event-study on China FCR has been reasonably explained and justified, 
which outperforms all the previous papers.  
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Most importantly, the results show that this reform was very successful in 
terms of maintaining and developing the China stock markets. The 
implication is China government learned lessons from their first failure in 
the attempt to sell NTAS in 2001. The government realised the minority 
TAS owners were seriously unhappy about the flotation of the NTAS as 
they feared their interests in the markets would be damaged severely due to 
the enormous dilution effect from the selling of NTAS almost twice the size 
of TAS. The minority owners, although less powerful in making decisions, 
were the major players in the China stock markets as the NTAS were not 
allowed to trade. In order to avoid the anticipated loss, the TAS owners 
began to sell their shares quickly after the government announcement to sell 
NTAS. As a result, the China stock markets shrank 40 percent in a very 
short time which was quite a shock to the government because the western 
markets, like US and UK markets, outperformed China stock markets even 
if they suffered from the 9-11 attack around that time. And this miserable 
situation persisted till the Government had to scrap the program. But the 
China stock markets didn’t recover full to the original level, indicating the 
investors were still suspicious and aware of this danger hanging around. 
Therefore the China government improved their approaches in 2005. They 
showed they cared about the minority TAS owners and protected their 
interests. The government issued documents nine months before to enhance 
the voting power of TAS owners. Any essential company decision wouldn’t 
be approved without winning the majority votes from the TAS owners. 
They put restrictions on selling the NTAS in three years after the reform. 
Most distinctively, the government paid the TAS owners either in cash or 
shares or zero-premium warrants for their ownership in the listed companies. 
According to the results, the adjusted total payment made by the 
government was worth up to 22 percent of the TAS held. The stock markets 
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actually gained 9 percent overall after the reform. Obviously the China 
government was willing to pay to keep and develop the stock markets and 
was satisfied this goal was achieved very successfully as well. This practice, 
the Full Circulation Reform, was introducing ideas that a government, 
performing at the macro level, should not focus on profits and figures only. 
They need to think in a much broader context and consider the long-run 
interests, even if it means they may have to sacrifice some short-term 
interests to achieve that. Apparently, the China government evaluated the 
Full Circulation Reform not in a way how much profits could be made out 
of the practice but whether it would bring healthier and more prosperous 
stock markets in the future. They locate their interests in the potentials of 
the stock markets in the long run rather than the short-term profits at that 
moment. This is a lesson can be delivered to the next leadership in China 
and in other countries when they want to take similar actions to sell large 
amount of restricted shares in the stock markets. Furthermore, in the context 
of financial crisis or any macro-level financial difficulties, this is a lesson to 
be spread onto the governments all over the world. Calculating profits 
would be the last thing a government should do in a scenario like this. 
Reducing the damage to the minimum, getting the problems sorted out, and 
maintaining the markets and the society, should be prioritised, even at a 
huge cost of the government. Otherwise, things may get worse and worse 
due to the snowball effect and go out of control and eventually the 
government and the whole country would end up with paying much more to 
correct the mistake and solve the problem. This practice taken by the China 
government in 2005 is very meaningful to the other countries in similar 
difficulties.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1 
The State Council announced the "Provisional Measures on Management 
over the Reduction of State Shares to Raise the Social-security Fund," on 
June 12th, 2001.The full text is as follows: 
   Article 1: These measures are made in a bid to perfect the social-security 
system, open new fundraising channels for the social-security fund and 
support the reform and development of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
   Article 2: The "reduction of state shares" (including state-owned shares 
and state-owned corporation shares, the same below) mentioned in these 
measures refers to any action that transfers the state shares in listed 
companies (including companies to be listed, the same below) to the public 
and public investors like securities-investment funds. 
   Article 3: The State Council exercises in a unified manner the ownership 
over state shares on behalf of the state. 
   "Representative units authorized by state shareholders" in these 
measures refers to units that are authorized to represent the state to hold 
state shares in listed companies, in accordance with the principle that state 
assets "are owned by the state, managed at different levels and operated with 
authorization." 
   Article 4: Funds raised through reducing state shares shall be turned 
over to the Council of the National Social-security Fund for management. 
Specific management measures shall be made separately by the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF), which will be implemented upon approval by the State 
Council. 
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   Article 5: The reduction of state shares is mainly carried out through 
issuing the stocked state shares. When joint-stock limited companies with 
state shares (including companies listed overseas) launch initial public 
offerings (IPOs) and issue additional stocks, they shall sell state shares, up 
to 10 percent of the total funds to be raised. If a joint-stock limited company 
has been established for less than three years, the state shares to be sold 
shall be transferred to the Council of the National of Social-security Fund. 
The council will then authorize the company to sell the shares at one time or 
over several times when it publicly raises capital by floating stocks. 
Revenue from the selling of stocked state shares shall all be turned over to 
the National Social-security Fund. 
   Article 6: The reduction of state shares shall on principle adopt the 
method of market pricing. 
   Article 7: The reduction of state shares shall be examined, approved and 
implemented by the Inter-ministry Joint Conference. The MOF shall be 
responsible for the convention of the Inter-ministry Joint Conference. The 
State Development Planning Commission (SDPC), the State Economic and 
Trade Commission (SETC), the Ministry of Labor and Social Security 
(MOLSS), the China Securities Regulatory Commission (THE CSRC) and 
the Council of the National Social-security Fund are members of the 
Inter-ministry Joint Conference. The conference is mainly responsible for 
working out the fundraising plan and pricing principle in relation to the 
reduction of state shares. It also studies and solves other major problems 
related to the reduction of state shares for fund raising. 
   Article 8: The office of the Inter-ministry Joint Conference, which is set 
in the MOF, undertakes specific matters related to the Joint Conference. 
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   Article 9: For those the Inter-ministry Joint Conference has decided to 
reduce state shares, the representative units authorized by state shareholders 
need to provide the following documents: 
   1. Prospectus (draft) for the reduction of state shares and underwriting 
agreement; 
   2. Written commitment of the representative unit authorized by state 
shareholders and the lead underwriter on turning over the revenue from the 
reduction of state shares; and 
   3. Other documents required by the Inter-ministry Joint Conference. 
   Article 10: The CSRC is responsible for making rules for the 
information disclosure and market regulations concerning the reduction of 
state shares in listed companies. 
   Article 11: The National Social-security Fund shall be established, 
together with a council. 
   The National Social-security Fund is composed of cash realized from 
the reduction of state shares, the budgetary allocation by the central finance 
and funds raised through other channels. The Council of the National 
Social-security Fund assumes the following main responsibilities: 
   1. To manage funds from the reduction of state shares, funds allocated 
by the central finance and funds raised through other channels; 
   2. To allocate funds in accordance with the instructions and methods 
jointly determined by the MOF and the MOLSS; 
   3. To select and authorize domestic and overseas professional 
investment management institutions to operate the funds so as to preserve 
and increase their value; 
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   4. To publicise the financial status of the National Social-security Fund 
regarding assets, earnings and cash flow; and 
   5. To undertake other tasks assigned by the State Council. 
   Article 12: The lead underwriter shall be responsible for turning over the 
revenue payable from the issuance of stocked state shares to the designated 
item set by the budget of the MOF within two days after obtaining the 
revenue. The MOF shall allocate the funds to the Council of the National 
Social-security Fund within five days and undergo formalities for verifying 
the reduction of state-owned capital in related units. 
   Article 13: The professional investment management institution 
authorized to operate the fund must report regularly to the Council of the 
National Social-security Fund on the operations and performances. The 
Council of the National Social-security Fund shall then disclose the 
information to the public and accept supervision. 
   Article 14: The Inter-ministry Joint Conference may, according to the 
needs of the social-security fund and the development of the securities 
market, select a few listed companies for the trial of state share placement 
and oriented repurchase, while adopting the method of issuing the stocked 
state shares. The trial plan shall be subject to the deliberation of the 
Inter-ministry Joint Conference and submitted to the State Council for 
approval before being implemented. 
   Article 15: After these measures are implemented, the transfer by 
agreement of the state shares in listed companies, including the transfer by 
agreement of the state shares held by non-initiators, shall be verified by the 
MOF. In case the state stock ownership is reduced as a result of the transfer 
by agreement, the representative unit authorized by state shareholders shall 
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turn over a certain portion of the revenue from the transfer to the National 
Social-security Fund. Specific proportion and operation methods are made 
by the Inter-ministry Joint Conference and submitted to the State Council 
for approval before being implemented. The securities registrar handles 
formalities related to the transfer of stock ownership according to the 
official and written reply of the MOF. 
   When a representative unit authorized by state shareholders uses state 
shares of a listed company for bank loans or as pledge for issuing corporate 
bonds, the amount shall be no more than 50 percent of the total state shares 
in the listed company. Details for the management shall be made by the 
MOF. 
   Article 16: These measures are effective as of the date of promulgation. 
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Appendix 2 
Some Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the Reform, Opening and 
Steady Growth of Capital Markets (31
st
 Jan 2004) 
The people’s Governments of all provinces, autonomous regions, and 
municipalities directly under the Central Government, all ministries and 
commissions of the State Council, and all agencies under the direct control 
of the State Council: Since the issuance of the “Notice of the State Council 
on Further Enhancing the Macro-control of the Securities Market” (Guo Fa 
[1992] No.68), China’s capital market has embraced rapid growth and 
reaped stunning achievement. With scale-forming on a preliminary basis, 
continuous improvement of the market infrastructure, gradual perfection of 
the legal system, and further upgrading of the market standardization, 
China’s capital market has become an important component of the socialist 
market economy by contributing greatly to the reform and development of 
state-owned enterprises and the financial market, to the optimization of 
resources allocation and to the promotion of economic restructuring and 
growth. In order to vigorously promote the reform, opening up and steady 
growth of the capital market by implementing the guidelines laid down by 
the 16th National Congress and the 3rd Plenary Session of the 16th Central 
Committee of the CPC and by aiming at the strategic target of building a 
well-off society in an all-round way, the opinions are hereby put forward as 
follows: 
I. Fully Understanding the Importance of Developing the Capital Market 
Developing the capital market is a task of strategic importance to the 
strategic target of quadrupling the national economy within the first two 
decades of this century. First, it will perfect the socialist market economy 
system, bring into fuller play the role of the capital market in optimizing 
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resources allocation, and successfully turn the social funds into long-term 
investment. Second, it will facilitate the structural adjustment and strategic 
reorganization of national economy and enhancement of non-state economy 
development. Third, it will improve the direct financing proportions, perfect 
and uplift the structure and efficiency of the financial market, and safeguard 
the finance security. 
China’s capital market has been developing step by step with the course of 
economic system reform. Due to the inappropriate reform and limitations in 
the system design in the preliminary stage of establishment, there still exist 
some deep-seated problems and structural inconsistency in China’s capital 
market, which restricts its effective functions. These problems arise from 
the development of the capital market, and only can be worked out in the 
course of development. The strategic goal of building a well-off society in 
an all-round way brought forward by the 16th National Congress and the 
“Decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on 
Some Issues of Improving the Socialist Market Economy” approved at the 
3rd Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the CPC have made 
deployment to the development of China’s capital market, and clarified the 
orientation towards its reform, opening up and steady growth. We should 
eye the situation clearly, seize opportunities and change concepts, thus 
vigorously developing the capital market, increasing the direct financing 
proportions, creating and cultivating a friendly investment environment, 
bringing into full function exertion of the capital market in pushing the of 
capital formation, optimizing the resources allocation, improving the 
adjustment to economic structure and perfecting companies’ governance 
structure, all of which will make a brand-new contribution to the continuous, 
speedy, coordinated and healthy development of national economy and 
building of a well-off society in an all-round way; 
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II. The Guidelines for and Tasks of Promoting the Reform, Opening and 
Steady Growth of the Capital Market 
Guiding ideologies that promote the reform, opening up and steady growth 
of the capital market are as follows: carrying forward the spirit of the 16th 
National Congress and the 3rd Plenary Session of the 16th Central 
Committee of the CPC in an all-round way with the guidance of Deng 
Xiaoping Theory and the important thought of “Three Represents”, 
complying with the principles of “openness, fairness and justice” and 
guidelines of “law, regulation, self-discipline and standardization”, 
persisting in serving the national economy and achieving the coordinative 
development between the capital market and the national economy; insisting 
on regulating the market in accordance with the law, safeguarding the 
legitimate rights and interest of investors, especially those of public 
investors; adhering to market-oriented reform in the capital market, and 
giving full play to the market mechanism; keeping to the uniformity of 
reform momentum, development speed and market endurance, and striking 
a balance among reform, development and stability; insisting on solving 
problems cropping up on our way forward through development, and 
achieving a harmony between speedy development of the capital market and 
protecting against the market risks; and upholding the principle of 
progressiveness and the continuous upgrading of opening to the outside 
world. 
Tasks of promoting the reform, opening up and steady growth of the capital 
market are as follows: building the transparent and efficient capital market 
featuring a rational structure， a sound mechanism， perfect functions and 
safe operations while aiming at the goal of expanding direct financing, 
consummating the modern market system as well as bringing into play the 
basic role of market in resources allocation to a greater extent. Centered on 
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this goal, we should establish an efficient capital market system in helping 
enterprises of various types raise funds and in satisfying diverse investment 
needs. We must perfect market-oriented product innovative mechanism, and 
form a harmonious product structure of capital market between price 
discovery and risk management also share financing and bonds financing. 
We must foster listed companies and market intermediaries with honesty 
and trustworthiness, standardized operation and sound governance system, 
and strengthen the mechanism for restraint of market players and survival of 
the fittest. We must consummate the market regulatory system with clear 
duty location, effective risk control and in-place coordination to protect the 
legitimate rights and interests of investors; 
III. Further Improving Relevant Policies to Promote the Stable Development 
of Capital Market 
Appropriate policy guidance and support are a must for the steady growth of 
capital markets. And all the departments should further improve relevant 
policies to create a friendly environment for the stable development of 
capital market. 
The approval system for the issuance and listing of securities must be 
improved. We should consummate the mechanism under which high quality 
enterprises of all types can utilize capital markets on an equal footing, thus 
improving the efficiency for resources allocation. 
Investment returns on the capital market must be highlighted. We should 
take practical measures to reverse the situation in which some listed 
companies focus excessively on listing and fund raising while paying 
inadequate attention to restructuring and investment returns, and enhance 
the overall quality of listed companies to provide good opportunity for 
investors to share the fruits of economic growth and increase their wealth. 
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Qualified capital shall be encouraged to enter into the market. We should 
continuously develop the securities investment funds, support the 
multi-form direct investment of insurance funds in the capital market, and 
gradually improve the proportions of funds invested into the capital market 
including the social security funds, enterprise supplementary pension funds 
and commercial insurance funds. Besides, we should cultivate a group of 
honest, law-abiding and professional institutional investors, and make the 
institutional investors mainly composed of fund management companies 
and insurance companies the leading force in the capital market. 
Financing channels of securities companies must be expanded. We should 
continuously support qualified securities companies in public issuance of 
shares or bonds to raise long-term funds, perfect the management methods 
of pledge loans of securities companies and their entry into the inter-bank 
market, formulate the examination and approval standards for securities 
companies’ M & A and loans of securities underwriting business, as well as 
create favorable conditions for securities companies to utilize loan facility 
funds under a sound risk control mechanism. In addition, the financing pilot 
of fund management companies should also be carried out steadily. 
The problems in the equity division must be settled vigorously and steadily. 
We should standardize the transfer of non-floating shares of listed 
companies, thus preventing loss of state-owned assets. Additionally, we 
should steadily solve the distribution of untradeable shares of listed 
company at present. While steadily making tradable the presently 
untradeable shares of listed companies, we should respect the law of market, 
maintain the stability and growth of the market, and effectively protect the 
lawful rights and interests of investors or individual investors in particular.  
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The tax policies of the capital market must be refined. We should study and 
formulate taxation policies encouraging more investments from public 
investors, consummate the administrative measures for the collection of 
turnover tax and income tax on securities and futures companies, as well as 
implement centralized collection and administration of income tax towards 
qualified securities and futures companies; 
IV. Consummating the Capital Market System and Diversifying the 
Varieties of Securities Products 
A multi-level system of stock market must be established. Based on the 
rational layout and functional localization of the capital market, we should 
establish a multi-level system of capital market to meet every need of 
financing for various enterprises step by step, work out the corresponding 
conditions for securities’ issuance and listing as well as establish a 
supporting company selection mechanism. Moreover, we should 
continuously standardize and develop the main board market, improve the 
structure of listed companies in the main board market, push the 
construction of growth enterprise market in phases, perfect the mechanism 
for venture capital investments, open new channels for financing of small 
and medium-sized enterprises as well as probe into and consummate the 
shares transfer system under unified regulation. 
The bonds market must be developed in a positive and reliable manner. 
Under the precondition of strict risk-control, we should encourage the 
qualified enterprises to raised funds through issuance of corporate bonds in 
order to reverse the sluggish growth of bonds financing and diversify 
products on the securities market and promote the coordinative development 
of the capital market. Besides, we should formulate and perfect the 
company’s rules and regulations regarding the corporate bonds issuance, 
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transactions, information disclosure and credit rating, etc., and establish and 
improve the secured loan repayment mechanism including assets mortgage 
and credit guarantee, and gradually build a bond market with concentrated 
regulation and integration. 
The futures market must be developed steadily. Under the precondition of 
strict risk-control, we should introduce commodity futures products to 
provide the functions of price discovery and hedging for producers and 
consumers of bulk commodities.  
The market-oriented products innovation mechanism must be established. 
We should study and develop new varieties and their derivatives related to 
shares and bonds. In addition, we should enhance the development of fixed 
income securities products of low risk, provide investors investment with 
deposit-replacing securities products, and vigorously grope for and develop 
variety of assets securitization; 
V. Further Improving the Quality of Listed Companies and Promoting the 
Standardized Operation of Listed Companies 
The quality of listed companies must be upgraded. The quality of listed 
companies stands for the headspring of its investment value in the securities 
market. Directors and senior management of listed companies should regard 
the optimization of stockholders' interests and sustained improvement of 
profitability as the starting point and final goal, further perfect the 
management system of shares issuance, advocate the sponsor system for 
securities issuance and listing, support companies with strong 
competitiveness, standardized operation and good returns to go public, and 
improve their quality at root. We should also encourage listed companies to 
conduct market-oriented merger, acquisition or restructuring propitious to 
the company’s sustainable development, consummate the re-financing 
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policy as well as support the superior listed companies to speed up their 
development and grow stronger by utilizing the capital market.  
The operation of listed companies must be standardized. We should perfect 
the legal-person governance structure of listed companies, form the 
check-and-balance system among the authority organ, decision-making 
organ, supervisory organ and the management in compliance with 
requirements of modern enterprise system. Moreover, we should strengthen 
the credibility and responsibility of directors and senior management, 
further improve the independent director system, standardize the behavior of 
controlling shareholders, and prosecute controlling shareholders for 
damaging the interest of listed companies and minority shareholders. 
Additionally, we should reinforce the responsibilities of listed companies 
and other obligors of information disclosure, ensure the trueness, accuracy, 
completeness, timeliness of information disclosure, as well as set up and 
perfect incentive and restraint mechanisms for the senior management of 
listed companies.  
The market exit mechanism must be improved. We should take effective 
measures and take the construction of a multi-level market system into 
consideration to further improve the market exit mechanism. While 
implementing the survival of the fittest in listed companies, we should also 
set up the mechanism of responsibility investigation on derelict members of 
senior management in delisted companies, and safeguard the legitimate 
rights and interest of investors; 
VI. Promoting the Regulated Development of Intermediary Institutions on 
Capital Market and Upgrading their Practicing Level 
Securities and futures companies must be built into competitive modern 
financial enterprises. Conforming to the principle of prudential supervision, 
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we should perfect the market access system of securities and futures 
companies, urge them to improve the governance structure, standardize the 
behavior of their shareholders as well strengthen the credibility and 
responsibility of the directorate and executives. Moreover, we should 
innovate the management system of transaction and settlement capital of 
securities and futures clients, study and perfect the depository system of 
clients’ transaction and settlement capital, strictly prohibit the appropriation 
of clients’ assets, and protect the legitimate rights and interest of investors. 
Besides, securities and futures companies should consummate the internal 
control mechanism, and reinforce the centralized management over their 
branches. And we should also improve the risk-monitoring indicator system 
centralized on net capital, urge securities and futures companies to carry out 
stable financial policies, encourage them to be better and stronger by way of 
merger & restructuring and optimization & integration as well as set up and 
amplify their exit mechanisms. 
The administration of other intermediaries must be enhanced. We should 
standardize the development of securities & futures investment consultation 
organization and securities credit rating organization, strengthen the 
administration of accounting firms, law firms and assets evaluation  
institutions, thus upgrading the level of professional service of 
intermediaries; 
VII. Enhancing the Construction of Legal and Credit Systems and 
Improving the Supervision of Capital Market 
The legislation system of the capital market must be improved, and the 
credit building must be enhanced. In compliance with the overall 
deployment for developing the capital market, we should consummate the 
legislation system which is propitious to the steady development of the 
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capital market and protection of investors’ rights and interests, clear the 
administrative regulations, local laws and regulations, department rules and 
policy documents that frustrate the market development as well as 
vigorously create a positive legislation environment for developing the 
capital market. Furthermore, on the basis of requirements for perfecting the 
social credit system of the modern market economy, we should formulate 
the integrity criterion of the capital market, maintain the integrity order, and 
impose the banning of market access on organizations and individuals in 
serious violation of laws and regulations or in serious loss of 
trustworthiness. 
The law-based administration must be promoted, and the supervision over 
the capital market must be reinforced. In accordance with requirements for 
deepening the reform of administrative approval system and implementing 
the “Administrative License Law”, we should improve the quality and law 
enforcement level of law executors, set up regulatory concepts advancing 
with the times, institute and perfect a regulatory approach adaptable to the 
development of capital market, consummate the regulatory approaches as 
well as enhance the regulatory efficiency. Besides, we should further 
reinforce the regulatory organ, integrate regulatory resources and cultivate a 
regulatory team with superior political and professional qualities. Through 
the effective market regulation, we should also endeavor to promote the 
fairness, transparency and efficiency of the market, reduce its system risks 
and guarantee the legitimate rights and interests of market participants. 
The role of self-disciplines and media supervision must be brought into full 
play. We should bring the self-disciplines of trade associations including the 
securities & futures exchanges, depository and clearing companies, 
securities & futures associations, lawyers, accountants and assets 
assessment institutions into play. In addition, the publicity and regulation 
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over the securities & futures market by news media should also be guided 
and reinforced; 
VIII. Strengthening the Coordination and Cooperation, and Preventing and 
Reducing Market Risks 
A friendly environment for development of the capital market must be 
created. The risk prevention of capital market has respect to the country’s 
financial security and healthy development of the national economy. All 
regions and departments should show their concerns about and support the 
standardized development of capital market; they should give full 
consideration to the sensitivity, complexity and particularity of the capital 
market when policies and measures related to the capital market are 
promulgated, and establish a coordinative and cooperative mechanism with 
shares information, easy communication and clear duties to create a 
favorable environment and conditions for the steady development of the 
market.   
Market risks must be prevented and defused with common efforts. All 
regions and departments should implement their duties provisioned in 
relevant laws and regulations including the “Company Law”, adopt 
effective measures to prevent and timely correct behaviors of initiator’s 
feigned contribution and appropriation of listed companies’ assets by major 
shareholders or actual controller; all regions and relevant authorities should 
strengthen their administration over delisted companies according to laws, 
ensure a smooth delisting. Concerning the securities & futures companies 
that must withdraw from the capital market or be imposed on other 
administrative measures due to their significant operating risk, authorities 
including the local people's Governments, financial regulatory departments, 
police and judicial departments should enhance the coordination and 
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cooperation, take active and effective approaches to make a good job in risk 
handling in terms of the provisions in laws and regulations and relevant 
policies, and establish the rapid response mechanism dealing with 
emergency in the capital market and permanent mechanism preventing and 
reducing risks.   
Illegal activities in the securities & futures market shall be subject to harsh 
crackdown. All regions should implement relevant documents of rectifying 
and standardizing the economic order of the market outlined by the State 
Council, and strictly prohibit the illegal issuance of securities, illegal 
establishment of securities & futures operating agencies, illegal 
commissioned purchase and sale of securities & futures, illegal or disguised 
establishment of securities & futures exchanges and other illegal activities 
related to securities & futures in the local area. Government sectors 
including the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Public Security, the 
Ministry of Audit and the Ministry of Industry and Commerce and the 
state-owned assets supervision and administration institution should 
enhance the coordination and cooperation, intensify the crackdown to 
maintain the order of the capital market. 
IX. Conscientiously Summing Up Experiences, and Actively and Steadily 
Promoting Opening Up 
China will strictly fulfill its promises about the opening up of securities 
services industry when entering into the WTO. We should encourage 
qualified overseas securities agencies to take a stake in securities companies 
or fund management companies as well as continuously implement the 
tentative mechanism of qualified overseas institutional investors.  
The overseas capital markets should be vigorously utilized. Conforming to 
the market discipline and international practices, qualified domestic 
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enterprises are encouraged to conduct overseas securities issuance and 
listing, and qualified domestic institutions also individuals are encouraged 
to engage in overseas capital market investment-related service and hedging 
business. We should conscientiously work out a system for qualified 
domestic institutional investors. 
The exchange and operation should be strengthened. We should carry out 
the arrangement for a much closer operation on economy and trade with 
Hong Kong and Macao, and further intensify the contact and operation with 
relevant international organization and overseas securities regulatory 
agencies.  
Vigorous development of the capital market is a decision of great 
importance made by the CPC Central Committee and the State Council from 
an overall and strategic perspective. All regions and departments should 
attach great importance to it, set up overall point of view, fully understand 
the significance of developing the capital market, firm the confidence, seize 
opportunities and make innovation, thus jointly creating positive conditions 
for the development of capital market, actively promoting the reform, 
opening up and steady development of China’s capital market, and making 
great contributions to the ambitious goal of building a moderately 
prosperous society in an all-round way.  
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Appendix 3 
Regulations on strengthening protection of public shareholders 
The CSRC has adopted Regulations on strengthening protection of public 
shareholders' rights and interests, which came into effect on 7 December 
2004. 
The regulations will not apply in the case of shareholder resolutions adopted 
and announced prior to the release of the regulations. However, the 
regulations will apply where companies have issued notices on shareholders' 
meetings but the relevant shareholders' meetings have not yet been held. 
The main aspects of the regulations are as follows: 
    * listed companies must implement public shareholder voting systems 
for major issues; the following actions require to be approved by more than 
one half of voting public shareholders at a shareholders meeting: 
         1. additional offerings, convertible bonds issues and right issues, 
         2. major asset restructuring, where the assets premium reaches or 
exceeds 20% of the net audited book value of assets purchased, 
         3. where a shareholder proposes to repay debts owed to a listed 
company with stock rights, 
         4. where a company affiliated to a listed company (and which is 
"significant" to the listed company's operations) makes an IPO overseas, 
         5. other events that have a significant impact on the interests of 
public shareholders;  
    * when holding shareholders' meetings, a listed company must provide 
an online voting platform in addition to voting at the meeting (spot voting); 
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listed companies must also actively pursue a system of cumulative voting 
when electing directors and supervisors which fully takes into account the 
opinions of minority shareholders; 
    * for events that have significant impact on public shareholders' 
interests, the regulations require listed companies to re-announce notices of 
the relevant shareholders' meetings within three days after the date of 
confirming all shareholders' identities for the purposes of the vote (the share 
right recording date); 
    * when declaring resolutions passed at shareholders' meetings, listed 
companies must set out the number of public shareholders who have 
participated in the vote, the number of shares held by them and the 
proportion of total tradable shares represented by those shares; companies 
must also announce how the ten largest shareholders voted; 
    * the regulations also aim to improved the independent director system; 
in particular, independent directors will have special duties in relation to 
connected transactions and the employment of accounting, auditing and 
consulting firms; 
    * the regulations aim at the strengthening of investor relations 
management, and the enhancement of disclosures by listed companies; 
company secretaries will be responsible for companies' investor relation 
management; 
    * listed companies must adopt active profit distribution methods and 
prescribe such methods in their articles of association; companies which 
have not distributed cash dividends in the previous three years will not be 
permitted to launch additional offerings, convertible bonds issues or rights 
issues; 
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    * under the regulations, controlling shareholders (whether direct or 
indirect) may not illegally use the capital of listed companies or provide 
guarantees for affiliated parties; in addition, they may not use affiliated 
transactions, profit distributions, asset restructurings or investments to 
damage legal rights and interests of shareholders; 
* the regulations require senior management of listed companies to 
faithfully perform their duties and safeguard the interests of the companies 
and all shareholders  
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